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ABSTRACT
Though much media and academic attention has been paid to recent Arctic resource
development projects such as the Mary River project on Baffin Island (Canada), the
extraction of resources from circumpolar regions is not a new phenomenon. In fact
enclaves in the Arctic have been industrialized (and in some cases, deindustrialized) for
some time now, and these operations have been no less intertwined in historical and
contemporary Arctic geopolitics. Through an analysis of historical and contemporary
documents complemented by key-informant interviews, this thesis presents historical-
geographical research on two case studies - Svalbard (Norway) and Nanisivik (Canada) -
that provide valuable insight into the political economies of extractive activities in the
Arctic. This thesis argues that the mines at Svalbard and Nanisivik were not simply
economic projects intended to produce valuable ores, but were "co-productive" in the
sense that they reproduced state territory and fulfilled political, geopolitical or
geostrategic objectives. FUl1hermore, this thesis suggests that the operation of these mines
was not characterised by a productive phase followed by a closure phase, but other
activities such as scientific research have revalorized these mining landscapes, owing to
the geographical, geostrategic and environmental importance of these Arctic sites.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
This thesis is about the industrial development of mining in the Arctic. At first
sight, this is a curious topic. The Arctic, encompassing the northernmost limits of Canada,
Russia, Alaska, Greenland, Norway, Sweden, Finland and Iceland when crudely
demarcated by a dotted line at 66°N, is an area often considered peripheral to industrial
development and commodity production. Though a diverse and dynamic landscape, the
Arctic is more commonly envisioned "as a wilderness, a place of the unknown -- cold,
mysterious, forbidding, inhabited by wild beasts, yet magnificent in its grandeur -- bereft
of Western civilization" (Grant 1998,27). Physical scientists have, historically speaking,
embarked on extensive research campaigns in the Arctic, feeding northern narratives of
the north as a dehumanized technospace for scientific exploration and study. Over time
the Arctic has been cast as a pristine wilderness (Grant 1998; Powell 2005); used as a
space of exploration and scientific discovery (Bravo and Sorlin 2002; Powell 2007;
2008b); deployed as a site of militarization and political contestation (Grant 1988;
Lackenbauer and Farish 2007; Wegge 2010); and most recently, understood as a
manifestation of climatic change (Johnson 2010; Launius, Fleming and DeVorkin 2010).
As the circumpolar north has grown in importance in recent years, geographers
have seized the opportunity to undertake increasingly fashionable Arctic research on
diverse themes such as indigeneity, storytelling and colonialism (Cameron 20 I I; 2012),
scientific practice and Arctic exploration (Bravo and Sorlin 2002; Powell 2007; 2008b),
resource development (Johnson 20 10; Keeling and Sandlos 2012) and the human
dimensions of climate change (Ford and Smit 2004; Ford el al. 2006). Focussing on
community exposure, vulnerability and adaptive capacity to climatic change, this latter
field has become oneofthe most influential strands of research in the Arctic (social)
sciences because it is perceived to be an applied field that infonns policy (Smit el al
208). This research has diversified scholarship on climate change that was largcly
dominated by physical scientists no more than a decade ago.
Unfortunately, some of this emerging research in the Arctic social scicnces is
preoccupied with climate change as a force external to broader political-economic
processes, including the development of mining projects in the north (Cameron 2012).
Despite a lack of critical academic engagement with resource development and political
economy in the Arctic, there are clear signs that this is an important issue. Recently, the
circumpolar north has become the focus of much new economic activity and estimates
suggesting that up to 25% of the world's untapped oil reserves are located in the Arctic
(Hargreaves 2006; see also Powell 2008a) have prompted a surge of investment in high-
tech resource megaprojects designed to feed global demand for resources in the future.
For instance, the British newspaper The Daizv Mail reported on Russian plans to build an
Arctic city called Umka, with an artificial climate to sustain a community in close
proximity to hydrocarbon resources: "Welcome to Ice City: Russia plans to build h'ozen
community 1,000 miles from North Pole... as raee for Arctic minerals heats up" (Stewart
20 II, I). Fuelling claims of a mining boom in the Canadian north (Nunatsiaq News 2012;
Postmedia News 2012), the Canadian newspaper The Clohe and Mail reported on plans to
develop a mine dubbed the 'Mary River Project' on Baffin Island with the headline: "A
sea port, a mine that will move a mountain, and a I49-kilometre railway in between: The
N0I1h has never seen anything like the multibillion-dollar plan to tap Baffin Island's rich
supply of iron ore" (Waldie and Sopinski 20 II, B I). Amid uncertainty about the impacts
of a changing Arctic climate and heightened political anxiety ovcr depleting global
natural resources, stories ofa booming Arctic economy are becoming commonplace in
media narratives of industrial development in the circumpolar north.
This northward flow of industrial capital has not been driven by a profit-motive
alone, but has often been motivated by various interconnected geopolitical and
geostrategic imperatives. Anticipating a scramble for Arctic resources in the future,
symbolic acts of territorial claim such as the planting ofa Russian flag on the North Pole
seafloor in 2007 demonstrate that the Arctic is increasingly considered a "zone of
contestation" (Powell 2008a; Johnson 20 I0). In response to these developments, several
scholars have wril1en about the Arctic as both an economic resource and as a space of
political contestation in books such as Afier the lee (Anderson 2009), The World in 2050
(Smith 2010), The Scramblefor the Arctic (Sale and Potapov 2010), and The FlItllre
HistolY a/the Arctic (Emmerson 20 I0). This surge of attention on Arctic resource
development projects has clearly captured the imaginations of the public and policy-
makers alike.
Though much media focus is paid to recent geopolitical strategies that seek to
secure the economic exploitation of Arctic resources into the future, the extraction of
resources from circumpolar regions is not a new phenomenon. In fact enclaves in the
Arctic have been industrialized (and in some cases, deindustrialized) for some time now,
and these operations have been no less intertwined with historical and contemporary
Arctic geopolitics. Geographers and historians alike have examined the industrialization
of the north and the proliferation of resource extractive activities there (McPherson 2003;
Barnes 2005; McGhee 2005; Powell 2008a; Hacquebord and Avango 2009; Keeling and
Sandlos 2009; Piper 2009; Keeling 2010; Sandlos and Keeling 2012, to name a few).
Though this literature is far from a coherent body of scholarship, it often highlights the
negative economic, environmental and cultural legacies of northern resourcedevclopment
projects. Mining developments, in particular, are conceived to provide only temporary
economic prosperity and infrastructural development, while causing severe environmental
destruction. The temporary and destructive nature of mineral extraction is amplified in the
Arctic, where remote communities are often dependent on a single resource, where few
opportunities for diversification exist, and where mineral extraction can be devastating to
the Arctic environment.
At some pioneer industrial sites in the Arctic, however, mines have developed for
reasons other than to produce valuable commodities. Some mines have been established
not only to produce economically valuable ores but to fulfill a variety of objectives tied to
the environmental, political, geostrategicoreconomic importance of these Arctic sites.
These resource development projects are not just economic ventures driven by what
eminent geographer David Harvey calls the 'capitalist logic of power' (processes of
capital circulation and accumulation following a profit-motive), but are often established
to fulfill political, geopolitical or geostrategic objectives, what Harvey calls the 'territorial
logic of power' (processes that (re)create configurations ofplacc and territory across
space and scale) (Harvey 2003). Furthermore, some Arctic development projccts oftcn
operate for a long time, and even after closure seemingly 'post-productive' landscapcs
continue to perfonn economic functions and fulfill a variety of objectivcs as a rcsult of
revived mineral development, environmental reclamation activities, tourism promotion,
scientific research, brownfield industrial development and even military activities. Thcsc
renewed activities challenge images of devaluation and degradation after mining projccts
have stopped producing ores, and illuminate how 'closed' mine sites can continuc to be
productive. These observations raise the questions: I1'halfimc/ions do Arc/ic mines
perform. and wha/ do /hey produce during /heir opera/ion and alier /heir closure? Rathcr
than conceiving production as a linear process that fulfils economic functions alone, this
thesis (re)evaluates the interlocking economic and non-economic impcratives driving
mincral production, and examines the "on-going-ness" of production processes at pioneer
sites in the High Arctic (cf. Lepawsky and Mather 2011).
This thesis explores these questions though a historical-geographical analysis of
the mining political economy at two High Arctic case study sites - Nanisivik on north
Baffin Island (Canada) and Svalbard (Norway) (Figure I). Though these sites are located
on what is popularly imagined as the geographic margins of modern capitalism at 73°N
and 78°N respectively, pioneering mining ventures developed as the primary economic
activity at Nanisivik and Svalbard, and purpose-built company towns werc constructed
with state support. Nanisivik and Svalbard are both what I term minescapes: sitcs wherc
mining is the defining characteristic of the human landscape; where mining is the raison
d'e/re for the existence of settlements at these Arctic locations; and where flows of
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Figure I. Map locating Nanisivik (north Baffin Island. Canada) and Svalbard
(Norwegian High Arctic). Map courtesy ofCharlie Conway. Memorial University.
industrial capital are imprinted into the human and physical morphology of the landscape.
When they were established, the economic feasibility of establishing mines at both
Nanisivik and Svalbard was questionable, and both of these High Arctic mincscapes were
developed with strong government support to perform national and geopolitical
objectives.
Nanisivik and Svalbard have been selected as study sites in this thesis because
their stories problematize the notion that mines operate on linear lifecycles determined by
economic or geological variables. Both Nanisivik and Svalbard provide interesting
historical-geographical examples of the way mineral production did not simply generate
valuable commodities, but functioned as a means of fulfilling a variety of political
objectives at these pioneering sites. Furthel1110re, these cases suggest how 'closed' mining
sites can be revalorized or can continue to be productive as other activities have made use
of these minescapes.
While visiting Svalbard, an archipelago located in the Norwegian High Arctic, for
a four month period in 2009 I was intrigued by the industrial mining landscape that
dominated Svalbard's main settlements and the unique history of unprofitable coal
mining at this Arctic location. At the beginning of the twentieth century, early mining
companies from Norway, Sweden, Russia and other nations opportunistically exploited
the status of Svalbard as terra nu//iu!;. driven by a profit-motive. From 1920 onwards,
however, only Norway and Russia continued to mine on Svalbard. During this time, the
production of coal served as a geopolitical strategy in consolidating and contesting
Norwegian sovereignty over the islands. Indeed most of the mining undertaken on
Svalbard has been historically unprofitable, and the need to maintain a Norwegian
presence on Svalbard has taken precedence over the economic viability of mineral
extraction. While over time, many mines have opened and c1osed,and manynationshavc
come and gone, several Norwegian coal mines still operating on Svalbard are central to
sustaining Svalbard's largest settlements and are important in fulfilling a number of
geopolitical strategies. At some former mine sites, other activities have developed (such
as scientific research) using mining infrastructures to maintain this landscape as a
(geopolitically) productive one. Svalbard offers an interesting insight into the economies
of Arctic sites where mining not only produces ores but fulfills geopolitical objectives as
well.
Nanisivik, 25km from the Inuit community of Arctic Bay on nOlih Baffin Island,
is the site of an abandoned mine and town, now dismantled. Having first learned about
the Nanisivik lead-zinc mine from a reading of annual government reports from the
1970s, I was enthralled by the explicit terms that cast Nanisivik as a political project.
Operational between 1976 and 2002, the Nanisivik venture was supported by the
Canadian government in the hope that this pioneer project would pave the way for mining
across Canada's north em resource frontier. The government envisaged Nanisivik as
prompting an industrial revolution in the Baffin Region, but also viewed the mine as a
method of maintaining Canadian sovereignty and security in the North. In particular, this
venture provided an opportunity to develop Canadian shipping in the Arctic, and through
rigorous scientific study become a working model of technological innovation and
engineering triumph. The Nanisivik townsite was purpose-built for mining, and destroyed
after mining finished. After the mine's closure, a variety of technical and scientific
consulting companies were hired to inform reclamation activities. Nanisivik functioncd as
a site of scientific experimentation that not only produced scienti fic knowledge, but
produced valuations of the cost of reclamation. Far from simply a site of waste and
degradation, Nanisivik continued to be a site of (scientific) production and valuation after
its closure.
While the stories of Svalbard and Nanisivikareunited by a numbe I' of similarities
and both sites possess fascinating histories of High Arctic industrialization that offer
surprises to the dominant modes of understanding mines and their 'lifecyclcs,' therc arc,
of course, important geographical and historical differences between the two. Whereas
the Nanisivik townsite, for instance, developed in close proximity to an indigenous
community, Svalbard has never sustained an indigenous population, and mining
developed at each site under different political, economic and environmental conditions.
Importantly, the stories of Svalbard and Nanisivik are not linked to one and another, nor
does this thesis attempt to compare or connect these two sites. Rather, narrating these
stories together is important because very little detailed scholarship on Svalbard,
Nanisivik or indeed, on High Arctic industrial development generally, has been
undertaken in geography, history and cognate disciplines. These stories are significant
because Svalbard and Nanisivik provide valuable understanding into the potcntial impacts
and legacies of new extractive activities, research that is timely given the rcccnt surge of
interest in developing the circumpolar north.
In addition to narrating these stories, this thesis makes a theoretical contribution to
understanding the political economy of resource production in the Arctic. Thc
interlocking political-economic and geopolitical imperatives at play at Svalbard and
Nanisivik raise theoretical questions regarding the function and character of historical-
geographical capitalist production processes in the Arctic. Little attention has been paid to
the political economy of similar Arctic projects despite the recent explosion of interest in
Arctic resource development. The different stories of Svalbard and Nanisivik offcr an
opportunity to enrich geographical and historical understandings of mining political
economies in the Arctic.
In response to these gaps in the literature, this thesis narrates the storics of mining
at Svalbard and Nanisivik while deploying geographical concepts in political economy to
better theorize the (geopolitical) functions Arctic resource projects fulfil, and take account
of on-going production processes at these sites after closure. In the next part of this
introduction, I introduce and explain these geographical concepts by reviewing existing
literature on the political economy of production, before summarising thc methods
deployed in this thesis research.
1.1 Geographical Perspectives on the Political Economy of Mining:
A Literature Review
The goal of this thesis - to reconsider the function and character of production at
the Svalbard and Nanisivik High Arctic minescapes - engages with a broad sclcction of
litcraturc in geography on political economy. In general terms, political economy is a
body of scholarship that highlights the relationship between political and economic
processes in a critique of apolitical, classical and neo-c1assical economics (Peet and
Hartwick 2009). Based on a Marxist tradition, political economy adopts a materialist
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conception of history whereby social change is grounded in production (Cloke el al
1991; Graham 2005). However, some scholarship in political economy and cognate fields
can be highly theoretical, sometimes lacking substantive grounding. In recognising this
problem, David Harvey has called for a greater focus on place and particularity in what he
calls 'historical geographic materialism,' that grounds political-economic theory in
concrete geographic case studies (Harvey 1984). Adopting this premise, this thesis uses
empirical evidence from Nanisivik and Svalbard as the basis for informing the theoretical
observations made.
Although geographers are paying a renewed interest in the political economy of
resources (Bakker and Bridge 2006), very little scholarship has grounded political-
economic theory in an Arctic setting. More generally, Hayter and colleagues suggest that
the "resource peripheries are treated not only as peripheral pi aces, but peripheral to
disciplinary theorizing" (Hayter el al. 2003, 16). Mirroring popular images of geographic
marginality, the Arctic has remained peripheral to geographic theorization yet, as in other
resource peripheries, "there is a clash of industrial, environmental, cultural and
geopolitical dimensions not found in cores, and as a result not theorized in mainstream
economic geography" (Hayter el al. 2003, 16-19). Answering Hayter and colleagues' call
for more attention to the resource peripheries, and in response to a 'revitalized' research
agenda that is moving away frommanagerialist accounts of resource development in
favour of critical theory in the field of resource geographies (Bakker and Bridge 2006),
this thesis contributes toward understanding the geographies of resource production at
sites in the Arctic using concepts in political economy.
This section reviews literature in political economy to situate the thesis within
core debates in geography and to info1l11 the tC1l11inoiogy used herein. It begins by
introducing foundational theoretical scholarship in geography relating to capitalist
production, focusing on the 'production of nature' (Smith 2008) and the production of
landscape in particular. By doing this, I highlight that production not only involves the
generation of capitalist commodities and value, but involves the discursive and material
co-production of other 'things' as well. This literature review then splits into two sub-
sections which evaluate works specific to the topic of this thesis. The first sub-section
critically interrogates literature on the politics of resource production in periphcral
regions to underline how (geo)politically-motivated industrial ventures in these regions
can bc co-productive of capital and the state, in what I term the 'geopolitical economy'.
The second sub-section reviews literature on the after-life of mining economics to
highlight how minescapes can continue to be (co-)produccd and productive after their
closure.
Geographers have long considered commodity production as a process under
which space, nature and landscape (among other things) are entities produced in the
capitalist system (Marx 1952; Harvey 1996; 200 I; 2003; 2006; Smith 2006; 2008;
Prudham and Heyncn 20 I I). In Uneven Development: Nature. Capital and the
Production a/Space, geographer Neil Smith develops a theoretical framework which
welds different notions of production together. In this work, Smith, like many other
Marxist geographers, theorizes capitalist production as a process under which labour
power is deployed to transform non-useful items into useful commodities (Smith 2008).
Under this schema, produced commodities embody practical uses (usc-values) that arc
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conditioned by the physical properties of a commodity, the material need for societies to
physically reproduce, and the socially produced desire to consume (for more detail see
Marx 1952; Harvey 2006; Heynen 2006; Swyngedouw 2009). The key point here is that
while the use-value of a produced commodity fulfills human needs and desires, use-
values are themselves culturally-produced appraisals of utility. To give an example, the
work of geographer David Trigger on remote mine development in Western Australia
suggests how 'utility' and 'value' are socially-produced entities:
As the manageroflhe large Telfer goldmine in the Pilbara Pllt it, 'whataresollrceis
sllpposedtobeissomethingyollcaneconomicallyrecover';itisnotlhewholeofthe
landscapewhichconstitlltesa 'resource' blll ralher 'an occllrrenceofminerals from which
vaillable or lise fll I materials maybe recovered'. In the context 0 fanactllalminc,other
rock isdefinedas'overbllrden' or 'waste'. Thisisaverydifferenl terminology fromlhat
lIsed within environmentalisl or Aboriginal discollrses,wherei nthe notion of'resollrce'
might encompass living fallna or flora and sections of earthscape wOlildnolnormallybe
conceived lIsing the notion of'waste' (Trigger 1997,170)
So, production involves both the material transformation of non-useful entities into useful
ones and the production of value as a socially determined category "through an
amalgamation of biochemical processes, material and cultural practices, social relations,
language, discursive constructions and ideological practices" (Heynen 2006, 130).
Critically, however, commodities are not simply produced for their use-value, but for
their exchange-value in order to realize a profit - and this profit-motive serves as both the
driving force and organizing feature of modern capitalism. Accordingly, many
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geographers, borrowing Marx's general formula for capital (Marx 1952), suggest that
capitalist production is largely organized according to an overarching logic: I
{
LP
M ----> C MP P ... C' ----> M + .6
Nature is integral to this production process, as nature is itself transformed to
produce commodities and yield profits (Castree 200 I; Smith 2006; 2008). As Smith
asserts,
Under dictate from the accumulation process, capitalism as a mode of production
must expand continuouslyifit is to survive. The reproduction 0 fmateriallifCiswholly
dependent on the production and reproduction of surplus value. To this end, capitalism
stalks the earth in search of material resources; nature becomes auniversalmcansol"
production in the sense that it not only provides the subjects,objectsand
instruments of production, bUlis also in its totality an appendage to the produclion
process (Smith 2008, 71).
For Smith, nature is not only enrolled in capitalist production processes, but scientific and
technological advances have materially produced nature anew - through optimizing crop
growth, tinkering with DNA, and the like. This scientific production of nature is often
Ilnlhisschemaofcapilalistproduclion,"M (money) iSpUl forward 10 purchase C (commodities)-namely.
MP(meansofproduclion; inputs, rawmalerials, machines) and LP (Iabourpower)-which arc combined in
lheproducliveprocess(P) 10 produce a newcommodily(C'), which isthen sold for the original moneypul
forward, plus a profil (1'1)" (formula and descriplion laken from CasIree2001, 192-193)
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intrinsically tied to a capitalist logic, so that nature itself becomes an accumulation
strategy (Katz 1998; Castree 200 I; Byrne el al. 2002; Smith 2006; 2008).
Smith also asserts the 'production of nature' is more thanjust the material
transformation of nature, but involves externalizing nature as an entity outside of society.
Smith draws parallels between industrial labour processes and scientific methods to argue
that both place mechanical practices between labourers and their objects of labour to
improve productivity, and in doing so externalize nature. Both share the same
"epistemological assumption of an external nature, objectified in theory just as it is
objectified in practice in the labour process" (Smith 2008,15). In sum then, the
'production of nature', according to Smith, involves the deep commodification and
material transfol1nation of nature organized according to intersecting scientific principlcs
and capitalist objectives, accompanied by the discursive externalization of nature as an
entity mankind can dominate and manage.
In scholarship parallel to work on the 'production of nature', some geographers
have been instrumental in merging political-economic theory on production with
landscape studies. Reacting to Carl Sauer's 'Morphology of the Landscape' (Saucr 1925),
geographers have long emphasized that landscape is not just a physical entity, but bound
with power, class and gender relations (Nash 1999; Seymore 2000), signi tying systcms
and cultural representations (Duncan and Duncan 1988; Daniels 1989; Mitchell 1996).
Other geographers conceptualize landscapes not just as spaces of representation and
consumption, but as produced, material things that perform multiple functions in the
production process (Mitchell 1996; 2008). For Smith, landscape refers to both its
(produced) natural and anthropogenic elements, through which geographical processes of
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uneven capital production and accumulation operate and manifest - a point I will explore
in more detail in the last sub-section of this literature review (Smith 2008). However, Don
Mitchell perhaps provides some of the most detailed insights into how landscapes arc
enrolled in production processes.
Deploying a historical geographic materialist methodology, Mitchell suggests that
landscapes fulfill numerous material-discursive functions in capitalist production
processes. Most fundamentally, Mitchell proposes that landscapes are work and
landscapes do work - they do not just exist, but they are material things that arc actively
made and remade (Mitchell 1996; 2005; 2008). Landscape (as a totality or items in it) can
be produced as a commodity: landscapes are invested in, in the hope of creating
conditions for the realization (or direct production) of exchange-value (Mitchell 2008).
For instance, landscapes (and nature itself) serve as the means of production for mineral-
extractive industries - they are the sites from which ores are extracted in an attempt to
realize value (Smith 2008). But also Mitchell posits that "one of the important usc-values
of the material landscape is not only that it is a site for the investment of circulating
capital, but that it is also the means - the very physical conditions - for the circulation of
capital" (Mitchell 2008, 35). This is an important point which emphasizes that landscapes
are not simply recipients of capitaI, but landscapes are also generative of the very
conditions of the capital process. Because landscapes are produced and productive, they
are embedded in, and constituted by the everyday social relations of production, ranging
fj'om daily work routines and living conditions to major economic restructuring. As
Mitchell explains:
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Landscape both establishes the geography of production and works to naturalizc that
geography, to Illake it seeIII inevitablethatthosewhobuildthelandscapearcnolthcsalllc
asthosewhoownthelandscape.Thisisacll.lciallllove,becauselandscapesarc
necessarilynol only the site of production (work) but also reproduction(leisurc,rcst,
entertainlllenlandtheattendanceofbodilyneeds)(MitcheIl2005,I).
Here, Mitchell is trying to move away from the idea that there is some pre-existing
landscape 'out there' that acts as the medium or container for capitalist (and other)
relations, but instead contends that the landscape is produced and reproduced by those
relations. But landscapes are also something more than a projection or rcprcscntation of
those practices, since landscapes are intel1wined in material processcsand haveamaterial
form. Landscapes are thus not only suggestive of, but are constituted by geographical
processes of capital production (and reproduction), circulation and accumulation.
The key notion that can be gleaned from literature on the production of
commodities, nature, and landscape, is that production is not just a linear proccss that
transforms non-useful objects into useful ones. Instead production involves producing the
material-discursive conditions for future rounds of production (including the means of
production and a labour force), the commodification and transfollllation of nature, and the
material-discursive production of landscapes (to namejust a few dimensions of
production). However, although Smith's 'production of nature' thesis has gained
substantial currency in the last twenty-five years, some geographers have suggested that
ideas relating to the production of nature are produetivist in emphasizing capitalist
processes at the expense of non-economic or non-capitalist relations in which production
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is embedded2 (Castree 2001; 2003; for a critique see also Swyngedouw 1999; Bakker and
Bridge 2006). Arguing that Smith's 'production of nature' thesis relies on a dualist
ontology of nature and society, several geographers have modified this work by
conceptualizing production as a "process of perpetual metabolism in which social and
natural processes combine in a historical-geographical production process of socionaturc"
(Swyngedouw 1999,448). This school of thought posits that both society and nature are
enrolled in production processes in such interconnected ways that socionatural hybrid
"things" are inevitably produced (Latour 1999; Swyngedouw 1999; Bakker and Bridge
2006; Swyngedouw 2009; White and Wilbert 2009).
Drawing from these ideas, scholars working within the 'revitalized' field of
resource geographies suggest that resources have a hybrid quality ~ part natural, part
social - because resources are natural things whose use is culturally-produced within
particular socio-technical arrangements and historical-geographical circumstances
(Bakker and Bridge 2006; Bridge 2009). As Gavin Bridge explains, "what qualifies as a
resource can vary over time and space, because it is technology and culture (in its widcst
sensc) that confer utility and value onto materials" (Bridge 2009, 1220). Historian Liza
Piper captures the complexity of socionatural production processes using mining activity
as an example (Piper 2007). On the one hand, Piper suggests that the bodies of miners arc
enrolled (as labourers) in a metabolic transformation of nature. On the other hand, Piper
proposes that the mine can itself be understood as a body dependent on a variety of
'Arelated criticism is that this scholarship can, at times, beeconomicallydeterministicbyredllcing
prodllction processes and vaillations to economic categories. Thollgh monetary vaillations appear arbitrary.
choosing what is to be vailled and how it is val lied isan inherently political process (Alexander 2005). and
'vaille' embodies mliitiple (contested) meanings beyond theeco nomic realm (Graeber 2005)
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socionatural assemblages that circulate flows of air, water and energy to make thesc
mining spaces habitable for miners. Piper explains how surface mills, for instance,
physically digest ores extracted by mining men as part of this metabolic process. The key
message ofthis literature is that the production of ores depends on a variety of social,
technical, and natural (hybrid) assemblages and metabolic processes (Piper 2007; scc also
Walker 20 I0). However, by deploying biological metaphors - of capital rcproduction,
circulation, competition and survival- there is a risk that this work naturalizes productivc
processes (Barnes and Duncan 1992; Harvey 1996; Swyngedouw 2009).
In recognition of this critique, this thesis bOITows from Sheila Jasanoffs idiom of
'co-production' in science and technology studies to describe how production not only
generates capitalist commodities and value, but is a hybrid process involving thc co-
production of various intertwining economic and non-economic products, logics and
relations. Jasanoff deploys the idiom of co-production to explain problems ofknowlcdge-
making and argues that co-production is foundational to state-making (Jasanoff2006). In
particular, Jasanoffuses co-production to describe the inseparability between knowledge
of the world and the way we live in it, suggesting that "science and society, in a word, are
co-produced, each underwriting the other's existence" (Jasanoff2006, 17). Though co-
production in this sense does not relate to political economy, Jasanoffmakes clear that
co-production is not a law-like theory or a rigid methodological template, but rathcr a
fluid way of interpreting complex phenomena - an "idiom" that captures the
inseparability between production processes (whethcr production involves generating
scientific knowledge or economic commodities) and the politics of producing things.
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Thus, the aim of Jasanoffs work is to make the "idiom of co-production more tractable so
as to encourage conversation with other approaches to political and social inquiry"
(Jasanoff2006,37).
To illustrate the fluidity of the idiom of co-production, Jasanoffeites the work of
James Scott as an example of scholarship relating to the co-production of social and
natural order. In Seeing Like a Siale, Scott highlights how some state authorities have
eliminated geographically bound and historically specific local measurement systems,
rendered illegible by central powers, in favour of standardized measurements (Scott
1998). Using scientific forestry in Germany as an example, Scott explains how geometric
concepts were used by forest scientists to carefully plan forests into a grid system,
comprising of straight rows of a single species with the underbush cleared. These forests
could be organized, manipulated and counted using standardized measurements that
allowed the yield of these commodities to be calculated. This, and other examples used by
Scott underline how eff0l1s to universalize and standardize measurements have been
driven by a synonymous set of scientific, commercial and bureaucratic logics that
simplify and order nature into legible units and make territories easier to control fi·om the
centre. Scott's insights resonate with the idea that co-production involves the mutual
constitution of the social and natural, and these ideas are also important in underlining the
ways in which realms such as 'state', 'capitalism', 'economy' and 'politics' are not
separate domains but co-produced entities (Jasanoff2006, see also Mitchell 2008).
In this thesis, I mobilize the idiom of co-production in two ways: first, to describe
the co-production of capital and the state, and to capture the interlocking (geo)political
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and economic functions of Arctic mineral production in what I call thc 'geopolitical
economy'; and second, to describe the co-production of science and the state to illustrate
the on-going-ness of productive functions at closed mining spaces where the (scientific)
production of knowledge has revalorized these minescapes. Though I incorporate a
political economy perspective into this idiom, I attempt to broaden 'production' beyond
an economic concept, like Jasanoff, by considering production as a process mutually-
constitutive of capital, science, states and the like. The following two sub-sections of this
literature review attempt to highlight alternate ways of theorizing (co-)production with
specific reference to the two key arguments made in this thesis.
The Politics ofProduction in the Resource PerljJheries
As one of its key objectives, this thesis questions how the production of minerals
from the Svalbard and Nanisivik High Arctic minescapes fulfilled a variety of
(geo)political objectives. Mining at Svalbard and Nanisivik was not mcrely incidental to
the location of ores there, nor were these ventures simply established in response to
market demand following the logic of capital, but mining intentionally fulfilled a
geopolitical logic. The suggestion that mineral production at these two sites was
influenced by geopolitical motives raises questions about what production is and what
production does: clearly, production processes are not just organized around economic
profitability alone. Through a synthesis of key literature that highlights the politics of
production in resource peripheries, this sub-section suggests that one way to theorize
geopolitically-motivated mining ventures is as projects co-productive of capital and the
state, in what I call the 'geopolitical economy'.
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Some interesting scholarship in resource geography has examined how peripheral
landscapes are materially-discursively produced and productive. This scholarship often
deals with questions surrounding why and how peripheral landscapes, far from centres of
capital, become sites of commodity production by emphasizing the political geographies
of production processes. Though many 'natural resources', including minerals, are
randomly distributed across the Earth's surface according to a 'geo-logic,' and human
populations settle according to a social logic (Bunker 1989; Freudenburg 1992), some of
this scholarship traces how cultural discourses and government policies can produce
conditions under which peripheral zones become foci of resource extraction. In line with
literatures in resource geography that emphasize how 'resources' are not natural entities
whose "location and availability are fixed and given," but rather "cultural appraisals
about utility and value" (Bridge 2009, 1219), geographers Gavin Bridge and David
Trigger have each argued that peripheral regions are often discursively constructed as
spaces amenable to resource extraction. Specifically, these regions may be discursivcly
cast as empty ahistorical and ageographical spaces open for extraction, in which
"resource endowment is understood as a gift from nature without reference to its social
production" (Bridge 200 1,2154; see also Trigger 1997). Often accompanied by
neoliberal policy, these discursive constructions act as pre-conditions to the developmcnt
of resource extractive projects in peripheral regions. In this sense, theorizing resource
production in peripheral regions is as much about theorizing the material-discursive
production a/peripheral regions (and landscapes) as a resource. Though this literature is
useful in underlining the politics of resource production in peripheral regions, at times
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this argument fails to recognize that such discursive constructions predate the nominally
neoliberal period.
David Harvey offers a slightly different analysis of resource extraction in
peripheral (and non-capitalist) regions through highlighting the state's role in capitalist
production processes, during and beyond the neoliberal period. In The New Imperialism,
Harvey uses the term 'accumulation by dispossession' to describe how new capitalist
devclopment (following a capitalist logic of power), often accompanicd by strong backing
of state power (following a territorial logic of power), can dispossess local people of their
resource base and wealth} (Harvey 2003). State powers may financially and politically
support capital's breakthrough into new profitable terrains through, for instance, the
provision ofinfi'astructural investments and favourable legal regimes, and are thus
important in "keeping the territorial and capitalist logics of power always intertwined
though not necessarily concordant" (Harvey 2003, 27). Because the expansion of
capitalism (and expansion of the state) often exploits local labour power, raw materials
and low land costs, accumulation by dispossession necessarily involves the
commodification of labour, privatization ofland or resources, suppression of rights to the
commons and suppression of non-capitalist fonns of production and consumption.
Consequently, local communities are otten dispossessed ti'om their land, resources and
livelihoods. Accumulation by dispossession is not mcrely a historical cvcnt Iikc Marx's
notion of primitive accumulation, but rather a theoretical insight into the on-going
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reproduction of capitalism that highlights the mutual (re)production and expansion of
both capital and the state (Glassman 2006). As a complementary body of literature on the
'anti-politics machine' highlights, the extension of capital and "expansion of bureaucratic
state power is enabled without appearing to be a political process as such," but rather cast
as a technical solution to development problems on the periphery of the capitalist system
(Lepawsky 2009, 267; see also Ferguson 1996). This is important for prompting us to
read capitalist production not just as an economic process, but as an inherently political
one (Glassman 2007).
One conceptual framework that pays attention to the politics (and geopolitics) of
capitalist economies and states is the 'geopolitical economy'. As a framework that
"incorporates both processes of economic and political change and the rhetorical
understanding that gives a geopolitical order its appeal and acceptability" (Agnew and
Corbridge 1989, 168), geopolitical-economic theory has been used occasionally by
geographers (e.g. Agnew and Corbridge 1989; Corbridge and Agnew 1991; Le Billon
2004; Glassman 2011) to overcome the critique that geopolitical scholarship privileges
analyses of discourses and representations of policy while often neglecting to consider
how the political-economic system shapes this policy (Dodds and Sidaway 1994; Mereille
2008). In each case, the geopolitical economy is deployed in different ways. In analysing
US budget deficits in the 1980s, for instance, Corbridge and Agnew propose that the
geopolitical economy is an approach that pays attention to the uneven development of the
world economy and the changing role of the US as an actor in global politics, to affirm
the "insistently spatial foundations of capitalist production, exchange, and regulation"
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(Corbridge and Agnew 1991, 18). Similarly, Jim Glassman uses the geopolitical economy
as an approach to account for geopolitical conflict and struggle absent in literatures on
global production networks (Glassman 20 II). In contrast, the geopolitical economy is not
defined as an approach in explicit tellllS by LeBillon, whose work on resource wars
examines the connections between the geopolitics of resource competition and the
political economy of resource exploitation (LeBillon 2004). Although the geopolitical
economy is used in each case to bring narratives and analyses of geopolitical regulation,
struggle and conflict into conversation with political-economic processes, the geopolitical
economy is left largely under-theorized in these literatures.
In a parallel (yet distinct) body of scholarship, some political geographers have
deployed geopolitical and geoeconomic analyses (Mercille 2008) that build more
sophisticated theoretical apparatus from David Harvey's twin concepts of the territorial
and capitalist logics of power, concepts originally used by Harvey to understand capitalist
imperialism (Harvey 2003). On the one hand, the capitalist logic of power refers to the
"molecular processes of capital accumulation in space and time," discussed earlier in this
literature review, that occur "through the daily practices of production, trade, commerce,
capital flows" (Harvey 2003, 26-27). On the other hand, the territorial logic of power
stresses the "political, diplomatic, and military strategies invoked and used by a state ... as
it struggles to assert its interests and achieve its goals in the world at large" (ibid.). As
James Scott reminds us, state control over a territory is constituted by a range of practices
and socio-political struggles. However, Harvey's territorial logic of power is largely
undeveloped, often conflating 'territory' and the 'state' - terms which are, in themselves,
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considered problematic by political geographers (Paasi 2003; Jones, Jones and Woods
2004; Agnew 2009) - while side-lining issues sUITounding power and sovereignty. Other
commentators have noted that a lack of attention is paid to political factors (Mercille
2008), and that "this approach carries with it an in-built lack of definition about the kind
of geopolitical explanation to be called on stage in understanding how the telTitorial logic
unfolds" (Pozo-M3I1in 2007, 553; sec also Ashman and Callinieos 2006). One interesting
result of this critique is that some political theorists have turned their attention to the
nexus between capital and the state, favouring a reading of Harvey's twin logics of power
as interdependent on one and another. As Ashman and Callinieos explain:
Thinking of the relationship between capitalists and statelllanagers-and,lllorcbroadly.
that between capital and state-in theseterllls,asoneofstructural interdependencc.
avoidsanydangerofreducingthestatetoaninstrulllentofcapitaI, or indeed the intcrests
ofeilhergroup of actors to those oftheolher: both capitalists and state Illanagcrsarc
accorded an active role as the initiators of strategies and tacticsdcsignedtoprolllotethcir
own distinct interests, while, at thesallletillle, the pursuit oft heseinitiativesbringsthclll
into pal1nership wilh each other (Ashman and Callinicos 2006, 114)
Although Harvey defines the two logics of power as distinct, and argues that both logics
do not always operate out of capitalistic motivations but intertwine in complex and
contradictory ways (as demonstrated through the notion of 'accumulation by
dispossession'), Ashman and Callinicos suggest more that this: while the two logics have
different interests and motives, capitalists and statesmen arc co-dependent on each other
to achieve their objectives.
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In recognizing the need to read production politically, this thesis deploys the
idiom of co-production to describe how the Nanisivik and Svalbard mines formed sites at
which capital and the state were co-produced, in what I call the 'geopolitical economy'.
While retaining the essence of geopolitical economy as an approach that brings
geopolitical analyses in conversation with political-economic processes (Agnew and
Corbridge 1989; Corbridge and Agnew 1991; Le Billon 2004; Glassman 20 I I), the
geopolitical-economy (as I use it) has two main features. First, the geopolitical economy
adopts a political reading of production processes by incorporating Harvey's twin
concepts of the territorial and capitalist logics of power. The interdependence between
these two logics of power is central to explaining the state's role in facilitating capitalist
accumulation, while illustrating how these capitalist ventures themselves (re)produced
state territory (Ashman and Callinicos 2006). As mining on Svalbard and Nanisivik
illustrate, commercial and political interests in Arctic mining are closely tied, and the
production of minerals embodies both economic and non-economic (i.e. geopolitical)
utility and value. The co-production and entanglement of economic and non-economic
value makes the very concepts of value and production ambiguous. In recognising that
territorial and capitalist logics of power are blurred, the geopolitical economy adopts a
more fluid approach that understands capitalist and territorial logics, and economic and
non-economic value, as intertwined and co-produced. Second, it involves highlighting the
geographic particularities of political-economic principles. Drawing from Harvey's
historical geographic materialism, this analysis attempts to ground often abstract and
universalistic theory by "integrat[ing] geographical sensitivities into general social
theories emanating from the historical materialist tradition" (ernphasis added. Harvey
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1984, 10). In sum, the geopolitical economy offers a theoretical terrain in which the
political imperatives and geographic particularities of production can be woven together,
and mobilizes the idiom of co-production to theorize how commodity production at
locations in the resource peripheries can involve the co-production of capital and the
The Unstable Political Economies o/Resource Production
Another key objective of this thesis is to investigate the 'on-going-ness' of
production at Svalbard and Nanisivik. Many geographers view capitalist production as
inherently contradictory, and mineral production is frequently cited as an example of
capital's instability and ephemerality. These characteristics of resource extractive
industries are particularly pronounced in geographically peripheral regions (Bradbury
1979), including (and especially) the Arctic where mining and hydrocarbon booms arc
reported to drive regional economic growth (Postmedia news 2012). This sub-section
reviews literature on the political economy of mineral production. Acknowledging that
these literatures often conceive production (and especially mineral production) as a linear
process that will inevitably lead to closure as a result of capitalism's contradictory nature,
this sub-section suggests an alternate way of viewing (co-)production as an on-going
process.
Much geographic literature asserts that capitalist production is fraught with
internal contradictions that frequently erupt as crises which often manifest in the
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landscape (for more detail see Harvey 2001; Smith 2008). For Smith, uneven
development is the essence of contradiction:
The logic of uneven development derives specifically from thcopposed tendcncics,
inherent in capital, toward the differentiation but simultancousequalizationofthclcvcls
and conditions of production. Capital is continually invested in the built environmcnt in
order to produce surplus value and expand the basis of capital itself. But cqually,capital
is continually withdrawn from the built environment so that it can movcclscwhcrcand
take advantagc of higher profit ratcs (Smith 2008, 6).
So, on the one hand, capital production promotes differentiation through the geographic
and social division of labour (Smith 2008). On the other hand, capital circulation
equuli::es the geographic distribution of capital. As capital jumps across spacc in a
systematic way, contradiction and crisis is often manifest in the landscape. As David
Harvey writes, "a perpetual struggle ensues in which physical landscapes appropriate to
capitalism's requirements are produced at a pm1icular moment in time only to be
disrupted and destroyed ... at a subsequent point in time" (Harvey 1985,44). In the casc
of mining, the geographic rigidity of mineral deposits and physical mining infl"astructurcs
are in constant tension with the hypcrmobility of capital which continually switchcs to
morc profitable ten-ains. The production of dead landscapes - through which capital no
longer circulates and which no longer embody value - appears unavoidable in thc
capitalist system (Edcnsor2005).
Much scholarship in geography and history has highlighted thc economically
unstable character of resource extractive industries (Randall and Ironside 1996; Barncs et
a/. 2001; Barnes 2005; Bakker and Bridge 2006; Bridge 2009) and mining is oftcn citcd
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as an economic activity that typifies the contradictory nature of capitalism (Aschmann
1970; Bradbury 1979; Cronon 1992; Bridge 2000; 2004; Whitmore 2006; Bebbington el
al. 2008; LeCain 2009; Richards 2009; Worall el al. 2009). Gavin Bridge's excellent
work describes the inherent instability of mining economies in tel111S of 'ecological
contradictions' which arise fi'om the commodity production process4 (Bridge 2000).
Reflecting the inherently contradictory and instable character of mineral production, some
scholarship has theorized mining activities as occupying a linear boom-bust lifccyclc,
whereby valuable ores are extracted during the operational phase ofa mine's lifetime,
leaving only economically exhausted and environmentally degraded landscapes (Davis
2009). Though an outdated schema in much social science and humanities research, it is
an important one that continues to be used by mine companies, economists and
governments (see Richards 2009). Scholarship in economics (Black el al. 2005) and
sociology (Brown el al. 2005) has attempted to quantify this boom-bust lifecycle, but
economic geographer Homer Aschmann perhaps provides the most complete account of a
mine's lifecycle: 5
I. In the first phase of Aschmann's model, capital is invested in prospecting
activities.
2. In the second phase, "someone has decided that the discovery represents a mine
with profitable prospects" (Aschmann 1970, 175). The feasibility of mineral
extraction is classically connected to economic valuations of the price of a
246)
sl-lacquebordandAvango(2009)applyasilllilarlllodellosullllllariselhe historical dcveloplllcnlofmining
selllelllentsonSvalbard. SeeChapler2 forllloredelail
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particular resource, ore grade (rcsource quality), reserves (orc quantity), and thc
cost of extraction. These factors determine whether minerals are considcrcd
economic and therefore exploitable for profit. If feasible, mining infrastructures
are installed and ores begin to be extracted.
3. In the third phase the mining operation stabilizes, but experiences adcclining ratc
of profitability (in the absence of new reserves) due to falling ore grades and
rising production costs (particularly labour costs).
4. And in the final phase, mining ceases to be profitable as ores become depicted, as
operating costs become too high or as the market price of the mined material
becomes too low.
When capital is withdrawn fi'om these sites, ruination is often produccd. For Tim
Edensor, "the production of spaces of ruination and dereliction are an inevitable result of
capitalist development and the relentless search for profit" (Edensor 2005,4). Explored
by environmental historians (Cronon 1992), cultural geographers (DeLyser 1999), among
others (see also Bradbury 1984), ghost towns have become a symbol of capital's
transience. This schema is, however, problematic. It reduces mine development to a lincar
lifespan, with a distinct start and end detelmined by economic laws and gcological factors
that position money as the sole measure and representation of value. This literature
implies that once the profitable extraction of ore has ceased, mines no longer have a usc-
value and no longer produce surplus value; closure and ruination appear a completely
natural outcome of capitalist development.
Rather than understanding these boom-bust dynamics in terms of a minc's
Iifecycle, some geographers have described resourcc development in periphcral rcgions as
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'cyclonic' to capture the intensity of capital accumulation and cyclical nature of
development (Barnes 2005; Keeling 20 10). Subjected to flows of capital, tcchnologies,
labour and the like, peripheral spaces are often subjected to a whirlwind of cyclonic
industrial development that radically remakes a region's "physical and human landscapes,
overturning traditional land uses and social arrangements and crecting cntirely new forms
in thcir place" (Keeling 20 I 0,229). Geographer Trevor Barnes uses this cyclonic wind
metaphor to conjure dramatic imagery of the ephemerality of resource extractive
industries:
Blowing across the economic landscape, global-cyclonic winds touch down at a I'ew sites
-single industrytowns-tocreate in a burst ofl'renetic energy theinl'rastructurcand
wherewithalol'resourceproduclion. BUI as implied by the central metaphor, stability is
always precarious and temporary (Barnes 2005, III).
The cyclonic nature of resource extractive industries is often particularly pronounced in
peripheral regions where resource production frequently involves intensively exploiting
non-renewable resources and where there are few oppOliunities to develop'linkages'that
assist economic diversification (Frickel and Freudenburg 1996). As historical geographer
Am Keeling explains, "such instability renders settlement and economy on thc pcriphcry
of the capitalist system inherently precarious, subject to the disruptive shocks of
geographically distant technological changes, market cycles and government policics"
(Keeling 2010, 230). Unlike Aschmann's 'natural history ofa mine', interprctations of
the cyclonic dynamics of resource development not only pay attention to the biophysical,
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ecological or geological limits and characteristics of 'natural resources', but include
discussion on the political economy of resource extraction as well.
However, some literature on mining has illuminated how minescapes can continue
to be productive after their closure. Geographer David Robertson critiques the idea that
"the end of mining usually signals an end to the historical narratives of these 'temporary'
locales; and readers are left with the false impression that mining communities have rich
but inconsequential futures" (Robertson 2006, 6), and instead suggests that the cultural
meaning and emotional significance of mining spaces may serve as a foundation on
which local identities and future activities are structured and maintained . Asanexample,
Ben Marsh argues that amid harsh working conditions in the anthracite towns of
Pennsylvania, communities with strong emotional attachments to place have developed
(Marsh 1987). Though these mines have closed, many people continue to live in mining
towns that are rich in cultural meaning and memories, although impoverished in
economic means (Marsh 1987). Similarly, at Butte (Montana), William Wyckoff
describes how the mining landscape not only produced minerals and wealth, but
accumulated symbolic meaning during the mine's operation (Wyckoff 1995). Though the
mining infrastructures at Butte no longer produce ores, they embody and reproduce
cultural meaning that symbolise industrial prosperity. These industrial referents have
become critical to the development of heritage industries at Butte, where the landscape is
productiveasa space in which meaningisconsumed,ratherthanonefrom which
industrial commodities are produced. This literature suggests that the life ofa minescape
is not always linear because these mining spaces can continue to be productive after their
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closure, and has injected insight into the ways minescapes arc culturally-produced and
valued after a mine's closure.
This literature points to the idea that mineseapes can be re-valued or revalorized
after their closure, and that the productive functions of these landscapes can be 'on-going'
in interesting and unexpected ways. This is not to downplay the contradictory or cyclonic
character of mineral extractive activities (especially in the Arctic), but to highlight how
closed mineseapes may continue to be sites from which commodities, scientific
knowledge or 'other' things are produced. As such this thesis mobilizes the idiom of co-
production in a second, more conventional way, to describe the connections between
mining, science, and the state after mine closure. Drawing from the idea that science is
involved in productive processes (as outlined by Smith's 'production of nature' thesis), I
suggest that the production of scientific knowledge at Svalbard and anisivik illustrates
how these minescapes continue to have productive functions.
SUIIIIIIGlY a/Literature Review
As stated from the outset of this thesis, both Svalbard and Nanisivik serve as
examples that problematize the notion that mines generate valuable commodities,
following a linear lifeeycle characterized by 'productive' and 'post-productive' phases.
Both sites also raise more fundamental questions concerning what production is and what
production does. By means of summary, allow me to pinpoint two key ideas that arc
valuable to guiding the questions this thesis asks regarding the productive functions
Arctic mines perform.
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First, the work of many geographers illustrates that production docs not simply
involve the generation of valuable commodities, but involves the material-discursive
production of other things, including nature, space, and landscapes. These ideas arc
particularly relevant at Svalbard and Nanisivik given that the decision to open and
maintain mines at these locations was not solely driven by economic variables, but by
geopolitical motives as well. At Svalbard mining not only (unprofitably) produced coal
but (re)produced Norwegian sovereignty over the archipelago. At Nanisivik, the mine
was designed to produce technological, operational and scientific products that
complemented socio-economic policy objectives outlined by the state. I use the term 'co-
production' to capture the economic and non-economic things produced by these
geopolitical-economic ventures - with a specific focus on the co-production of capital and
the state. The suggestion that some Arctic mines are co-productive is pertinent given the
(sometimes explicit) geopolitical motives that underlie decisions to exploit resources in
circumpolar regions.
Second, though some geographers suggest that mineral production is often
ephemeral especially in peripheral regions, the complete withdrawal of extractive
economics is not always clear-cut as other activities may revalorize these landscapes.
Though mining Iifecycles are supposedly pronounced in peripheral regions where
operating costs are high and opportunities for economic diversification are limited, both
Svalbard and Nanisivik serve as examples that demonstrate the on-going-ness of
production after mine closure, where scientific activities have I'evalorized the landscape.
At Svalbard, scientific research made use of existing mining infrastructures and
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strengthened the Norwegian settlements on the archipelago. At Nanisivik, scientific
knowledge was produced to inform reclamation activities, and this knowlcdge was used
to value the cost of reclamation. Both cases demonstrate how science has (rc)produccd,
re-valued or revalorized these minescapes after mine closure. Whereas the geopolitical
economy focuses on the co-production of capital and the state, I use the idiom of co-
production a second time to elaborate upon the connections between science, capital and
the state.
Clearly political-economic analyses should be sensitive to the geographic
particularities of production (in Arctic regions), and consider how the geopolitical,
economic and environmental importance of different Arctic sites intluences the character
and longevity of commodity production. Answering Hayter and colleagues' call for
greater theorization of resource peripheries, I treat production as a geographically-
particular process that involves the co-production of economically valuablc commoditics
and non-economic things (and discourses), and this production can be on-going owing to
the geopolitical, cultural or environmental importance of production at a particular sitc.
1.2 Methods and Methodology
This thesis uses Svalbard and Nanisivik as case studies that ground political-
economic theory on production in specific, concrete situations in an attempt to fulfill
Harvey's call for 'historical geographic materialism' (Harvey 1984). Highlighting the
geographic particularities of production at these two different study sites helps to explain
what functions these sites were intended to fulfill, and understand what these High Arctic
minescapes (co-)produced. This thesis adopts a qualitative interpretive methodology,
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using a mixed-methods approach tailored to the availability and viability of research
material at each site (England 2006). In this section, I describe the methods deployed for
each case study and I explain how this research material was subsequently interpreted to
answer the research questions.
At Svalbard, a number of semi-structured interviews and correspondence with key
informants employed in decision- and policy-making capacities in the mining and science
sectors were conducted (using interview techniques described in Schoenberger 1991;
Longhurst 2003; Wiles et al. 2005; Dunn 2010). Ethics clearance for these interviews was
granted by Memorial University's Interdisciplinary Committee on Ethics in Human
Research (project clearance code 2010/l1-157-AR). Potential participants were
approached in person or by email and provided with relevant information regarding the
interviews. Before the interviews, participants were given a consent form (appendix I) to
read at their leisure, and I verbally explained this consent form during the interview. The
interview questions asked were tailored according to the participant's job position on
Svalbard, to provide in-depth knowledge about mining on the archipelago (see appendix
II for sample interview questions). Interviews were digitally recorded and transcribed.
Participants were sent copies of the transcripts, and some participants provided additional
information via email correspondence in instances where they felt important information
was missing from the transcripts.
In addition to the interviews conducted on Svalbard, I collected government
policy documents and corporate reports to investigate key themes that arose from these
interviews in greater detail. These policy documents not only related to Norwegian policy
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pertaining to Svalbard, but also Svalbard's scicnce infrastructure, Norway's stratcgy tor
the High North and Norwegian Arctic research policy. These documcnts were largcly
obtained from online sources, but a number of documents were also collected during
fieldwork on Svalbard. In the absence of suitable archival material written in English, I
conducted a review of the historical literature on mining in Svalbard.
For Nanisivik, a rich variety of historical archival material consisting of
government correspondence, annual reports and meeting transcripts was collccted from
Library and Archives Canada (Ottawa), the Northwest TelTitories Archivcs
(Yellowknife), the Nunavut Social History Archives (Vancouver), and through thc
interlibrary loan service provided by Memorial University of Newfoundland. Alongside
this array of historical archival documents, a collection of over 1,000 contemporary
documents, including government correspondence, technical and scientific reports,
newspaper clippings and public hearing transcripts regarding the closure and rcclamation
ofNanisivik, was also obtained online from the Nunavut Water Board public registry or
acquired through inter-library loan. Given the richness and quantity of archival material
available and the fact that the mine was closed and dismantled several years before my
research began, I decided that undertaking key-informant interviews at Arctic Bay was
unnecessary.
Most of these historical and contemporary documents have becn digitizcd,
creating a virtual repository of the archival material that can be accessed electronically at
a later point in time (for a description and analysis of this 'digital history' mcthod sec
Keeling and Sandlos 2011). Because thousands of pages of documents were collcctcd and
digitally stored, one drawback of this approach is that a lot of irrelcvant matcrial was
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inevitably collccted. However, collecting a broad swathe of documcnts helped to
contextualize important material and often raised new research questions (see Moore
20 II; Keeling and Sandlos 20 II). I otten pursued new themes and idcas that arose Ii'om
these documents, and adjusted my research questions accordingly.
In analyzing this research material, [ did not deploy any type of formal data
analysis or coding framework but instead interpret each source separately, scnsitive to the
geographic and historic particularities of its content and production. This approach
attempted to foster a more natural interpretation attuned to the themes and rcscarch
questions that arise from each source, rather than imposing rigid (and oftcn reductionist)
categories upon the research material. Though this approach is not a formal method, it is
one many geographers use (Stuart Aitken describes this "couch-potato geography"
method in Flowerdew and Martin 1997; while Miles Ogborn describes the process of
constructing arguments from documentary sources in Blunt el al. 2003). I noted kcy
events, actors, ideas, and themes from each source that could be pieced togcthcr to form a
n3lTative. This note-taking was inherent to the interpretation and analysis ofthcse
sources, and critical to informing my argument (see Ogborn 2003; Cloke el al. 2004).
This interpretation was inevitably informed by my research questions and theoretical
interests. However the theoretical concepts deployed in this thesis were not pre-
determined, but rather emerged from my investigation of each of these cases. In this
sense, political-economic theory on production was reworked alongside the investigation
of empirical case studies, in line with a historical geographic materialist approach.
In researching and writing this thesis I recognize that "historical representation
and interpretation is always a contemporary reconstruction which must be attuned to the
39
uncvenness of the historical record and to the muted voices embedded in its
constructions" (Moore 2011). Inevitably, the construction of my interprctation and
analysis was shaped by a myriad of factors: the availability, accessibility and content of
documentary sources; my research questions and interests; and disciplinary training. I
accept and embrace my biases and acknowledge them as unavoidable.
1.3 Thesis Structure
In response to calls for a greater theoretical focus on the political economy of
resource production in peripheral regions within the 'revitalized' field of resource
geography, and a lack of literature on the geographies of Arctic mining at Svalbard and
Nanisivik specifically, this thesis adopts a historical geographic materialist framework
that attempts to ground political-economic theory in the unique stories of mining at
Svalbard and Nanisivik. The following two chapters each present empirical rcscarch on
Svalbard and Nanisivik, to highlight the geographic pal1icularities of production and
ground the concepts developed in the literature reviewed in this introduction. Thcsc
chapters narrate mine development at these sites, and in doing so, investigate how the
Svalbard and Nanisivik minescapcs were (and continue to be) functional ancl productive.
Through mobilizing the idiom of co-production, these two chapters suggest, in differcnt
ways, how mineral production at Svalbard and Nanisivik was related to both economic
and (geo)political imperatives (what I have termed as the geopolitical economy), ancl both
illuminate the on-going-ness of productive functions after closure as scientific activitics
have developed at these sites. In acknowledging that the historical-geographical stories of
each site are unique, I write about Svalbard and Nanisivik in two separatc substantive
papers that can be read as stand-alone documents in a manuscript thesis tormat. This
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approach is advantageous in allowing me to deal with separate bodies of contextual
geographical and historical literature appropriate to each site and provide an enriched
discussion tailored to each site, while still usinga common approach in political economy
and contributing towards a broader body of geographic literature to tie the thesis together.
In the second chapter on Svalbard I use key informant semi-structured interviews and
contemporary documents to evaluate how the production of coal on Svalbard has been
shaped by Arctic geopolitics, and how these geopolitical objectives extend the
productivity of Svalbard's minescapes. In the third chapter I use contemporary and
historical archival material to investigate how the Nanisivik mine was co-productive in
fulfilling economic and political functions during its operation, and how the mine became
a site of production and valuation after its closure. To reiterate, this thesis docs not
attempt to compare the two sites, but rather pays close attention to the geographic and
historic particularities of each site to provide a grounded and enriched theoretical account
relating to the function of these mining spaces. Consequently each chapter is written
slightly differently, as a result of the different research material available and methods
deployed. In the final chapter, I conclude by elucidating the key themes and theoretical
insights evident at both sites to tie the thesis together.
1.4 Co-authorship Statement
This thesis has been completed in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the
degree of the Master of Arts in Geo!,'Taphy at Memorial University of Newfoundland.
This research was supported by an ArcticNet-funded grant obtained by Dr. Am Keeling
on 'Adaptation, industrial development and Arctic communities'. While I (Scott Midgley,
MA candidate) and Dr. Am Keeling (my supervisor) jointly designed the research
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proposal, I was responsible for conducting fieldwork on Svalbard and collecting archival
documents under the guidance of Dr. Keeling. I drafted the manuscript thesis, while Dr.
Arn Keeling, Dr. Josh Lepawsky and Dr. John Sandlos provided feedback in accordance
with their role as supervisory committee members.
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CHAPTER 2
CO-PRODUCING COAL, SCIENCE AND TERRITORY:
THE GEOPOLITICAL ECONOMY OF SVALBARD'S MINESCAPES
Abstract
In 1916 the Norwegian mining company Store Norske began extracting coal ti'om
Svalbard, an archipelago located on the northern-most limits of Arctic Europe. Store
Norske has largely been an unprofitable operation, and much historical and
archaeological evidence suggests that early mining on Svalbard was undertaken to fultill
geopolitical objectives for Norway. In spite of its long-term unprotitability as a mining
company, Store Norske continues to operate almost one century after the company was
first established. This paper investigates the extent to which persisting territorial anxieties
and geopolitical objectives continue to shape contemporary coal mining on Svalbard, and
questions whether the recent development of scientific research activity on Svalbard
supports the mining economy in fulfilling contemporary geopolitical objectives for
Norway. Using key-informant interviews and various policy documents, this paper
suggests that mining on Svalbard is shaped by an interlocking set of political-economic
imperatives and geopolitical objectives - what I describe as a 'geopolitical economy' -
because Store Norske's mines not only produce commodities and capital, but also
actively co-produce Norwegian sovereignty over Svalbard.
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2.1 IntJ'oduction
Flying into the town of Longyearbyen (latitude 78°13' north) in the islands of Svalbard, I
amjust 800 miles li·om the North Pole. As the plane starts to descend, the view is of
snowy mountains, icecaps, glaciers, Gords,andhugeexpansesofbrowntundra
(Anderson 2009, 122).
Describing his journey to Svalbard, fanner editor of New Scientist and author of thc book
Afier the Ice, Alun Anderson conjures images of Svalbard as a pristine yet extreme Arctic
wilderness untouched by human activity. Located between 74° and 81 ° north, the
Svalbard archipelago lies midway between northern Norway and the North Pole (Figure
2). Owing to its geographic location in the Norwegian High Arctic, around sixty percent
of Svalbard's landscape is covered by glaciers and the darkness of polar night ensues
from mid-November to late January. Notwithstanding credentials that merit describing
Svalbard as a High Arctic wilderness, something about Svalbard's landscape unsettled
Anderson:
A few minutes before landing,outona stretch of tundra by the sea, theplanelliespast
row after row of yellow apartment blocks, set around a cluster of enormous industrial
buildings. Fora moment I wonder ifl'm hallucinating: who would build a high-rise
housing complex up here in the High Arctic? A minute later the scene shilis again and
now I'm in a science fiction movie. Below me, on an isolated dull-brown plateau streaked
with snow, are white radar domes; I just have time to count seven or cight large ones, but
smaller ones are scaltered among them (Anderson 2009, 122).
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Figure 2. Map locating Svalbard (above) and the main selllements 011 Spitsbergen
(bellJ\\). Map cOllrte.IY o(Charlie Conway. Memorial University.
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Despite its geographic marginality, and in stark contrast to romanticized images of Arctic
wilderness, enclaves of Svalbard's Arctic landscape have become sites for thc industrinl
production of con!. Norwegian explorer Fridtjof Nansen, visiting Svalbard in 1912 almost
a century before Anderson, expressed similar bewilderment at Svalbard's industrinl
landscape:
What a honid imposition on nature's solitary silence. Those ghastly workers' huls down
there in the valley, and the overhead cables and power lines trail ingthe mountain sides.
It's shattering. And the racket created by the lives of all thesepcop Ie, with theirstrikcs
and unpleasanlness, headed by such rudeness. No, there is nothi ng here that would tempt
metostay ... (Nansenquoted in the Store Norske Annual Report 2005, 5)
Svalbard dramatically depicts how industrial capital, channelled northward by
geopolitical motives, extended its grasp to the far north as mining developed beginning in
the early years of the twentieth century.
Today, coal is still extracted by Russia and Norway on Svalbard and an industrial
minescape characterizes its main settlements. Barentsburg is the last remaining working
Russian coal mining town after the town of Pyramiden was abandoned in 1999. Whilc the
Russian population of Svalbard has been dwindling in recent years, the Norwegian
presence on Svalbard has remained strong. Longyearbyen (in Figure 3), formcrly owncd
and run by the Norwegian coal company Store Norske as a company town, is now the
administrative centre of Svalbard with a population of approximately 2000 pcople.
Longyearbyen's skyline is dominated by an iconic coal powerplant smokestack thnt
constantly churns out dark smoke, fed by the coal extracted hom Store Norske's mines.
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Down the valley from Longyearbyen, 'Mine 7' ('Gruve 7' in Norwegian) in Adventdalen
is operated by Store Norske. The company also extracts coal at Svea, 60 km south or
Longyearbyen. Despite its high northerly location, Longyearbyen boasts a modern
infrastructure and is serviced by a commercial airline throughout the year. Alongside
mining tourism, research, education and administrative functions have developed in
Longyearbyen. Mining has been fundamental to the development of Svalbard's
permanent settlements and has offered a platform for economic diversification, including
the development of Arctic science research facilities and a university-level education
institution.
Figure 3. Historic and contemporary mining remains evident at the tOH'n oj'
Lungyearbyen. Author's photograph
S6
In spite of the seeming incongruity of industrial production in an Arctic sctting-
exposed to extreme (and expensive) operating conditions, and subjected to infrastructural
and logistical challenges-Store Norske has operated continuously since 1916 and
continues to extract coal on Svalbard. Many economic factors dictate the profitability of
Store Norske's operations: the challenging Arctic environment and isolated geographical
location of Svalbard, volatile global commodity prices, and competition f-j'OIl1 Australia
and North America. For instance, in January 2008 the coal price was approximately $130
USD/tonne, and sharply rose to $219 USD/tonne by July. However, as the global
economic crisis kicked in, by January 2009 the coal price dropped to a mere $70
USD/tonne (Store Norske Annual Report 2008). Though the economic volatility of
mining in the Arctic has cut into Store Norske's profitability, Store Norske only began
generating a profit from 2002. In this respect, the stubborn persistence of Store Norske's
mining operations are not only surprising by virtue of their longevity, but also present a
powerful paradox: that Svalbard's landscapes are productive while failing to generate
profit. Norwegian mining on Svalbard historically developed and survives, however,
largely as a geopolitical strategy to maintain Norwegian sovereignty over Svalbard.
Though mines are conventionally conceived as sites of commodity production, Svalbard's
mines do not merely extract ore but fultill geopolitical objectives as well.
This paper investigates two interrelated questions that interrogate how Arctic
geopolitical imperatives have shaped the capitalist production of commodities on
Svalbard. First, how are capitalist productions of coal and landscape shaped by Arctic
geopolitical objectives on Svalbard? Second, given that state intervention has been critical
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to the survival of mining and has funded scientific activities that make use of mining
inti'astructures, how do geopolitical objectives extend the productivity of Svalbard's
minescapes? At a time when the industrialization of the Arctic is becoming an
increasingly contentious geopolitical issue for many Arctic states, Store orske's mincs
are important as examples of on-going operations intertwincd in historical and
contemporary Arctic geopolitics. Svalbard also provides interesting theoretical insight
into the interlocking economic and geopolitical functions of mineral production, and how
this geopolitical economy has dictated the lifespan and charactcr ofmincral production on
the rcsource periphery.
This paper focuses on the histories and geographics ofNorwcgian mining on
Svalbard using a mixed-methods approach. 6 On their own, Svalbard's landscapcs do not
recall a history of mining or reveal the geographic political economics of this
development. Rather, these minescapes provide a material cvidence-base which can bc
placed in conversation with policy documents, corporate repol1s and key informant
interviews to better understand Svalbard's mining geographies. Interviews wcrc
undertaken with key stakeholders employed in decision- and policy-making capacities in
the Norwegian mining and science sectors on Svalbard. The interviews followcd a scmi-
structured format, whercby a series of open-ended questions werc tailored to each
pal1icipant's experience, and impromptu questions probed responses in greater dctail.
Contemporary government policy documents and company reports relating to Svalbard's
"Though many nations have operated mines on Svalbard. and Russia continues to actively extract coal
there, I focus on Norwegian mining in this paper. This focus on Norwegian mining reflects the long history
and endurance of Store Norske's activities on Svalbard, and theavailabililyofNorwegiandocul11cntary
evidence for research
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mining, science, communities and infrastructures (provided by interview participants or
acquired from the web) have been reviewed to complement these interviews.
Interrogating this research material reveals that mining on Svalbard was not
mercly incidental to the geo-Iogic location of ores, nor was coal extracted in rcsponse to
market demand. Instead, the Norwegian government financially and politically supportcd
Store Norske's coal mining operations to help maintain its sovereignty over the
archipelago: an instance of what I describe as a 'geopolitical economy' of resource
extraction. Using existing scholarship, this paper begins by outlining Svalbard's history of
resource extraction to trace the historical development of Svalbard's mining gcopolitical
economy. The next section describes the mining geopolitical economy from the late
1970s to present, arguing that the production of coal on Svalbard continues to be heavily
influenced by geopolitical imperatives. As such, I suggest that Svalbard's minescapes are
productive, not just as spaces from which valuable coal is extracted but are also co-
productive as spaces that secure Norwegian sovereignty over the archipelago. Then, I
describe how the existence of mining infrastructures on Svalbard has served as a
springboard for the development ofscicntific research facilities. I assert that this
development of scientific activities on Svalbard has not only extended the productivity of
this Arctic minescape in places where mining has formally ended, but also complements
mining activity in fulfilling geopolitical objectives. In short, this demonstrates the on-
going-ness of productive functions at closed mining spaces. First, however, I begin by
defining what is meant by the 'gcopolitical economy' in theoretical terms.
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2.2 Theorizing Resource Peripheries: The Geopolitical Economy
This paper was initially intended to explore the unique character of Svalbard's
mining political economy. While much existing scholarship focuses on the historical
dimensions of scienti fic exploration (Jones 200 I; 2008; Wrakberg 2006; Lewander 20 I0),
resource development (Hacquebord and Avango 2009; Avango et al. 20 II), and
geopolitics of Svalbard (Mathisen 1954a; 1954b; Machowski 1995; Ulfstein 1995; Atland
and Pedersen 2008; Pedersen 2009), this paper extends existing historical literature to
analyse the contemporary status of mining on Svalbard and better theorize the mining
political economy there. As research for this paper progressed, it soon became clear that I
was not dealing with issues in political economy alone. Instead, mining on Svalbard is
shaped by an interlocking set of political-economic imperatives and geopolitical
objectives which together demand a reconfiguration of the way we theorize resource
extractive activities on Svalbard, not only as productive of material commodities and
capital, but also as productive of sovereignty.
This paper offers a theoretical telTain in which the geopolitical imperatives and
geographic particularities of political economy can be woven together through an analysis
of Svalbard's 'geopolitical economy'. Different variants of this notion have been
occasionally deployed by geographers interested in both geopolitical and political-
economic analyses (Agnew and Corbridge 1989; Corbridge and Agnew 1991; Dodds and
Sidaway 1994; Le Sillon 2004; Mercille 2008; Glassman 2011). In particular, this paper
draws from the twin concepts of the telTitorial and capitalist logics of power presented by
David Harvey, ideas that have been subsequently mobilized by scholars undertaking
60
intcrsecting geopolitical and geoeconomic analyses (e.g. Mercille 2008). The capitalist
logic of power refers to the "molecular processes of capital accumulation in space and
time" that occur "through the daily practices of production, trade, commerce, capital
nows" (Harvey 2003, 26-27). Most fundamentally, this logic of power is drivcn by a
profit-motive, and operates in and beyond fixed territorial boundaries. The territorial logic
of power stresses the "political, diplomatic, and military strategies invoked and uscd by a
state ... as it struggles to assert its interests and achieve its goals in the world at large"
(ibid.). This logic seeks to augment state power, working within a te'Titorialized space
confincd by fixed territorial boundaries.
The geopolitical economy (as I use it) is a theory that attempts to bcttcr
conccptualize resource development at Svalbard, and other Arctic sites, where
geopolitical imperatives are otten decisive in detel1l1ining the political economy of
industrial ventures. The geopolitical economy draws from Harvey's capitalist and
territorial logics of power, concepts that are useful in paying equal attention to capitalistic
and state objectives that motivate economic ventures, as well as the connections and
connicts between the two. As mining on Svalbard illuminates, commercial and political
interests in mining are closely tied, and the production of coal embodies both economic
and non-economic (i.e. geopolitical) functions. In recognising that territorial and capitalist
logics of power are blurred, the geopolitical economy adopts an approach that
understands commodity production as co-productive of both capital and the state. I usc
cmpirical evidence in the remainder of this paper to unpack Svalbard's geopolitical
economy, arguing that both economic and geopolitical objectives shape the character of
6\
coal production on Svalbard and other on-going (scientitic and mining) activities on
Svalbard.
2.3 A Brief History of Resource Exploitation on Svalbard
Over millions of years, Svalbard has slowly crawled from the southern
hemisphere to its current position in the high nOlih. Plate tectonics have driven Svalbard
northward, subjecting its physical landscape to monumental change. The landscape was
once tropical, and rich in flora and fauna. Buried deep in bogs, these nora and fauna have
been subjected to intense heat and pressure over geologic time, to form coal seams which
remained untouched by humans until the last century when miners arrived to exploit this
coal. Notwithstanding its location in the High Arctic, Svalbard has experienced a
surprisingly long history of resource exploitation, some of which has been tied to
geopolitical aspirations. Svalbard's geopolitical economy, as it exists today, is very much
a product of these historical events. In tracking the historical development of mining and
the dynamic geopolitics of Svalbard, this section highlights how the production of coal
was increasingly used as a device to fulfil the geopolitical strategies of many nations, and
especially Norway.
Before mining started, Svalbard was perceived as tabula rasa in commercial
terms, attracting whale, seal, Arctic fox and walrus hunting fj'om the l7'h century in
pursuit of Svalbard's natural riches7 (Jones 200 I; Hacquebord and Avango 2009). Owing
to its geographic proximity to Scandinavia, Svalbard appeared a natural extension to
'Formoredelail on Ihe hislorical dimensions of natural resourceexploilaliononSvalbardseeAriov 1994;
Avangoelal. 2011; Hacquebord and Avango 2009
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Norway and people from Norway's north had long visited Svalbard to hunt and fish
(Mathisen 1954a). Norwegian Scientific exploration, undertaken in the 17th, 18\h and 19\h
centuries was closely tied to these economic ventures: "trade and exploration, at this time,
amounted to one and the same thing"S (Jones 200 I, 16). Whalers from many nations, for
instance, explored different coastal areas around Svalbard as a means offinding the most
protitable whaling grounds (Jones 200 I). Unlike other economic and scienti tic ventures
in the Arctic at this time (cf. Launius 2010), this activity on Svalbard was not explicitly
linked to territorial ambitions. Instead, the lack of an indigenous population and few
wintering settlements on Svalbard lessened the need for any country to lay claim over the
archipelago (Jones 2001).
Nonetheless, questions sUITounding the ownership of Svalbard did arise from time
to time. In the 19th century, some scientists and hunters began questioning the ownership
of Svalbard (Mathisen 1954a). Most notably, Swedish scientist and explorer Professor
Adolf Erik Nordenskiold drew attention to the political status of Svalbard, asserting that
establishing a colony on Svalbard would assist year-round meteorological observation,'!
At this time, some prominent figures offered a variety of suggestions regarding the
ownership of Svalbard. For instance, a zoologist with business interests in North Russia
named Michail Sidorov declared in a Geographical Society lecture in St. Petersburg that it
was a "historical fact" that Svalbard belonged to Russia (Mathisen 1954a, 25). However
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some countries, including Norway, prefelTed that Svalbard's status remain ambiguous,
amid fear that their use of the archipelago would be jeopardized should a 1'01111a I
agreement be reached. evel1heless, this episode clarified Svalbard's political status as
no-man's land -Ierra nul/ills - unclaimed, unowned and without an indigenous
population, open to exploitation by enterprises from across the world.
Enticed by the possibility to protit from Svalbard's natural resources, mineral
prospectors accompanied scientific expeditions to Svalbard in the 19th century. During
this 'initial phase' of mining on Svalbard, exploration and prospecting expeditions laid
claim to easily accessible coal seams (Hacquebord and Avango 2009). Soren
Zachariassen, a Norwegian sealing skipper, shipped the first coal from Svalbard to
Norway in 1899 sparking a new intemational interest in Svalbard (Mathisen 1954a;
Ulfstein 1995). In the early years of the 20th century Dutch, British, American,
Norwegian, Swedish and Russian experimental mining ventures were soon established on
Svalbard - though few enterprises lasted long (Mathisen 1954a; Avango el al. 20 I I).
These early ventures were principally established for economic reasons, exploiting only
the most profitable resources and investing in coalfields requiring the least initial capital
outlay (Avango el al. 20 I I). One of the most notable mining ventures was undertaken by
American financier John Munroe Longyear, who opportunistically established the Arctic
Coal Company in 1906 after visiting Svalbard in 1903 as a tourist and recognising the
potential for commercial coal mining (Arlov 1994; Hartnell 2009). The Arctic Coal
Company acquired Zaehariassen's interests, mining coal at Advenlljorden and
establishing Longyear City, the site of the present-day administrative centre of Svalbard -
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Longyearbyen. During this 'establishment phase', early claims were sold to industrialists,
and new companies established permanent year-round settlements (Hacquebord and
Avango 2009).
While early mining ventures were economically-driven, resolving the political
ambiguity of Svalbard became an increasingly contentious issue. The rapid proliferation
of mining on Svalbard brought about disputes between different nations, companies and
their workers. As historian Trygve Mathisen explains, "though the economic possibilities
were considered favourable, there was every reason to think twice about investing capital
in mining ventures, as long as the political status of the archipelago was so uncertain and
law and order so insecure" (Mathisen 1954a, 45). The government of the United States,
for instance, feared that sovereignty disputes would interfere with the Arctic Coal
Company's economic activities on Svalbard (Hacquebord and Avango 2009).
Mining on Svalbard also became politically important for Norway and Sweden at
this time. In a period of increased rivalry between the two countries - unified until 1905-
Svalbard offered an opportunity for expanding the influence of newly independent
Norway (Jones 200 I; Avango et at. 2009). Furthermore, because Norway and Sweden
had no coal resources within their national boundaries, establishing mines on Svalbard
would make these countries less vulnerable to price fluctuations and help sustain
independence (Avango et al. 20 II). The development of mining thus drove the need for a
system oflaw and order, and once again raised questions about Svalbard's political status.
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Though installing a stable political regime on Svalbard was dccmcd csscntial to
ensuring that mining remained profitable, mining activity itself strategically marked
territorial claims for several nations operating on Svalbard. Norwegian mining
companies, for instance, claimed both resources and territory for Norway through
"perfon11ing rituals of possession and by erecting symbols ofoccupation"'O (Hacqucbord
and Avango 2009, 35). Though resource claims were driven primarily by private
economic interests, these rituals also strengthened Norwegian territorial claim over
Svalbard. Additionally, Norwegian, Swedish and Russian mines received financial and
political suppOli from their governments to establish effective occupation of Svalbard
(Avango el at. 2011). This illuminates one way in which the territorial and capitalist
logics of power were distinct, yet closely tied and co-dependent in Svalbard's geopolitical
economy at that time.
During World War I the Scandinavian countries again realized they were at a
great disadvantage being dependent on foreign coal, especially when the price of coal was
high (Mathisen I954a). In this context, the Store Norske Spitsbergen Kulkompani
(referred to as Store Norske for the remainder of this paper) was established in 1916 as a
syndicate financed by several banks and encouraged by the Norwegian state, with the idea
of taking control of the Arctic Coal Company's property (Mathisen 1954a; ArJov 1994).
That same year, the Kings Bay Kul Compani established as a private Norwegian company
at Ny-Alesund in Kongsfjorden (see Figure 2). Alongside the establishment of more
mines on Svalbard, Norway organized conferences with Sweden and Russia in 1910 and
10 Interesting examples of claiming both resources and territory are brielly described by Avango ,,[III
(2011)
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1912, and various powers were invited to a conference in Oslo in 1914 to discuss the
legal status of Svalbard II (Mathisen 1954a). However, in closed meetings the Norwegian
government decided that Norwegian sovereignty over Svalbard was the best solution for
the international community (Ulfstein 1995). It should be noted that Norway's actions
were not aggressively expansionist, but rather aimed to promote diplomacy and
neutrality, ideals championed during Norway's independence (Mathisen 1954a; Ulfstein
1995).
In 1920 the 'Svalbard Treaty' was submitted to the League of Nations and signed
by fourteen initial parties. 12 Still in effect today, the Treaty grants the "full and absolute
sovereignty" of Svalbard to Norway, so that all countries present on Svalbard must
confonn to Norwegian law (Ulfstein 1995). The 1925 'Svalbard Act' otTicially placed
Svalbard under Norwegian sovereignty and installed the 'sysselmann' (the governor of
Svalbard) as the highest Norwegian authority on Svalbard (Ulfstein 1995).
Notwithstanding Norwegian sovereignty over Svalbard, the Svalbard Treaty also
preserves the international character of Svalbard through the non-discriminatory access of
signatory nations to Svalbard's resources. As such, Article 7 of the Svalbard Treaty states
that:
[w1ith regard to methods of acquisition, enjoyment andexerciseoftherightofowncrship
ofpropel1y, including mineral rights, [...1 Norway undertakes to grant to all nationals of
II FormoredetailonlhepoliticalhistoryandlegalstatusofSvalbard see Mathisen 1954a; 1954b: Ull'stein
1995
12 Inlerestingly,the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairsdidnolaclivelypreparethistrcaty,butinstead
Store Norske established a committee lodraf1 the treaty (Ulfslei n 1995). The fourteen inilialsignatory
nalions were the United States. Denmark. France, Italy, Japan, the Nelherlands, Norway. Sweden. the
United Kingdom, and British overseas dominions of Canada, Australia. India, South Africa and New
Zealand. Presently, there are now over forty signatory nalions
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the High Contracting Parties treatment based on cOll1pieteequality[ .. ](TheSvalbard
Treatyl920)U
Though this clause pemlits signatory nations to undeliake resource extractive activities on
Svalbard, they must follow Norwegian mining regulations on Svalbard. Accordingly,
'The Mining Code' was presented simultaneously to the Treaty at the Paris Peace
Confcrence, and ratified by Royal Decree in 1925. The Mining Code permits signatory
nations to search, acquire and exploit natural deposits of coal, mineral oils and other
minerals and rocks (Article 2, The Mining Code 1925).
One commentator has noted the terms of the Svalbard Treaty are very much a
product of historical events at that time:
In theafterll1alh of the Great War, the Svalbard Treaty resolved theunfeasibilityof
Spitsbergen!!.Q!beingaliocatedtoaparticlilarnation. The dividing lip of geographical
spoilsthroughollttheworldhasbecoll1eapoliticalnecessityandthis allocation of
international territory conferred recognition of Norway' sacknowledged statllsasa nation
(Jones 2001, 37).
Nevertheless, in the period immediately after the Treaty was entorced, Norwegian
jurisdiction over Svalbard was virtually non-existent (Pedersen 2009). During this time,
instances of Soviet non-compliance with Norwegian policies have been noted, but the
sysselmann did not have sufficient staff or logistical resources to exercise Norwegian
13 As well as these principles, the Svalbard Treaty enforces environmental conservalion. promoles the
peaceflilutilisationofSvalbard,anddemandsthatalitaxescollectedon Svalbard are spent on Svalbard
(Ulfstein 1995).
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sovereignty (Ulfstein 1995; Pedersen 2009). Even had the sysselmann been able to
enforce Norwegian jurisdiction, some scholars suggest that "small state Norway" did not
want to provoke any sort of dispute with the Soviet Union during this time, so adopted a
laissezfaire approach to Svalbard (Pedcrsen 2009).
Towards the end of the 1920's an economic depression heavily impacted mining
activities on Svalbard, leaving only Norwegian and Russian mines on the archipelago.
While the economic oppOliunities Svalbard offered had been exaggerated, thc costs of
production in the Arctic had been underestimated (0streng 1978). As the price of coal fell
in the 1920's, only mines with strong government support survived in the post-1920's
'consolidation phase', which was characterized by fewer actors involved in mineral
extraction, more investment in operations and housing, and the establishmcnt of multi pic
permanent settlements which acted as administrative headquarters(Hacquebordand
Avango 2009). Alongside the Norwegian settlements at Longyearbyen and Ny-Alcsund,
the Russian state-owned coal company Trust Arktikugolmaintained mining communities
at Barentsburg and Pyramiden (see Figure 2). In 1933 the Norwegian state acquired all
the shares of the Kings Bay Kul Compani at Ny-Alesund by writing-offthc company's
debt to the government l4 (0streng 1978). This maintenance of Norwegian and Russian
mines on Svalbard was clearly linked to geopolitical-economic imperatives: while
Norway still relied on Svalbard as her only source of coal, the Soviet Union had no othcr
significant production in her northern regions (Mathisen 1954b).
14 However, the Kings Bay Kul Compani closed the mine at Ny-Alesund in 1963 after a mining accident.
and the company's mining rights were transferred to Store Norske
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During the Second World War coal was important for Norway, and the
Norwegian government strategically ordered an increase in the production of coal l1'om
Svalbard's mines (Mathisen 1954b). Though Svalbard did not play an important role
during the war, there were some outbreaks of combat around the archipelago which raised
questions about the Svalbard Treaty, and specifically its peaceful utilization clause. In
particular, the Soviet Union asserted that the Russian government had not been
represented during the Treaty negotiations in Paris, and argued that two of the signatory
nations had fought against the Soviet Union during the war. This discussion came at a
time when the exiled Norwegian government had to operate from London and the Soviet
Russian government no longer recognised Norway as a sovereign state (as it was under
German occupation). However, Mathisen suggests that the Soviet Union did not question
the Svalbard Treaty to exploit Norway's weak state, but rather sought to consolidate its
power on Svalbard (which was viewed as an impOliant defence of north Russia) in
response to increasing American influence in the Arctic. This not only gives insight into
Russia's interests in the Arctic, but illustrates that Norwegian sovereignty over Svalbard
was still contentious.
Tensions between Norway and Russia remained, especially amid a climate of
"fear, mistrust and suspicion" between Norway and Russia that climaxed during the Cold
War. On the one hand, press reports suggested that Norway was struggling to maintain its
sovereignty as around 2,500 Soviet residents were based on Svalbard in the 1950's
(Pedersen 2009). On the other hand, Russian mistrust of Norway grew as Norway became
a NATO member and sparked fears that Svalbard could become a NATO base which
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would violate the Svalbard Treaty's peaceful utilisation clause 1s (Atland and Pedersen
2008; Pedersen 2009). Atland and Pedersen suggest that this tension between Russia and
Norway was influenced by Russia's fluctuating relationship with the United States and
NATO (Atland and Pedersen 2008). In response, Norway took steps to consolidate its
jurisdiction on Svalbard from the mid-1970s onwards (Pedersen 2009). In 1976 the
sysselmann was finally given a helicopter, more administrative staff were employed and a
new office was built to help exercise sovereignty over Svalbard (Ulfstein 1995).
Alongside this, the Svalbard budget swelled from 0.7 million Norwegian Kroner in 1960
to over 90 million by 2000 (Pedersen 2009). Furthel1l10re, the Norwegian state increased
its stake in Store Norske to save the company from bankruptcy and keep Store Norske
afloat. The post-l 970s geopolitical economy of mining is described in the next section in
greater detail, but it is important to highlight at this point that Norway evidently sought to
consolidate its presence on Svalbard during a period in which Norwegian sovereignty
over Svalbard was on shaky ground.
Despite ratification of the Svalbard Treaty, increasing co-operation between
Russia and Norway, and the contraction of Russian mining on Svalbard, Norwegian
sovereignty over Svalbard remains a contentious issue in the post-Cold War era. Some
policy documents suggest that Norwegian sovereignty over Svalbard is important as a
method by which the terms of the Svalbard Treaty can be upheld:
15 As well, Russia registered its opposition to Norway's interpretation of the Svalbard Treaty.lnparticular.
Russia contested Norway'sclailll to exclusive rights in zones beyond the territoria I sea and viewed
environlllental protection Illeasures undertaken by Norway as prohib itiveofRussianlllineralexploralion
and exploitation (for Illore detail see Atlandand Pedersen 2008: Pedersen 2009)
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The Government's overriding objectives in respect of the policy towards Svalbard
comprise consistent and fimlenforcement of sovereignty, prope I' observance of the Trcaty
relating to Spitsbergen and control to ensure compliance with the Treaty, maintenance of
peace and stability in the area, preservation of the area's dist inctive natural wilderness and
maintenance of Norwegian communities on the archipelago (Norwegian Ministry of
Justice and the Police 1999)
In this, and other policy documents, Norway is cast as a guardian of Svalbard's unique
environmental and cultural character. Yet as the remainder of this chapter argues, mineral
extraction continues to be an important method by which Norwegian sovereignty on
Svalbard is exercised.
In sum, Svalbard's mining history can be characterized by a more or less constant
struggle to maintain Norwegian and Russian economic activities on Svalbard, driven by
changing geopolitical motives. Government subsidization, a key characteristic of
Svalbard's mining geopolitical economy, has been essential to sustaining economic
operations on Svalbard, particularly during the Cold War. Yet at times, the exact reasons
for maintaining economic activity on Svalbard are ambiguous, leading one commentator
to note that "Norway, consciously or unconsciously, seems to have worked hard over the
previous couple of decades to ensure Spitsbergen could be perceived as a territory II'or,h
acquiring ... " (Jones 2001, 37). The next section argues that this sentiment is still true
today, and uses primary research material to analyse how the production oreoal (tl'om the
1970s onwards) has been driven by geopolitical economic imperatives described in this
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2.4 Svalbard's Contemporary Mining Geopolitical Economy
Svalbard's summertime reveals a landscape that comes alive under the midnight
sun. The snow covering Adventdalen melts to expose a straight road that cuts down the
valley - from Mine 7 to Longyearbyen. Trucks loaded with coal roar down this dusty
road, heading to the harbour (Figure 4). Meanwhile, small planes shuttle miners 60km
between Longyearbyen and Svea. Whereas Mine 7 produced a mere 75,000 tonnes of
coal, the Svea Nord mine produced 2.6 million tonnes in 2009. Store Norske's coal is a
commodity, containing value and circulated in the capitalist system. Used for energy,
cement and metallurgy, this coal is principally sold to Germany, the Netherlands,
Portugal, and France among other European countries. Although the landscape remains
industrious, productive and integrated into nows of capital and commodities, this
economic productivity is not the only - or even principal - source of its value; rather, the
production of coal is valuable by virtue of Svalbard's geostrategic location in the Arctic.
One main strategy to extend the life of mining, and thus, extend Norwegian sovereignty
on Svalbard, has been to develop Longyearbyen into a more stable, 'normal' community.
Set within the context of Longyearbyen's 'nonnalisation', this section uses an array of
policy documents, corporate reports and interview material to explore how the co-
production of coal, landscape and telTitory is shaped by geopolitical-economic
imperatives on Svalbard.
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Figure 4. A truck transporting coalFo/11 Mine 7 in Adventdalen (hackground. lefi)
Author's photograph
The last 30 years of Norwegian activity on Svalbard can be broadly characterized
by an intensification and consolidation of Norway's presencc in response to Cold War
territorial anxieties and the limited nature of Norwegian sovereignty ovcr Svalbard. As
explained in the previous section, because the Svalbard Treaty allowcd signatory nations
to undertake economic activity on Svalbard, "Norway received a very special and highly
restricted sovereignty over the archipelago" (0streng 1978,28). Recent policy documcnts
demonstrate the political importance of maintaining Norwegian activity on Svalbard:
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Several conditions havetobemel in order to ensure that Norwegian sovereignty is
prolonged. One important one is thaI there have to be Norwegian eeonomie activities at
Svalbard ... whenthetreatywassigned,miningwasthedominatingeeono11lieaetivity
(Bjornsen and Johansen 2010,17)
In response, there has not only been a marked increase in state investment and a growth in
bureaucratic capacities that strengthen Norway's sovereignty on Svalbard, but an effort 10
turn Longyearbyen into a more stable settlement through 'non11alisation'.
This 'non11alisation' effort sought to develop Longyearbyen as a permancnt
family community to firmly root a Norwegian presence on Svalbard. Longyearbycn was
initially established as a company town owned and controlled by Store Norskc, and
typical of company towns, the male-dominated workforce at Longyearbyen occupied
temporary job positions and lived in temporary accommodation (Norwegian Ministry of
Justice and the Police 1999; see also Viken 2006). However, from 1975 onwards
government policy sought to 'normalise' Longyearbyen as a family community and
diversify economic activity there (Norwegian Ministry of Justice and the Police 1999).
During this period of normal isali on, infi'astruclural assets have been transferrcd to thc
Norwegian state, food and clothing stores opened, new housing developed and an airport
built. Store Norske has played a central role in Longyearbyen's normalisation, by
building family housing, sponsoring sports and cultural activities, and remaining as the
largest employer on Svalbard (Carlsen pel's. comm. 2011 b). Norwegian policy documcnts
illustrate how normalisation has been used to develop Longyearbyen into a more
pell11anent family community to prolong Norway's presence on Svalbard:
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Oneofthe main objectives of Svalbard policy is the maintenancc of Norwegian
communities in the archipelago. This objective is met through the family community in
Longyearbyen.Overtheyearstherehasbeenaconsciouserfort to facilitate three lieldsof
activity in particular. Throughout history, coal mining has formed the basis lor
Longyearbyen and other communities in the archipelago. There has also been a locus on
research, education and tourism. Theseeff0l1s have all helped to make Longyearbyen the
modern community it is today (Norwegian MinistryofJusticeandt hc Police 2008. 8-9)
As part of a "conscious effort" to maintain Norwegian mining on Svalbard, the
Norwegian state took control of one third of Store Norske's shares in 1973, and by 1976,
the state owned 99.9% of Store Norske to save the company trom bankruptcy. Store
Norske's coal mining has been historically unprofitable and the state has absorbed Store
Norske's financial losses, paying 100 million Norwegian Kroners annually to subsidize
Store Norske during the 1980s (Ulfstein 1995). Recent annual reports published by Store
Norske illustrate that the Norwegian state continued to subsidize Store Norskc's losses, at
times in excess of 100 million Kroners, in the early 2000s (see Figure 5). Read in the
context of normalisation, state ownership of Store Norske clearly complements eftorts to
strengthen a Norwegian presence on Svalbard. This consolidation of Norwegian power
through increasing the state-owned share of Store Norske, vividly exemplifies how
"sovereignty capitalizes a telTitory" (cf. Foucault 2007, 20), driven by geopolitical
economic imperatives.
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Figure 5. Table o!'Store Norske 's production. sales. profit before laxes und s/lhsidie.l·
hetween 1999 and 2010 using data compi/edfi'om Siore Norske Annual Reporl.I'
(2004:2007:2010)
The diversification of Svalbard's economy has been integral to these
nOllllalisation efforts, and a particularly important strategy to maintain Norwegian
economic activity on Svalbard given Store Norske's unprofitability. Though mining is
still critical to Svalbard's economy, the emergence of other (arguably more stable)
economic activities on Svalbard, such as research and tourism, has also facilitated
Longyearbyen's normalisation. As one report reviewing the status of Svalbard's mining
economy explained:
Norwegiancoalll1iningoperationswerepreviouslythell1ainmeasurcformaintainingthe
Norwegian presence on Svalbard, but now the privatesectoroftheeconoll1yalsoplaysa
ll1ajorpart in relation tosettlell1ent in Longyearbyen ... A well-developed economic sector
isan impol1antbasis fora viable local comll1unity, and theservices industry isof
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particular importance for other activities on the archipelago (Norwegian Ministry of
Justice and the Police 1999, 1).
In view of changes and challenges to Svalbard's economy and society during
normalisation, numerous policy documents (reviewed throughout this papcr) have been
produced to monitor the status of Svalbard's economy. The Norwegian Institute for
Urban and Regional Research (NIRB) assesses the importance of mining to the
Longyearbyen community on an annual basis (Bjornsen and Johansen 2010), whilc the
Polar Affairs Department of the Norwegian Ministry of Justice and the Police has
submitted three reports to the Storting (the Norwegian Parliament) regarding the
economic and political status of Svalbard at decadal intervals. Thcse documcnts are
themselves suggestive of the importance of Norwegian economic activities in keeping
Norway's settlements on Svalbard productive. Together, the normalisation of
Longyearbyen and the diversification of Norwegian economic activities on Svalbard
helped strengthen Norway's presence on Svalbard during the Cold War period, and state
control of Store Norske has been the centrepiece of this effort.
In 1999, however, one of the reports produced by the Department of Polar Affairs
proclaimed that a new geopolitical situation had arisen on Svalbard. The brcakup of the
Soviet Union earlier that decade, the report claimed, allowed increasing coopcration
between the Russian and Norwegian settlements on Svalbard (Norwcgian Ministry of
Justice and the Police 1999). Alongside this, the Russian population on Svalbard had bcen
decreasing, especially since the abandonment of Pyramiden in 1999 left Barentsburg as
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the only remaining pennanently inhabited Russian settlement on the archipelago. If> Yct
this same report also included a cautionary note, that as "experiencehasshown,howcvcr,
that the Norwegian authorities cannot relax their vigilance as regards the tlrm and
consistent exercise of sovereignty" (Norwegian Ministry of Justice and the Police 1999,
I). Nonetheless, just three years after this report, Store Norske began 'normal' mining
operations whereby the governmcnt stopped subsidizing the company after the opening of
the Svea Nord mine. Like other enterprises within the state's porttolio, Store Norskc is
now operated as a business using "commercial principles with a vicw to achieving a
market return on the capital invested" 17 (Norwegian Ministry of Tradc and Industry 2007,
25). Indeed, Store Norske has generated its own profit and paid government royalties
since 2002 as coal production has increased and the price of coal improved (see Figurc 5).
In 2002 for instance, the price of coal was a mere $36 USD/tonne, but by 2008 this tigure
had risen to $175 USD/tonne (Store Norske Annual Rep0l1 2008, 2). In 2002, Store
Norske's profit after tax was $64 million Norwegian Kroners, and by 2008 this figure had
risen to $881 million.
Despite focusing on commercial mining, Store Norske's current coal production
clearly continues to fulfil not only economic objectives, but geopolitical imperatives that
help secure Norwegian sovereignty over Svalbard. 'Government Ownership Policy'
documents, produced by the Norwegian Ministry of Trade and Industry to increasc
transparency of government-owned enterprises, admit that:
16 For more on the abandonment of Pyramiden and its post-productive landscape, see Andresen, Bjerck and
Olsen 2010
17Enterpriseswithinthestate'sportfoliofulfilpoliticalandeconomicobjectives,includingthemaintenance
of command over Norwegian resources, providing a source of income for society and ensuring long term
value creation (Norwegian Ministry of Trade and Industry 2006)
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The objective of state ownership of Store Norske Spitsbergen Kulkompani is to contribute
to the continued existence and further development of the community in Longyearbycn
andtoensurethatitdevelopsinamannerthatunderpinstheoverridingaimsof
Norwegian policy for Svalbard ... Thejobs in connection with theoperationofthecoal
mineshavemadeasubstantialcontributionformanyyearstomaintainingstable,year-
round Norwegian activity and settlement on Svalbard (Norwegian Ministry ofTradc and
Industry2007,25-26).
In this policy document, riddled with nationalist sentiment, state ownership of Store
Norske clearly helps to maintain Norwegian control over Norwegian resources. Seeking
to cultivate conditions that present mining as both stable and appropriate for 'Norway's
Svalbard policy', Store Norske's Annual Reports adopt a similar rhetoric:
Coal mining accounts for about 40% of employment. I-Ialfofallchildrenin
Longyearbyenhaveparentswhowork for Store Norskeor for associated companics
In view of this, it is important that Store Norske manages its resourcesascfficientlyas
possible. Production volume is extremely important for long-term planning of the coal
mining operation. If too many Store Norskeemployees do not live permanently in
Longyearbyen, this will weaken the family-based society and make mining less suitable
as a tool in Norway's Svalbard policy (Store Norske Annual Report 2008,4)
These documents reveal how the production of coal by Store Norske is tailored around a
geopolitical-economic logic that focusses on sustainable extraction to extend the life of its
mines and prolong Norwegian sovereignty over Svalbard. Rather than conceptualising
Store Norske's coal reserves as a potential commodity whose economic value is waiting
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to be realized, Store Norske's focus on sustainable extraction suggests that these reserves
are valuable in securing both Norwegian mining and Norwegian sovcrcignty on Svalbard
in the future. There are several important conceptual implications for understanding how
the production of coal under capitalism is shaped by Norwegian geopolitical objcctivcs on
Svalbard.
First, Svalbard's minescapes are the means of multiple geopolitical-economic
productions. By this, I mean that Store Norske's mines are not only economically
productive (though not always profitable) in producing coal (or more abstractly, value),
but are also co-productive in the sense of reproducing Norwegian sovcreignty on
Svalbard. As a Store Norske Annual Report notes, "Store Norske's product, in addition to
coal, is a long-term and stable presence in Longyearbyen" (Store Norske Annual Rcport
2008,9). The extraction of coal is motivated not only by the use-value or exchange-value
of this "natural resource" infoll11ed by the capitalist logic of power, but by the
geostrategic and political function that the performance of coal mining on Svalbard
represents: Norwegian mining is sovereignty exercised and actualized. Critically, the
minescape (including the Norwegian mining town of Longyearbyen) is itself produccd.
by the operation of the state-subsidized fill11 Store Norske, as a material manifestation of
Norwegian sovereignty on Svalbard. So, one characteristic of Svalbard's geopolitical
economy is that Store Norske's mines are not only economically productive of ores, but
are a material product of Norwegian sovereignty claims.
Second, although Svalbard's minescapes are productive they have not always
been economically profitable. Ifwe were to accept the idea that capital evacuates Ii'om
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unprotitable telTains and enterprises must produce surplus value to survive, Storc orskc,
by this capitalist logic, would have failed long ago. As a Store orske representative
noted in an interview: "[when] it comes to a point where you can choose between protit
and sovereignty, sovereignty is more important" (Carlsen pel's. comm. 20 II a). Instead,
the production of coal is shaped around a territorial logic that seeks to extend the
productivity of Norwegian mining on Svalbard. Thus, the political economy of mining on
Svalbard has been organized, not just around a profit-motive alone, but attuned to
geopolitical objectives: it is a geopolitical economy. Accordingly, another charactcristic
of Svalbard's geopolitical economy is that the territorial and capitalist logics ofpowcr arc
closely intel1wined in the production of coal.
In sum, the n0ll11alisation of Longyearbyen has bcen closely associatcd with
eff0l1s to maintain a Norwegian presence on Svalbard. Though orway's geopolitical
motives for maintaining a Norwegian presence on Svalbard have changed over timc, this
n0ll11alisation has been ccntral to detell11ining the lifespan and nature of Store orskc's
coal mining. Mining on Svalbard is not just incidental to thc geo-Iogic location of orcs on
the archipelago but centred around maintaining sovereignty, and to a Icsser cxtcnt
commercial profitability should global markets allow. In keeping with the idea that
"power itself is not a resource, but rather something generated or actualized through thc
control and reproduction of different kinds of resources" (Allen 2003, 44), mining on
Svalbard demonstrates one way in which sovereignty is materially manifest - in short,
mining on Svalbard is co-productive of both capital and the Norwcgian state. At Svalbard
(and other Arctic resource development projects) these geopolitical imperatives extcndcd
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the lifespan of Store Norske's mines (under government assistance), disrupting
convcntional conceptualisations of resource lifecycles that view mining as ephemeral.
The next section argues that these dual geopolitical and economic impcrativcs continuc to
characterize new activities on Svalbard, including the development of scientific facilities,
which complement n0ll11alisation efforts and economic diversification attempts.
2.5 The Scientization of Svalbard's Minescapes: Co-producing Science and
Territory
While Store Norske's operational mines continue to perform geopolitical-
economic functions, Svalbard's 'post-productive' minescapes have been rejuvenated by
scientific activities, driven in part by on-going geopolitical imperatives. These closed
minescapes may appear as if they are no longer productive of coal (or Norwegian
sovereignty), however elements of historic and contemporary mining infrastructures have
served as platfonllS for the development of scientific facilities on Svalbard. Even though
the proliferation of science has occurred at a time when Arctic research has become
fashionable, this section argues that the development of scientific institutions and
facilities on Svalbard has also been influenced by Norwegian territorial anxieties. I
suggest that science on Svalbard does not merely complement the continued operation of
mining, but is itself a component of Svalbard's on-going geopolitical economy. The
scientization of Svalbard's minescapes question the idea that activities in peripheral
regions are always ephemeral, instead suggesting that past and present mining
infi-astructures can act as platforms for diversification with the shared goal of keeping
Svalbard's Norwegian mining settlements productive of both resources and sovereignty.
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This scientization also demonstrates the on-going capitalist and telTitorial motivations at
playon Svalbard.
Svalbard's closed minescapes might appear as if they are no longer productive.
For instance, in Adventdalen old mining structures run parallel to the road to Mine 7,
seemingly contrasting the productivity of the operational mine. These structures haunt the
landscape; old mines can still be seen, precariously perched on the eli ff sides of
connecting valleys but remain disused. Old mine cableways and headti-ames arc
integrated into the fabric of the landscape, acting as banal reminders of past mining. The
mountainsides are scarred with piles of wood, wires, crates and pieces of coal.
In line with this aesthetic, Svalbard is often portrayed as a natural and historical
relic, a space reclaimed from capitalist production. Cultural heritage literature produced
for visitors romanticize this long gone history:
Today there are no more hammer strokes from the copper boilers, crcaking from thc
ships' ropes,sholltingand lallghter from workers bllilding railwaysandthealmostsilcnt
footstepsofahllnteronhiswaytotendtohistraps.llowevcr,thetraccsofthcpcoplc
remain as silent testimonies of the people of past timcs. By having the having thc
oppol1unitytomeetllpwiththesehistoriesolltinthcwildcrness,and the oppol1LlIlity to
hear the tales where they took place, we can reach an llnderstandi ng forthevaillcofwhat
was left behind, and experienceconstrllctivc mcctings with thcpast(Prcstvold2003,2-3).
Archaeological research on Svalbard also places mining activities firmly in the past
(Hacquebord and Avango 2009; Kruse 2011), and many visitors view abandoned mine
sites as "rubbish, as waste" (Sandodden pers. comm. 2011). For this literature, the
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abandoned minescape perf0ll11S no work, it produces nothing; just an infi'astructural
skeleton remains. It scars the landscape. It ruins the beauty of the Arctic. It has no use. It
has no value.
However, these mining remnants unwittingly overshadow new structures in the
minescape, whose work is equally as silent. Now, scientific instruments are embedded
into the fabric of the minescape. These scientific projects are not always obvious within
the minescape. In some areas, a lone marker or quadrat indicates the presence of scientific
research. Aside from the occasional truck fi'om Mine 7, this valley still appears as ifit
isn't a working landscape. Few people work here. But these scientific instruments are
automated, continually logging and probing nature (Figure 6). This is still a landscape of
production; technological assemblages are the means of production ofscicntific
knowledge, mining data from the environment. Although Svalbard has for centuries been
subjected to scientific exploration, from 1989 onwards Svalbard expericnced a period of
unprecedented investment in physical infi'astructures for scientific use. Svalbard's
minescapes have been scientized: rapidly colonized by scientific facilities, institutions,
research projects and personnel, supported by state-funded investments and stabilized by
a favourable political climate which has revalorized theminescape.
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Figure 6. Scientific equipment beside an abandoned mining structure in Endalen (close
to Longyearhyen). Author's photograph.
National policy documents reveal that the scientization of Svalbard's mincscapes
occurred at a time when the Arctic has become regarded as the crucible of global climate
change in scientific and political circles, and gained a new prominence in Norway's
national research agenda. In response to the (re-)emergence of the Arctic as a frontier of
scientific knowledge, a white paper on Norwegian research to the Storting (Report No.
42, 1992-93) presented plans to forefront polar science that would assist Norway in
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becoming a "leading Arctic research nation,,18 (The Research Council of orway 2004,
8). Strategic planning of this task was assigned to the Research Council of olway, which
subsequently established a ational Committee for Polar Research and developcd policy
for Norwegian research in the Arctic l9 (see for example, The Research Council of
olway 1998a; 2004).
As Arctic science became a research priority in orway, Svalbard was hailcd as a
scientific platform to fulfil these national objectives, owing to the archipelago's Arctic
location. In addition to its location and well-developed research infrastructure (The
Research Council of Norway 1998b), Svalbard is also made scientifically valuable by thc
variety of natural phenomcna observable there:
Svalbard's position inthefarn0l1h improvesthecxtcntandrange of registrations and
monitoring of weather and climate parameters of importance to bothweatherforecasting
and climate research. Svalbard and the sUIToundingsea areas are also important
"archives" of information about earlier climate Iluctuations. G lacierson Svalbard,and the
extent and quantity of drift ice, could also provide significant monitoring parameters in
connection with future changes of climate. Svalbard isthusakeyarea for research and
18 The full mission slalemenl oUllined by the Research Council of Norway reads: "Norway is 10 be a leading
Arclic research nalion, and will inlhepcriod 2004-2008 seek to advance its underslanding of the processcs
governing climate and environmenlal change in Ihe Arctic, as well as lhcimpaclsofchangeonlhenalural
cnvironmenl and society, asa basis forbellermanagement of the region"(The Research Council of Norway
2004,8)
'''TheNationalCommillee for Polar Research is responsible for the devclopmenl of researchslralegyand
co-ordinalion of financial and logistical resources (The Research Council of Norway 199Rb). The Rcsearch
Council subsequenllyhighlighled three keyobjeclives, namel y: I)"tooblainbasicknowledgeaboutlhe
physical and biological environmenl in the Arclic byexploiling their unique qualilies as a natural
laboralory, 2) to improve the foundalion of the knowledge requiredformanagementoflheArctic.3)to
exploit Norway's natural advanlages for research in the Arctic 10 ensure both environmenially friendly and
economically sustainable induslrial developmenl. (The Research Council of Norway 1998a)
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sllrveillance relating to changes in the global climate (Norwegian MinistryofJlIsticeand
the Police 1999).
Once valued as a geostrategic outpost during the Cold War, these policy documents
suggcst how Svalbard's geographic location became valuable as a space sensitive to a
changing climate and as a frontier of Arctic research. As Wegge notes, this shin has bccn
obscrved across the Arctic: "while during the Cold war the high north was important
primarily because of its military strategic value, the recent surge might rather be
explained by changes related to global warming and its consequences" (Wegge 20 I0, I).
In response to the various policy documents promoting scicnce on Svalbard, the Svalbard
Science Forum (SSF) was established in 1998, funded by the Norwegian govcrnmcnt, to
encourage Svalbard as an "international platfol1l1 for research" by facilitating and co-
ordinating research on the archipelago (The Research Council of Norway 1998a; 1998b;
Hi.ibnerpers. comm. 2011).
A variety of research infrastructures and scientific institutions have been
established in response to the rising importance of Arctic science in Norwegian policy. At
Ny-Alesund, the world's n0l1hernmost pennanent settlement, the former mining town has
been transfol1l1ed into a centre for research. Though the state-owned King's Bay
Company closed its mine at Ny-Alesund in 1963, from 1974 the former mining company
assumed responsibility for the operation ofNy-Alesund and turned its attention to
establishing a research station. The Norwegian Polar Institute had already established a
scientific station at Ny-Alesund in 1968. As owner of much of the land and buildings at
Ny-Alesund, the Kings Bay Company developcd the old town inti'astructure into a
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'research village' that offered accommodations to scientists and providcd logistical
support. From 1989 Ny-Alesund really came alive. One by one, year after year, nations
from across the world began establishing research stations.20 An "international scicntitic
community" developed: the celebrated internationalism of the Svalbard Treaty manifcst
in the landscape (Paulsen pel's. comm. 2011; Gisnas pel's. comm. 2011).
The development of Ny-Alesund as a research base from 1989 onwards occurrcd
alongside government efforts to normalise Longyearbyen and the development of a
university there. Establishing an Arctic college or university on Svalbard "had long bccn
a dream of biologists and geologists at the universities on the mainland" (Fla pel's. comm.
20 II). In 1992 the Norwegian government decided to establish a university centrc
spccialising in contemporary Arctic-related environmental issues. In 1993, the University
Centre of Svalbard (UNIS) was founded, and accepted its tirst students who studied in
provisional premises at Longyearbyen. Reflecting on the development of UN IS, onc
government report notes that "the rate at which UNIS was established is without parallcl
in Norwegian - and probably international - university history" (Norwegian Ministry of
Justice and Police 1999). Estimates suggest that over I billion Norwegian Kroner has
been invested in Svalbard's research infrastructurebetwecn 1990and 1999 alone
(Norwegian Ministry of Justice and the Police 1999). The scientization ofthcse
Norwegian settlements dramatically illuminates the way scientific activity has revalorized
Svalbard'sminescapes.
20 Stations were established in 1968 (Norway), 1989 (Norway and Sweden, a joint station). 1990
(Germany), 199\ (the United Kingdom). 1992 (Japan), 1995 (Norway and the Netherlands). 1996
(Norway). 1997 (Italy), 2001 (France). 2002 (Korea), 2003 (France and Germany. ajoint station). 2004
(China) and 2008 (India)
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The timing of Norway's scientization of Svalbard not only coincidcs with an
intensified Norwegian Arctic research effort, but is linked to a range of other Norwegian
objcctives for the Arctic. Though Norwegian scientific agendas cast the Arctic as "a
pristine natural laboratory for the field sciences" (Bravo and Sarlin 2002, vii)-and
indeed the central motto of UN IS is 'nature as laboratory' (Arlov 2003)-the
scientization of Svalbard's landscapes was far from an apolitical process, but rather
heavily influenced by existing Norwegian territorial anxieties in the Arctic. As Jcnscn and
Skedsmo assert, "the European Arctic is at the head of the Norwegian political agcnda in
a way that has not been since the Cold War" (Jensen and Skedsmo 2010, 439). Onc of
many strategic plans that justify Norwegian research in the Arctic explains that:
As the only country that has possessions in the Arctic and also upholds territorial claims
in Antarctica, Nonvay has a special responsibility for building up knowledge of the polar
regions. Norway's objective isthereforetobea leading player in the investigationofits
own Arctic land and sea territory and adjacent areas about which too little is known and
where there are major research challenges (The Research Council of Norway 2004, 5)
Other documents on Norwegian 'High North' policy outline Svalbard's importance in
similar terms: "Svalbard's geographical location means that it is of strategic importance
for the management of our [Norwegian] resources in the North" (Norwcgian Ministry of
Forcign Affairs 2004, 22). Clearly, the development of scientific research institutions and
infrastructures on Svalbard has been driven by geostrategic objectivcs as well as scientific
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This resurgence of interest in Arctic research not only fulfils scientific and
geostrategic agendas, but occurred during a period in the 1990s in which the mining
company Store orske faced an uncertain future. As onc employee of the Svalbard
Science Forum explained: "The onvegian government [was] seeking for platforms for
other reasons to be here. And research is certainly one, an impol1ant one" (Hubner pcrs.
comm. 20 II). Another interviewee, who has worked at the University Centre since its
opening, suggested that: "It was a political decision that even ifmining was going down,
the Norwegian government didn't want less people, they wantcd people, so they had to
find something productive to do here in case mining was going down" (Fbi pers. comm.
20 I I). Indeed, strategic research policies explicitly assert that research should use
existing Norwegian settlements and new scientific infrastructures should complcmcnt
each settlement to "keep people productive,,21 (The Research Council of Norway 1998b;
U IS Annual Report 2011). More specifically, policy documents suggest that the
development of scientific research complements nonnalisation eftol1s, providing a
"socially useful investment and an important contributor to scttlement and community
Iife"n (Norwegian Ministry of Justice and the Police 2008), and helps to maintain
orwegian sovereignty on Svalbard:
Norwegian research and Norwegian research bases are illlporlant Illeans not only 01"
llleelinglheobligalionsinlheSvalbardTrealywilhregardlopreserving the region's
21 Additionally, foreign institutions constructed within Norwegian settlcmcnts arc considered Norwegian
r,r~~erty (The Research Council of Norway 1998b)
-- Ihls natlOnahst sentIment IS also eVIdent In documents produced by the RcsearchColincil of Norway.
which state that: "thedevelopmcntofSvalbardasanintemationalrescarchplatformdependstoalargc
extent on thecontinlled existence ofa stable familycommllnityi n Longyearbyen. This community will. in
tllrn. be based primarily lIpon coal mining, research and tOllrism for the foreseeable flit lire" (The Rcscarch
Councilof orway 1998b)
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characteristic wilderness,bllt also of lipholding national interests and exercising
sovereignty (Norwegian Ministry ofJlIstice and the Police 1999, I).
As with Store Norske, these objectives have been achieved through state-
ownership of the Kings Bay Company and UNIS, which operate non-profit busincsscs
selling scientific services while firmly rooting a sovereign Norwegian presence at Ny-
Alesund and Longyearbyen respectively. The Kings Bay Company is owned by the
Norwegian Ministry of Trade and Industry, and is operated as a non-profit busincss
whose "customers" are scientists that use its logistical services (Gisnas pel's. comm.
2011). 'State Ownership' documents explain that government ownership of the Kings
Bay Company is intended to help sustain and internationalize Norwegian scientific
research on Svalbard through establishing Ny-Alesund as an international scientific
community (Ministry of Trade and Industry 2006; 2007). Though UNIS is owned
completely by the Norwegian Ministry of Education and Research as a non-profit limited
company, approximately 30% of UN IS' funding derives from corporations (including
Store Norske) who purchase consulting and logistical services from UNIS (Fta pel's.
comm. 2011). Thus, there is not only cooperation between scientific institutions and
resource extractive corporations on Svalbard but a co-dependency between them which
continues to sustain the mining geopolitical economy on Svalbard. 23 Through channclling
state invcstment in scientific projects to existing Norwegian settlements on Svalbard,
these settlements are strengthened in their role as material manifestations of Norwcgian
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sovereignty on Svalbard. The recent scientization of Svalbard has not only supported the
existing mining geopolitical economy - through extending the productivity of Svalbard's
minescapes, for instance - but UNIS and the Kings Bay Company work as a geopolitical-
economic contingency should mining fail.
However, several recent documents produced by the Research Council of Norway
suggest that Norway's sovereignty claims possess a new economic and geopolitical
importance under climate change. In these documents, the Arctic is valucd
simultaneously as a landscape needing environmental protection while cast as a landscape
from which resources can be exploited in the future:
The challenges in the Arctic have assumed a new character. Formerly in the foreground of
national security, the Arctic now lies at the point of intersect ion between large-scale
industrial development and the preservation of Europe's last remaining wildemcss (The
Research Council of Norway 1998a).
On the one hand, the potential impacts of climate change provide a rationale for
protection of the Arctic 'wilderness', which justifies the proliferation ofscientific
research on Svalbard. On the other hand, the anticipated material transformation of the
Arctic environment under climate change offers the possibility of opening new shipping
routes and unlocking previously inaccessible natural resources in the north, which may
provide economic opportunities to shipping, logistics and knowledge industries24 In its
most recent rcport on Svalbard, the Norwegian Ministry of Justice and the Police
24 This rhetoric is also evident in policy on the 'Norwegianl-ligh North', which underlines the economic.
geopolitical, environmental and scientific importance of the Arctic. Asaresult,a 'I-ligh North Commission'
was established in 2003 to provide coherent policy regarding Norwegian activities in the Arctic (Norwegian
Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2004; 2006; 2009)
93
recogniscd that " ... an increasingly ice-free Arctic Ocean could also open up ncw routcs
for international shipping between East and West" (Norwegian Ministry of Justice and the
Police 2008). The shortest route through the Arctic Ocean to the Bering Strait, fi'om the
large cargo pOliS on the European continent, pass just west of Svalbard. Describing this
potential "development boom in the north," Store Norske Chief Executive Robert
Hermansen wrote in an annual report:
Withollr 100 years' experience of logistics and operations at inaccessible Arcticarcas
sllchas Svea, Store Norske is well eqllipped for taking on newchallenges.lntheyears
ahead, we will expect toenjoysllbstantial dell1and forthedevelopll1ent and lise of Arctic
technology and experience in Svalbard-based coal and oil explorationactivitics.Our
experienceofenvironll1entallysafeoperationsinthenorthisalsoexpectcdtobccoll1ca
valliedasset(StoreNorskeAnnllal Report 2005,5).
Government policy documents suggest that Store Norske's knowledge of operating in the
Arctic could be "exploited" for research by UNIS - useful in particular for the
development of oil and gas industries in the Barents Euro Arctic Region (The Research
Council of Norway 1998b). Indeed, the Technology Department at UN IS first developed
out of a necessity to provide practical solutions to infrastructural and operational
challenges on Svalbard (Arlov 2003). The shifting materialities of and discourses
surrounding climatic change may revalorize Svalbard's minescapcs after mining has
ceased, allowing Store Norske and UNIS to profit from Svalbard's geostrategic position
within the warming Arctic (The Research Council of Norway 1998b; 2004; Norwegian
Ministry of Justice and the Police 2008). The development of scientific research and
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education activities on Svalbard is clearly driven by interlocking capitalist and tcrritorial
logics of power.
All of this suggests that, while anticipated climatic change may offcr cconomic
opp0l1unities to Store Norske and UN IS, this new economic activity depends on the
maintenance of Norwegian sovereignty on Svalbard. Once established, this cconomic
activity will facilitate the Norwegian government in "keeping people productive" to
consolidate sovereignty claims. These coupled economic and geopolitical imperatives
may extend the longevity of Store Norske's operations, and permit the reuse Svalbard's
minescapes for alternate purposes. This complicated configuration of causc and cffcct
reveals the on-going entanglement of economic and geopolitical productions of
Svalbard's minescapes, reinforcing the utility of a geopolitical-economic analysis.
In sum, from 1989 onwards a number of scientific facilities and institutions
developed on Svalbard using existing mining infrastructures. Though Norwegian
involvement in Arctic science has increased alongside the rising prominence of Arctic
issucs rclating to climatic change, the development of science on Svalbard is shapcd by
territorial anxieties and assists mining in achieving geopolitical objectives. Like Store
Norske, the Kings Bay Company and UNIS are key components of Svalbard's
geopolitical economy, operating as state-owned businesses that achieve geopolitical
objectives. Though state subsidization of Store Norske was withdrawn in 2002, the statc
has instead invested in the development of scientific facilities which act as a gcopolitical-
cconomic contingency should mining fail. These scicntific institutions mirror and support
the geopolitical-economic work that historical and contemporary mining does to maintain
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Norwegian sovereignty on Svalbard. Svalbard's geographic location in the High Arctic
continues to make the (scientized) minescape gcostratcgically and economically valuablc
into the future, possibly providing an emerging impetus for strcngthcning Norwcgian
sovereignty over Svalbard.
2.6 Conclusion
The beginning of this paper painted an image of the Arctic landscapc as a spacc of
wilderness, pristineness, and marginality. Though romanticized, thcse imagcs havc been
used to supp0l1 notions that the Arctic may soon be subjected to irreversible and
devastating environmental transformation. When I first visited Svalbard in September
2009, for instance, the Secretary-General of the United Nations Ban Ki-Moon describcd
the Arctic as a vulnerable landscape susceptible to catastrophe, as he stood on Svalbard's
polar ice rim to draw the world's attention to the impacts of climate change. As the Arctic
is increasingly impacted by, and connected to global climate change, global capital and
international politics, Svalbard looks set to continue to bc an important Arctic site owing
to its economic, environmental and geopolitical significance.
Through investigating the contemporary ways in which Svalbard's mincscapcs
have been both produced and productive, this paper has extended existing historical
analysis, using key-informant interviews and documentary evidence, to answer two
questions concerning the contemporary mining geopolitical economy on Svalbard. The
first asked how capitalist productions of coal and landscape are shaped by Arctic
geopolitics. This paper has recognised that Svalbard's minescapes were not only
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productive as spaces of coal extraction, but were productive in terms of reproducing
Norwegian sovereignty shaped by interlocking capitalist and territorial logics of power.
Historians have suggested that mineral exploitation by Store Norskc was, from the outset,
ti-amed by geopolitical imperatives and intrinsically tied to Svalbard's geographic
position in the Arctic. These activities were not solely incidental to the geo-Iogic location
of coal on Svalbard or driven by a profit-motive, but fulfilled geopolitical objectives as
well. Despite being prone to global commodity price tluctuations and high operating costs
(among other economic pressures), Store Norske continues to operate and the Norwegian
state has been instrumental in subsiding unprofitable mining as a means of securing
sovereignty on Svalbard. Until very recently, Store Norske was not a profitable
enterprise, nor was its sole goal "accumulation for accumulation's sake; production for
production's sake" (Marx 1952,294), but rather coal production offered a method of
maintaining Norwegian sovereignty on Svalbard by "keeping people productive". 25 So,
Svalbard's minescapes are not only valuable by virtue of the material commodities they
produce, but function as material manifestations of Norwegian sovereignty. However, this
is not to say that the geopolitical function of mining is discrete and separate from its
economic imperative, but rather, they are co-dependent and their outcomes arc co-
produced. This co-production of economic commodities and geopolitical imperatives, and
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ofthc capitalist and territorial logics of power, is a key characteristic of Svalbard's
mining geopolitical economy.
The paper also investigated how geopolitical objectives have extended the
productivity of Svalbard's minescapes. This paper suggests that operational and c10scd
minescapes have acted as platforms for economic diversification as scientific rescarch has
made use of these mining infrastructures, to revalorize and extend the lifespan of
Svalbard's mining spaces. Alongside material infrastructures already in placc, a numbcr
of policies and discourses assisted the development of science on Svalbard. Justas Arctic
field sciences have historically acted as a means of knowing colonial fj·onticrs, and
scientists have acted as "witnesses of sovereignty and truth" (Bravo and Siirlin 2002, 18;
see also Launius 20 10),26 material manifestations of science on Svalbard strcngthen
Norway's sovereignty claims over the archipelago. Driven by historically persisting
gcopolitical imperatives and stabilized by emerging discourses around climatic changc,
Svalbard's geostrategic location in the Arctic has both an economic and gcopolitical
importance, which revalorizes Svalbard's minescapes and demonstrate the on-going
geopolitical-economic functions Svalbard's mining spaces fultll.
By focusing on the geographic importance of Svalbard's position in the Arctic-
from its role in expanding the influence of newly independent Norway, to its potential
role in future Arctic shipping and logistics industrics - we see how the character of
capitalist production is determined by the geographic particularities ofplacc, and its
26Theproliferatiollofscielltific programs ill the Arclic isa well-documelltedwayofoffsettillgallxieties
oversovereigllty(Powell 2007; 200R; Howkills2010)
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geopolitical significance. On Svalbard capitalist production does not just result in the
production of commodities for circulation and exchange, but also involves the co-
production of physical landscapes which perform as material expressions of Norwegian
sovereignty. This geopolitical economy has been maintained by state-supported
enterprises (in the mining and research sectors) whose objectives are not just profit-driven
but often geopolitically-motivated. Svalbard's geopolitical economy provides important
insight into the connectedness of economic and geopolitical objectives at historical and
contemporary Arctic resource development projects.
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CHAPTER 3
PRODUCrNG A HrGH ARCTrC EXPERIMENT:
THE DEVELOPMENT AND CLOSURE OF THE NANISrVrK MrNE
Abstract
As the first mine to operate within the Arctic Circle in Canada at the time of its opening
in 1976, the Nanisivik mine was cast as an experimental project designed to tcst the
feasibility of mining in the High Arctic. Accordingly, the Canadian government hoped
that Nanisivik would pioneer new technologies, provide wage employment opportunities
to the Inuit of north Baffin Island, and help secure Canadian sovereignty in the north.
Through narrating the historical development of this unique mine project using historical
and contemporary documentary evidence, the first pal1 of this paper suggests that
Nanisivik's establishment functioned as much as an expansion and enforcement of
government objectives for the north as it was an economic project intended to producc
profitable ores. The second part of this paper suggests that, after the closure ofthis
pioneer project in 2002, the seemingly 'post-productive' minescape was in facta sitcof
the production of scientific knowledge and valuations of the cost of reclamation. In
dealing with the legacies of mining at Nanisivik, the minescape continued to function as a
space of experimentation as scientific knowledge about the environment was produced to
inform reclamation efforts. Together, these two arguments question the idea that mincs
simply function as economic ventures with a linear lifespan. Instead, the Nanisivik mine
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illustrates how production can be politically-motivated and continue beyond the economic
lifespan ofa mine.
3.1 Introduction
In 1976 a new mine began production on the northern tip of Baffin Island in the
Canadian High Arctic - a location that experiences complete darkness from late
November until early February and an average temperature of -29°C in January. Locatcd
750km north of the Arctic Circle (see Figure 7), the Nanisivik lead-zinc mine opencd by
Mineral Resources International (MRI) was the first mine north of the Arctic Circle and
northernmost mine in Canada at the time of its establishment. The purpose-built townsitc
constructed on Strathcona Sound, some 25km from the Inuit community of Arctic Bay,
was financially supported by the Canadian government in the hope that this pioneering
project would serve as an experiment to test the feasibility of operating in the High
Arctic, and pave the way for mining across Canada's northern resource frontier. This
experiment proved successful: the Nanisivik mine profitably operated for twenty-six
years until its closure in 2002 and typically employed a workforce of200 people. As the
vice-president ofCanZineo Ltd. (the current owner of the Nanisivik property) explained
in one public hearing:
.. oneofthe visions was that this would beapilot project. It may not be successful, but if
it was, what a wonderful way to find out if we could do natural resource cxploitation in
the north. In 2007,there was $I-and-a-halfbillion that camethroughthell0l1hillmining.
and Nallisivik was the first one north of the Arctic Circle and a pioneer breaking the way
for all those others thai have followed (Bob Carreau in NWB 2009, 18)
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For the first owners ofNanisivik, MRI, the products of this mine were economically
valuable lead-zinc concentrates. In contrast, the government "saw benefit in the
[Nanisivik] project as a 'pioneer project' that without setting precedents might cnablc
large scale experimentation in Arctic mining techniques and transportation" (Hickling-
Partners 1981,6). Like previous Inuit employment at the Rankin Inlet Nickel Mine and at
the DEW (Distant Early Warning) line, the government also hoped that Nanisivik would
introduce some Inuit residents in the Baffin region to wage-labour in an industrial setting
for the first time. As this quote suggests, the Nanisivik venture was not just driven by
profitability alone but was also developed to achieve various government objectives
.NanisivikArctic Bay·
Baffin Island
NUNAVU\
Figure 7. Nanisivik is locc/ted on north Baffin Island in the Canadian High Arctic.
Map courtesy o{Char/ie Conway. Memorial University.
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After the closure of the mine in 2002, CanZinco and the Government ofNunavut
worked with the community of Arctic Bay on a closure and reclamation plan for
Nanisivik, as part of their commitment to forge a positive legacy to conclude this Arctic
experiment. Newspapers documenting this process reveal something intriguing about
Nanisivik's closure (Nunatsiaq Online 2002a; 2002b; 2003). While the mine had closed
and its production stopped, newspaper stories written by Nunavut's territorial newspaper
NUl1al.l'iaq News illustrate ways in which Nanisivik continued to be valued, and how these
valuations were contested by CanZinco, the government and the community. Huge
valuations were suggested (and contested) by each party: $29.5 million in onc instance,
$9.1 million in another instance, before settling on $17.6 million. These valuations were
estimations of the cost of reclamation. The closed Nanisivik minescape had become a
hive of new activity that produced scientific knowledge to inform valuations ofthc cost of
reclamation, which were subject to dispute between CanZinco (as payee of the
reclamation) and the Government ofNunavut (as regulator of the reclamation). The most
fascinating aspect about this production process is that this knowledge-making embodied
scientific authority and neutrality that was used to assert the cost of reclamation by these
different parties. Despite appearing to be an economically worthless post-productive
space - as popularly imagined of closed mines - these newspaper articles suggested
ways in which the minescape was a site of the production of both scientific knowledge
and valuations of the cost of reclamation.
At a time when the production of industrial commodities in Canada's north is
intensifying, the story ofNanisivik's establishment and closure highlights the historical-
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geographical production processes, actors and geopolitical-economic impcrativcs at play
at different stages of mining (and post-mining) in the Arctic. In particular, this papcr
investigates two key themes that emerge from Nanisivik's operation and closurc. First, as
a pioneering project designed to produce technical innovations, develop shipping in the
north, and secure Canadian sovereignty in the Arctic, this paper evaluatcs how the
Nanisivik mine was co-productive in fulfilling both economic and political functions
during its operation. Second, this paper examines how the seemingly degraded and
devalued minescape became a site of on-going production and valuation amid efforts to
offset the impact of mining after closure. Rather than conceiving production at Nanisivik
as a linear economic process, this paper tells an alternate story about the li fe of a mine - a
story that has multiple points of departure from traditional narratives of mining li fecycles
that view mineral production as an economic process. As the first Canadian minc located
north of the Arctic Circle, the story ofNanisivik provides important insight into the
interlocking economic and political functions mineral production fulfils, and the complex,
often contentious, environmental, cultural, economic and political legacies of such
ventures in the Arctic.
This story uses research from a variety of contemporary and archi val documcnts
relating to the opening, closure and reclamation ofthe Nanisivik mine. Alongside an
array of historical archival documents and reports, a collection of over 1,000 separate
contemporary documents regarding Nanisivik's reclamation and closure were obtained
fi·om the Nunavut Water Board (NWB) public registry. Throughout its operation, the
mine held three licences with the Northwest Territories Water Board and the Nunavut
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Water Board after the creation ofNunavut in 1999, and these licences detailcd the
conditions of the mine's operation and reclamation. The Nunavut Water Board was also
the primary government body responsible for overseeing reclamation ofthe Nanisivik
mine, and the Board collected all documents relating to closure and reclamation activitics
at Nanisivik. As part of the Northwest Territories Waters Act,27 the water board is obliged
to maintain a public register of all documents pertaining to each water licence, supporting
documents, public hearings, reports and correspondence (Smith 2002). This registry thus
represents a relatively complete collection of official documents that have been uscd to
undcrstand the mine's reclamation in detail. These contemporary archivcs document the
opinions ofthe government, mine company and community, rooted in the historical and
geographical circumstances at a given moment in time. For instance, the Nunavut Watcr
Board public registry contains public hearing transcripts where the views of community
members are captured. Although all archives (and readings of archives) are widcly
acknowledged as problematic repositories of'facts', shaped and ordered according to
particular institutional nonTIS and practices (Ogborn 2003), these documents are useful in
providing detailed insights into events surrounding the reclamation ofNanisivik.
Through an analysis of this archival and contemporary material, this paper
narrates the establishment of the Nanisivik mine and examines the reasons forthc mine's
development. This paper suggests that Nanisivik was intended not only to produce
valuable concentrates but to generate social, scientific and technical products in
accordance with government objectives and as part of the mine's experimental character.
27 Though the territory of Nunavul formed in 1999, The Northwest Territories Waters Act continues to
applyloNunavulunlililisreplaced
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I describe this as an example of a geopolitical ecol1omy, whereby the Nanisivik mine was
designed to be co-productive of both capital and the Canadian state. This paper then
describes the closure ofthe mine and deploys the idiom of co-production a second time to
explain the co-production of scientific knowledge of reclamation and valuations ofthe
cost of reclamation, and suggest this demonstrates the ol1-going-l1ess of production atier
the mine closed. First, however, I briefly explain how these arguments contest traditional
narratives of mining lifecycles and introduce the idiom of co-production.
3.2 Rethinking Mining Lifeeycles: Towards an Account of Co-production
Mineral extractive activities are considered critical to the economics of Canada's
north. In 2002, Indian and Northern Affairs Canada (INAC) estimated that the cumulative
value of metal and mineral production for the three telTitories since 1977 was over $18
billion, a figure rapidly growing as a result ofa mining boom in Canada's north (INAC
2002; see also Waldie and Sopinski 20 I I; Nunatsiaq News 2012; Postmedia News 2012).
New mining projects in the north, such as the proposed Mary River mine on Baffin
Island, are often endorsed as ventures that promote economic development on Canada's
resource frontier (Waldie and Sopinski 2011). Such mines are often conceived by mining
companies, governments and economists to operate according to linear Iifecycles - with a
distinct start and end to their lives - dictated by economic and geological factors n These
mines open with the intention of producing economically valuable commodities sold on
the capitalist market to generate a profit, but this production process necessarily depletes
28 See Homer Aschmann's 'natural historyofa mine' (1970) for more detail on this schema: see also
Richards 2009
III
ore reserves while generating wasteful (as well as useful) materials, degraded landscapes
and damaged communities as a by-product - often recognised as 'strong contradictions'
inherent to the production process - which can impact profitability, or even prompt mine
closure (Bridge 2000; 2004). These mining lifecycles may be particularly evident in the
Arctic, at sites far from the centres of capital and at locations where operating costs arc
high.
As Canada's first mine north of the Arctic Circle, the Nanisivik mine was seen as
a test of capital's feasibility in the Canadian north, and mine closure was considered to be
a natural and inevitable outcome of the mine's lifecycle. After the closureofNanisivik in
2002, for instance, the Vice President of Environment and Sustainability at CanZinco
Resources Bob Carreau presented closure as an inevitable milestone in the Iifecourse of
the mine:
Unlikemanybusinesseswhereclosureoftenmeansfailure,closureofamineis,infact,a
measure of success. It means that you have gone through all the stagesofa mine, and you
havereachedclosureandreclamation,atleastaplaninclosureandrcclamation.lfyou
didn'tdothat,youwouldbedoingabandonment,andthat'snotthe case with Nanisivik.
Wehavereachedthisfinalstage,c1osureandreclamation,itisameasureofsuccess
Now, as we enter the tinal stage of the project, we culminate the success with thc closure
of the mine and the townsite. Closing a mine is never a happy event. And in the case of
Nanisivikwherethismeansthecommunitywillceasetoexist,itisthatmuchharder.
However, as stated at the outset of this introduction, the closure of the mine is inevitable,
and planned reclamation, it isthe linal milestoneofthatachievement(BobCarreau in
NWB2004a,pIJ-16).
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Much like Homer Aschmann's 'natural history of a mine' (Aschmann 1970), Carrcau
reinforced the popular idea that the 'life' of the mine was characterized by prc-productivc,
productive and post-productive phases, and suggested that closure was a normal fcaturc
of production, a measure of the mine's success. Production, in this sense, followed a
linear Iifecycle detennined by economic and geological variables.
However, a close examination of the historical-geographical story ofNanisivik
rcveals that the lifecycleofthe lead-zinc mine was far from linca r. Thispapermobilizcs
the idiom of co-production (Jasanoff2006) using a political economy perspective to
illustrate this argument in two ways. First, this paper suggests that Nanisivik was
established as a prototype project designed to not only produce valuable ores but fullil a
variety of geopolitical-economic objectives including the provision of cmploymcnt for
Inuit on north Baffin Island, the development of the Canadian shipping scctor, and the
maintenance of Canadian sovereignty and security in the north. I use thc term
'geopolitical economy' to capture the interlocking capitalist and territorial logics of
power at play at Nanisivik, and evaluate how the mine was designed to be co-productive
of both capital and the state (Harvey 2003).
Second, I suggest that in the mine's 'post-productive' phase, the closed mincscape
continued to be a site of the co-production of scientific knowledge and valuations ofthc
cost of reclamation. I suggest that scientific activity charged with informing thc cost of
reclamation for this high-profile pioneer mine was impol1ant in dealing with the
environmental legacies induced by the opening and operation ofNanisivik. I discuss how
this involved generating objective, authoritative and neutral knowledge that was used to
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legitimize different claims about the environment and verify contesting valuations of the
cost of reclamation. Drawing from the idea that knowledge-making is connected to
production processes - whether it be through the production of nature (Smith 2008) or the
production of states (Jasanoff 2006) -the idiom of co-production is used to describe how
scientific knowledge and economic valuations of the environment were co-produced, as
efforts to legitimize the authority of scientific knowledge on reclamation concurrently
legitimized economic valuations of the Nanisivik minescape.
Together, these arguments contest notions that mines simply generate valuable
commodities following a linear lifecycle, after which closed mine sites arc no longer
productive or valuable. By mobilizing the idiom of co-production, this paper illustrates a
more complex conceptualization of production that pays attention to the ways the
multiple and interconnected ways the Nanisivik mine was productiveofeapital,state
territory, geopolitical objectives, and scientific knowledge, throughout its 'lifespan' and
beyond. Given the recent expansion of industrial ventures in the circumpolar north, these
concepts are important in highlighting the multiple interlocking functions commodity
production in the Arctic fulfils, and the legacies of such ventures at sites of cultural,
geopolitical and environmental importance in the circumpolar north. The following two
sections use empirical evidence drawn !i'om a variety of archival and contemporary
documentary material to narrate the development and closure of the Nanisivik mine, and
substantiate these theoretical assertions.
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3.3 Historical Development of Mining at anisivik
The history of the Nanisivik mine is characterized by significant government
influence throughout the mine's operation, driven by a desire to use anisivik as an
experiment to test the feasibility of resource development in the Canadian Arctic. The
anisivik mine, considered to be a potentially lucrative venture for the mine company
Mineral Resources International (MRI), was financed with state support in the form of
non-recoverable grants and loans. The government's financial backing was grantcd on the
basis that Nanisivik would strengthen Canadian industry, consolidate state power in the
north and test the feasibility of operating in the Arctic. By highlighting the government's
motives for financially supporting Nanisivik's establishment using archival evidence, this
section suggests argues that Nanisivik was intended to function as much as an expansion
and enforcement of government objectives for the north as it was an economic project - a
geopolitical-economic venture designed to co-produce capital and the statc.
Amid a post-war economic boom and an increased Cold War demand for
industrial minerals, the anisivik mine established at a time when the federal government
was instrumental in the development of mineral extractive activities across Canada,~'1 and
pm1icularly influential in facilitating mineral exploration and developmcnt projccts in the
Canadian nOl1h (McAllister 2007). From the end ofthc Second World War, the
Department of Mines and Resources deployed increasing numbers of field partics to
survey the north (Department of Mines and Resources 1947), and its Geographic Bureau
2. McAllister notes that from 1880-1980 the Canadian govelllment heavily promoted and invested in
mineral industries across Canada - in part. to build an industrial economy that could rival Europe·s
(McAllister 2007)
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later took aerial photographs of the Arctic islands as a way to assess the feasibility of
operating in the Arctic (Department of Mines and Resources 1948). As fieldwork was
time-consuming and expensive, the first usc of helicopters in 'operation Keewatin'
increased the surveying capacity by 30 times (Department of Mines and Technical
Surveys 1953). This mineral exploration and development effort intensilied in the latc-
1950s, when the Conservative Prime Minister John Diefenbaker promoted the idea that
Canada's future prosperity hinged on the development of the north (Damas 2002). The
exploitation of natural resources in Canada's nOlih was a central tenet ofthis 'northern
vision', and a feature that fuelled nationalist concerns over Canada's sovereignty in the
north (Grant 2010). Schemes such as 'Roads to Resources', the 'Remote Airports
Program' and the 'Prospector's Assistance Pro/:,'rat11' were implemented to assist the
exploration and development of resources in the north, in accordance with Dicfcnbaker's
'vision,.3o
A number of mining mega-projects sprang up across the Canadian north, and by
1974, the mining industry reportedly contributed more than $70 million to the economics
of the Yukon and Northwest Territories, while paying over $7 million in royalties to the
federal government (Department of Indian Affairs and Notihern Development 1974).
Compared to 1960, the value of mineral production in the NOIihwest Territories increased
1,238% while in the Yukon it increased 742%. Over the same period, mineral production
10 The Remote Airports Program, for instance, was designed to provide northern communities with the same
service and facilities found at southern airports. Like the Roads to Resollrcesprogram, the Remote Airports
Programlltilized local and native labollr, thllsprovidingan incometonortherncommllnities(Departmentof
Indian Affairs and Northern Development 1974). For mining developments alone, a total of$ROOOO was
madc available annllally forairstripconstrllction in the NorthwestTerritoriesin 1961.andthegovernmcnt
was prepared to pay lip to one half of the cost of an airstrip (Departmcnt of Northern Affairs and National
Resources 1961)
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rose by 470% in Canada as a whole, illuminating the economic significance of northern
mining projects and their rapid growth (ibid.).
This mineral development frenzy occurred not only during a favorable political
and economic climate, but at a time when mining was positioned as a method of solving
social and economic problems in the north (Sandi os and Keeling 2012; see also Damas
2002). After the Second World War, the government adopted an increasingly paternalistic
stance to improving the well-being of indigenous northerners in response 10 the 'Caribou
Crisis', a rapidly growing population, and the increasingly inhumane living conditions
experienced by the Inuit31 (Damas 2002). Welfare state policy extended federal social
programs to the nOI1h, focussing on the provision of housing, medical and educational
services, and financial services for nOl1hern indigenous residents (Gibson 1978;
Dickerson 1992). The state also looked to secure employment opportunities for Inuit in
construction projects, such as the DEW line in the 1950s, but these opportunities were
few in number, often short-lived and had negative cultural impacts (Duffy 1988; Farish
2006). One report produced by the government of the Northwest Territories suggested
that Inuit people were largely "taken from cradle to the grave under the care of
bureaucrats" and communities had lost dignity and self-respect (Government of the
Northwest Territories Baffin Region 1982, i). Arctic mining projects were positioned as a
source of income that would help solve these problems while improving the well-being of
northerners (Damas 2002; Boulter 20 II). For instance, the Rankin Inlet nickel mine was
31 The governlllent had, previollsly, adopted a 'Policy of Dispersal' to prevent the centralization of people in
areas close to trading posts, for instance, in an attelllpt to preservetraditional nOllladic cllltlire as well as
redllce the reliance oflnllit on welfare paylllents (Dalllas 2002)
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the first mine in Canada to employ Inuit labour in 1957, and the mine was seen as a
"beacon of hope" that would make Inuit economically viable citizens (Boulter 2011,33).
As well as the supposed economic benefits of mining to native peoples, mineral extractive
activities complemented the government's growing bureaucratic apparatus in the north
and the government's development strategy for northern communities (Grant 1988;
Damas 2002). The extension of the state and the expansion of mines across the north had
a profound impact: what Mark Dickerson claims to be the beginning of colonialism in the
north (Dickerson 1992).
The development of the Nanisivik mine occurred during this period of mining
prosperity and increased government interest in the Canadian north. First discovered in
1910 by Arthur English, a prospector on Captain Joseph Bernier's second Canadian
government expedition to the High Arctic, the lead-zinc ore body at the site on north
Baffin Island that later came to be known as Nanisivik was mapped by the Geological
Survey of Canada in 1954. Texasgulf Inc. initiated further exploration in 1957 (Gibson
1978) and an estimated 6,000,000 tons of ore with an average grade of 14.12% zinc and
1.40% lead was delineated in a deposit roughly 3km long, 100m wide and 10m thick
(Watts, Griffis and McQuat Limited 1973; Stewart 1998). Texasgulf, wary about the
limited shipping season from north Baffin Island, sold the property to Mineral Resources
International Limited (MRI)J2 in 1972 in exchange for 35% ofthe net profit once MRI
had recovered its initial capital outlay (Gibson 1978). MRI formed Nanisivik Mines
32 MRI later became a wholly owned subsidiary of AEC West Limited (NWB 2002a). The most reccnt
owners of the mine, Breakwater Resources Limited, acquired Nanisivik Mines Ltd. from AEC West
Limited in 1996, and in 1997 the mine was sold to CanZinco Limited, a wholly owned subsidiary of
Breakwater (NWB 2002a).
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Limited and commissioned a feasibility study undertaken by Watts, Gritlls and McQuat
Limited. As well as providing recommendations regarding the feasibility of the project,
the study was also intended to advise on the impacts of mining on the nearby community
of Arctic Bay - an Inuit community that had slowly developed alongside the
establishment ofa Hudson's Bay Company post in 1926 (Bowes-Lyon 2006; Damas
2002). The study suggested that a mining operation at Nanisivik would be feasible as a
bunkhouse community for eight years (Watts, Griffis and McQuat Limited 1973).
However, with government assistance for townsite construction, Nanisivik could open as
a more permanent operation for twelve to fifteen years, offering significant employment
and economic benefits to the region and particularly the community of Arctic Bay
(Department of Indian and Northern Affairs 1976). The feasibility study thus
recommended that MRI pursue and finalize discussions with the government to help
finance this venture (Watts, Griffis and McQuat Limited 1973).
While officials in the Department of Indian Affairs and Northern Development
(DIAND) viewed MRI's proposal as complementary to the department's objectives,
archival material reveals that some analysts in the Department of Energy, Mines and
Resources (EMR) questioned the economic profitability ofthe project and felt that the
feasibility ofNanisivik had been overstated by Watts, Griffis and McQuat Limited (see
Gibson 1978). A review undertaken by EMR in 1974 concluded that there was no
domestic need for lead or zinc in Canada, nor any other political or economic reason to
exploit the Nanisivik deposit at that point in time (Jean-Paul Drolet 1974). Furthermore,
the suggested level of government investment at Nanisivik-$8.8 million in non-
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recoverable grants and $7.9 million in recoverable loans-was unprecedentedin
comparison to the direct suppOli received by other much larger, low-risk developments in
Canada's north such as the Pine Point Mine (ibid.). Indeed, the need for government
involvement in financing the townsite was questionable, as MRI had suggcstcd that thc
company was prepared to develop a bunkhouse without government participation
(Hickling-Partners Inc. 1981).
In addition to the dubious feasibility of the Nanisivik mine, there was some
opposition to the construction of a townsite at Nanisivik. Though the consultants
responsible for the feasibility study had suggested a permanent townsite would cxtend thc
life of the mine and maximize the benefits ofNanisivik to the Inuit, the local community
of Arctic Bay wrote letters to Watts, Griffis and McQuat Limited, indicating their interest
in the project but also registering their opposition to the construction of a new town,
instead favouring the improvement of Arctic Bay (Gibson 1978). One lettcr statcd:
We, the Settlement Council of Arctic Bay, would like to voice our strong objcctionto the
construction ofa lown being planned for Strathcona Sound. At no time were the residents
of this settlement, orthiscouncil,everconsulted as to thedesirabilityofhavingatown
built at Strathcona Sound (Levi Kalluk [1975]. in Gibson 1978, 157)
Given the willingness ofMRI to finance a bunkhouse and Inuit opposition to the
construction of a townsite, the government's interest in financing a townsite supposcdly
for the benefit of the Inuit workforce was "puzzling" to consultants at that time (Hickling-
PartnerslncI981,15).
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Though the economic feasibility of the mine was uncertain and a purpose-built
townsite at Nanisivik was unwanted by the community of Arctic Bay, the governmcnt
granted financial support for Nanisivik on the basis of "anticipated employmcnt bcncfits
for north Baffin region Inuit and experience benefits for future Arctic mining ventures" in
line with an envisaged "industrial revolution" of the Baffin Region (Gibson 1978,50; scc
also Hickling-Partners 1981). In particular, one OlAND memorandum stated that "thc
project would provide employment opportunities for Inuit in the region suffcring f1'om
significant under- and unemployment" (Memorandum to the Cabinet 1974,45). At a timc
when Inuit communities were experiencing declining markets for traditional
commodities, rising costs of imported goods and a lack of access to money to purchasc
new hunting equipment, the government saw the Nanisivik mine as an opportunity to
provide wage employment to the Inuit ('Reasons for the Importance of Wage
Employment to the Eskimo Economy', no date). One report commentcd that:
In the greater context of the Canadian 11lining industry the Nanisivik 11lineisnota large
project but it isasignificant one in ter11lS of northern develop11lent. .. it will otTer them
[nativepeopleJanalternativetohunting,trappingandcarving,an option hopefully not
totally alien to their culture but one which will adapt itself to the culture, and to which
they in turn can adapt (Department of Indian and Northern Affairs 1976,6).
Prcvious mining projects in the Arctic such as the Rankin Inlet Nickel Mine (as well as
construction projects at the DEW line) had introduced Inuit to wage-labour for the first
timc (Boulter 20 II), and government officials championed this transition as a success
despite the short lifespan of such projects (Memoranull1 to the Cabinet 1974). Archival
121
material dating from the 1970s highlights that potential Inuit employment in futurc
industrial ventures such as the Strathcona (Nanisivik), Polaris and Baftinland mining
projects was a priority (for more detail see files on 'Eskimo Employmcnt' in the
Alexander Stevenson Fonds, NWT Archives), and a number of industrial oil operations
also hired Inuit labourers who commutcd from their home communities to earn 'windfall
cash' (Wenzel 1983; Grant 2010). The oil exploration company Panarctic Oils, for
instance, had employed some Inuit labourers from Arctic Bay prior to the opening ofthc
Nanisivik mine, and a social impact study completed on behalf of OlAND concludcd that
this employment had been economically beneficial to the Inuit (Gourdeau 1973). Other
government reports claimed that, after visiting numerous communities across the north,
up to 50% of the workforce at Nanisivik could be made up of Inuit from Arctic Bay,
Clyde River, Pond Inlet, Igloolik and Hall Beach (Strathcona Sound Projcct, no datc; sce
also Memorandum to the Cabinet 1974).
However, some government ofticials questioned the need to develop a mine for
the benefit of the Inuit. One EMR memorandum stated that the "employment of Inuit for
a period of at least 14 years is the main, and probably only significant objective for the
federal government financial supp0l1 of this project" (Jean-Paul Drolet 1974, 18), yct also
noted that "the proposed level of support appears high in comparison to the number of
native peoples who may receive benefit from the project" (ibid., 5). As wcll, critics within
the Territorial and Social Development Branch of OlAND argued that "cxisting
unemployment was not, or at least not yet, a serious enough problcm to warrant risking
repetition of the boom-bust experience of the Rankin Inlet mine" (Gibson 1978,43).
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Nonetheless, most OlAND analysts considered Inuit employment as the most
advantageous aspect of the proposed project (Gibson 1978).
The desire to introduce Inuit to industrial wage-labour also fed into the
government's vision ofNanisivik as a project to test the feasibility of operating in the
Arctic. Beyond the provision of employment for Inuit in the region, various archived
sources suggest that the government viewed Nanisivik as an opportunity to industrialize
northern Baffin Island and test the feasibility of operating in the Arctic. At a speech in
Frobisher Bay in 1974, the Minister of Indian Affairs and Northern Development Jean
Chretien described Nanisivik as a "pilot Arctic mining venture involving many new
concepts" and hailed Nanisivik as "a model for future mineral developments in the
Arctic" that sought to ground-proof new technologies, fine tune Arctic operations and
introduce Inuit to an industrial lifestyle (Chretien [1974] in Gibson 1978,220). In his
speech, Chretien emphasized that this venture provided an opportunity to develop
Canadian shipping in the Arctic, and through rigorous scientific study become a working
model of technological innovation and engineering triumph (Chretien [1974] in Gibson
1978; see also Yates 1975).
In government reports and correspondence evaluating the feasibility of the project,
a strong nationalist rhetoric underlay visions ofNanisivik as an experimental venture. For
an Interdepartmental Working Group on the Strathcona Sound Project, it was of utmost
importance that the mining company at Nanisivik was Canadian33 and that the mine only
33 MRI had a 77.5% stake in the venture, backed by Metalgesellschafl A.G. ofGerlllany and Billilon B.V
of Holland who each held a stake of 11.25% (Gibson 1978). MRI was 80'% Canadian-owned, and the
government viewed the level of Canadian ownership oflheNanisivikprojcclasacceplable.
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used Canadian shipping vessels and equipment to benefit other Canadian industries
(Interdepartmental Working Group on the Strathcona Sound Project 1974,93). Echoing
this economic nationalism, an article written by A.B. Yates, director of the Northern
Policy and Program Planning Branch, summarized the advantages ofNanisivik to
Canada:
The venture provides significant benefits to Canada: the Inuit will receive ll1ax ill1u 111
possibilities [ortrainingandell1ployll1ent; ll1axill1ull1useo[Canadianll1aterialswillbe
ll1ade,wherecoll1petitivelyavailable;theprojectprovidesall1ajoropportunitytodcvclop
Canadian shipping in IheArctic; andthe ll1ine project will, through rigorousscientilic
sludy,act asa working ll10del oftechnological,sociological,environll1enlalandlocal
econoll1ic interaction in the Far North (Yates 1975,71)
Additionally, an evaluation of the Nanisivik proposal by the Northern Program Planning
Division ofDlAND stated that the mine would provide the government with royalty and
corporate tax revenues (NOIihern Program Planning Division 1974, 102).
While the mine was supposed to bolster the Canadian economy, a memorandum
from Chretien to the cabinet described how the development of a townsite was also
intended to secure Canadian sovereignty in the north (Memorandum to the Cabinet,
1974). Six years prior to the completion ofNanisivik's feasibility study, Panarctic Oils
had been established as an exploration company in 1967 with federal government
assistance, in response to America's growing interest in the Northwest Passage and
increased American investment in offshore oil leases (Grant 20 I0). Similarly, this
memorandum detailed how the development of a mine at Nanisivik was envisaged to
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maintain Canadian control of resource development in the Arctic,andincreasethc
population there, thus offering a "method of maintaining Canadian sovereignty and
security in the North" (Memorandum to the Cabinet 1974, 54). Despite local opposition
to theconstructionofa townsite at Nanisivik,a consultant's report produced on behalfof
OlAND suggested that the government's involvement was largely based on the desire to
construct a permanent community at Nanisivik (Hickling Partners Inc. 1981). Together,
the level of Canadian control of the mine company, the construction ofa new community,
and development of resources in the High Arctic was seen by OlAND ofticials to not
only improve living standards and promote Inuit participation in the Nanisivik mine, but
also to contribute to "Canada's political and economic sovereignty in the nation's Arctic
regions" (Northern Program Planning Division 1974, 102). Clearly, the mine was not
simply an economic venture, but government involvement in this industrial project was
also based on a territorial logic of power that sought to ensure that the Nanisivik mine
fulfilled a variety of geopolitical-economic objectives: an explicit exam pic of thc co-
production of capital and the state.
Despite the questionable economic feasibility and employmcnt bcnefits of the
Nanisivik mine, the government entered into the Strathcona Agreement with MRI in
1974. Deemed a progressive and unprecedented approach to northern resource
development, the Agreement sought to enact the government's commitment to the well-
being of northerners (Gibson 1978) and "optimize experience benefits obtainablc fi'om
this pilot Arctic mining venture" (Cabinet Committee on Government Operations 1974,
10). The Agreement was signed by the Minister of Indian Affairs and Northern
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Figure 9. Nanisivik [Photo taken by Bob Wilson]. CREDIT: NWT ArchiveslNorth,,'est
Terri/aries. Dept. a/Public Works and Services/ondsIG-1995-001: 2845
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Development, the President of MRI and a local witness by the namc of I. Attagutsiak
('Strathcona Agreement' in Gibson 1978). Under the Agreement, the governmcnt
invested $18.3m into townsite development (Figures 8 and 9), a dock and airstrip in
return for an 18% stake in the company and representation on the company's board of
directors (Depmiment of Indian and Northern Affairs 1976). In return, MRI plcdgcd
compliance with the government's social, environmental and economic objectives for the
north (ibid.). One key objective of the Strathcona Agreement was to ensure that Inuit
workers comprised 60% of the workforce at Nanisivik. The Agreement also sought to
ensure that the environmental impacts of mining were minimized through the completion
of environmental studies and reclamation activities (e.g. Be Research 1975; Hatfield and
Williams 1976; Reedyk 1987). Other conditions of the Strathcona Agreement included:
Provisions of vocational training fornorthernresidents,coll1prehensiveenvironll1ental
studiesandplanning,preferencefortheuseofCanadianll1aterialandequipll1entand
Canadian shipping, cOll1pany exploration prograll1s to increase ore rcserves and possible
fUl1herprocessing ofllline concentrates in Canada (Departll1ent of Indian and Northern
Affairs 1976,50).
Evidently, many of the stipulations written into the Strathcona Agrccmcnt reflccted the
prevalent nationalist rhetoric adopted in government correspondence. The governmcnt
assumed a prominent role in the development ofNanisivik, and was highly influcntial in
ensuring that the mine left only positive legacies from this Arctic experimcnt.
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Though the Strathcona Agreement was intended to safeb'1lard the local community
and some government documents34 claimed that the community of Arctic Bay was
consulted at every stage of the mine's development, othcr sources suggest that Inuit wcre
often overlooked during the feasibility study and drafting of the Strathcona Agrecmcnt
(Gibson 1978). Perhaps one of the most dramatic stories of Inuit exclusion from thcse
initial decision-making processes was described at a public hearing in July 2002, in which
the Mayor of Arctic Bay Joanasie Akumalik explained:
In the middle of June 1974 two Inuit men from our community were invitedtoa party
One of those men was Issiah Altagutsiak. He was my uncle. The other was Levi Kudlook
He was the mayor.
Neither of them could read or understand English. They thought they were going toa
dance and to have some food. When they got to the pm1y they were asked to sign apapcl
agreeing to something. They did not know what they were agreeing to
The document they were agreeing to was signed by the Minister of Indian Affairs and
Northern Development at that time and the President of Mineral Resources International
Limited. It created a mine called Nanisivik Mines Ltd. The document they agreed to is
called the Strathcona Agreement. That Minister is now the Prime Minister of Canada - the
right Hon.JeanChretien. Theyweretoldatthetimethattheagrcementtheyagrccdtoat
that longagopal1y, would be translated into Inuktitut and providedtothem. Nobody in
ourcommunityhaseverseenatranslatedcopyoftheStrathcona/\greement.
34 According to government documenls, the communily of Arctic Bay was fully consulted during the
developmenl oflhe Nanisivik mine. and the government worked with Ihe Baffin Region Inuit Association
to make recommendations as to howlhe benefits of the project could be maximised (Department of Indian
and Norlhern Affairs 1976)
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Today28yearslaterwearetalkingabouttheclosureofthesamemine. Wedonotknow
how much the company has made from ore from the mine over those 28 yea rs.Wcdonot
know how much the Government of Canada has received fi·ommincralroyalticsovcr
those years. We do not know how much the Government of Canada, thc Govcrnmcnt of
Northwest Territories and now since 1999, the Government of Nunavut, has spent on
infrastructure in Nanisivik townsite in the past 28 years. All we know is that Arctic Bay
did not receive many of the benefits that the Nanisiviktownsite receivcd(l-Iamletof
Arctic Bay Working Group 2002, 1).
Drawing striking parallels to David Harvey's notion of 'accumulation by disposscssion'
(Harvey 2003), Akumalik's narrative describes the dispossession of lands and resources
from native peoples in the interest of capital accumulation, where the government and thc
mine company were the key beneficiaries. A copy of the Strathcona Agreement (in
Gibson 1978) confinns that Attagutsiak signed the Agreement as a witness, but docs not
detail the circumstances under which the Agreement was signed.
Despite opposition to the building of a townsite at Nanisivik, the bulk of
construction work had already begun by 1974. Large numbers of Inuit workcrs wcrc
employed during this construction phase and three training programs for Inuit wcre
established by MRI (Department of Indian and Northern Affairs 1976). The mine bcgan
production in October 1976, comprising west and east open pits at each end of thc ore
body, and horizontal shafts in the middle as well as satellite open pits (Stewart 1998). The
mine deployed the "drill and blast" method usingjumbo drills, remote scoop trams and
haulage trucks (CanZinco 2004). Mined sulphide ores wcrc crushed underground, and the
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crushed ore was moved to the surface using a conveyor system (CanZinco 2004). At the
mill, these ores were mixed with lime, then ground and added to water to form a slurry
(Stewart 1998). Lead and zinc were then separated during a flotation process, and the
subsequent concentrates were shipped to the USA and Europe for smelting (see Figure
10) (Department of Indian Affairs and Northern Development 1978; Stewart 1998). The
mine typically employed 200 people during its operation, and a purpose-built townsite
including a school, church, post office, recreational centre, dining hall and housing
supported those who worked at the mine (CanZinco 2004). Inuit tl'om Arctic Bay as well
as several other communities were employed by the mine, and the population of
Nanisivik eventually reached approximately 300 (Wenzel 1983; Bowes-Lyon 2006).
Figure 10. Ore Storage Shed & Loading Facility - Nanisivik [Photo taken by Dan
Mandin] CREDIT: NWT Archives/Northwest Territories. Dept. ofPublic Works and
Servicesfonds/G-1995-00 I: 1514.
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Highlighting the successes ofNanisivik as an Arctic experimcnt, CanZinco (thc
owner ofNanisivik during the closure period) described how the mine company had
heroically overcome the harsh Arctic environment, not only to make a feasible mining
operation, but also to develop important infrastructures such as the dcep-sea port and the
first jet airport in the region:
Nanisivik was Canada's first mine north of the Arctic Circle and pioneered many
practices, which paved the way for other northern developments. There were things that
we perfected in Nanisivik are being done in other operations todayand are only being
done because they were perfected at Nanisivik. Duringthefeasi bilityandtinancingstage,
many would-be supports said that obstacles imposed by the harsh climatic conditions and
the remote location would make the operation fail. The proof is in the pudding. But
despite this, the project went ahead. The first deepwater port in the Canadian Arctic was
built at Nanisivik. And with the closure of Polaris mine, it will be the only facility of its
type in Nunavut. The first jet airport in the region wasconstl'Ucteda t Nanisivik,andthis
continues to provide a vital transportation link between northern locations and the south
More than 50 kilometres of all-season roads were built, which included a 32 kilometre
link between Arctic communities, Arctic Bay and Nanisivik, and included a link between
Arctic Bay and the airp0l1. An entire townsite was built. Not a camp, but a townsite
Shared accommodations, rooms for the employees, private homes for families, both Inuit
and Southerners; a fully integrated school teaching the first languagelnuktitut,French
and English; an all-denominational church, a nursing station, an RCMP station, a fire
station, post office, rec centre with a full gymnasium, swimming pool. No small task
(Bob Carreau in NWB 2004a, p 13-16).
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From the perspective ofCanZinco, Nanisivik succeeded in the role tor which it was
intended. Nanisivik not only profitably produced ores, but produced tcchnical innovations
and had engineered a modern community in the far north. As well as successfully
constructing important infrastructures at Nanisivik, a harmonious community thrived at
the townsite according to CanZinco:
In what was constructed to be a physical townsite, a place to housc mine cmployecs and
their families, grew into a community in all sense of the word. Nanisivik, a place where
people were mining, became a place for people to achieve persona I objectives. Many
peoplegottheirstaI1inNanisivik,theycarnedahandsomewage,they learned trades or
skills that they could take with them to other projects. People came togcthcras a
community. Some brought their families, had babies, raisedandschoolcdthcir
children ...Childrenwereintegratedintheschool,lnuitandQadlunnaq.Southernchildrcn
studied culture inclusion in their classroom, learned how to scrapea seal skin, sew dulTcl
mittens, lighta kudlukand hear great stories from the Elders. And many adults Icarned
the traditions of our Inuit neighbours, and in doing so, developed alovcandrcspectfor
the land. People came forth to Nanisivik fora few years and stayed for 100r 150rcvcn
20. And by these measuremcnts, the Nanisivik project was a success, and wc shouldn't
forget that (ibid.).
Othcr sources confinn that the mine was beneficial to some local residents. In rccent
public meetings held in Arctic Bay, many community members expressed their gratitude
toward the mine for providing employment which helped the Inuit to develop skills and
provided cash to purchase hunting equipment (Brubacher & Associates 2002; see also
Wenzel 1983). Though industrial wage-labour increasingly displaced the traditional
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economy, some Inuit understood the mine and the cash-economy as simply bringing
about change rather than cultural loss. In a socio-economic impact study, one Inuit
interviewee commented that "money is the same as food here. Nowadays we work hard to
get money. When I was young we worked very hard to get food [from the land). It's the
same thing" (Brubacher & Associates 2002, 13). These comments suggest that some local
people adapted to the industrialization ofNanisivik and that the mine also provided many
opportunities for the community of Arctic Bay.
In spite of these positive assessments ofNanisivik's success asa pilot project in
providing significant local benefits, other documents reveal criticism of how the
development impacted the local community. When the mine did open, the target to
employ a workforce comprised of60% Inuit workers was never met and instead typically
only 20-25% of the workforce was Inuit. In the final year of the mine's operation this
figure dropped to 9% (Brubacher & Associates 2002). Early government correspondence
suggests that officials were highly concerned that Inuit employment levels were
unsatisfactory. As a result the Nanisivik Training and Employment Advisory Committee
(TEAC) comprising of company, government and community representatives was
established to monitor Inuit employment at the mine. In meetings held by TEAC it was
evident that efforts were being made to accommodate and train Inuit employees, but one
letter fi'om the Director of the Department of Program Planning and Evaluation in the
Northwest Territories recognised "a resistance on the part of mine officials to extending
the range of employment opportunities to native labour" (Creery 1979, 7). Another letter
fi'om an Employment Training Officer in Frobisher Bay commented that Inuit "turned
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their noses at Nanisivik" because of a lack of food from the land, no sense of a traditional
community and the difficulties in adapting to an industrial wage-economy from the
traditional lifestyle (Brintnell 1978,43; see also Hickling-Partners Inc 1981). Those who
did work at Nanisivik found that they had little time to spend in their home communities
or sufficient time to undertake traditional pursuits, often resulting in absenteeism (TEAC
1978; 1979; 1980; see also Wenzel 1983).35 Recent socio-economic impact studies
confirm that many of the Inuit who were employed at Nanisivik had fewer opportunities
to spend time on the land, and suggest that, like other northern communities, Arctic Bay
had become increasingly dependent on paid employment rather than traditional economic
activities (Brubacher & Associates 2002; Bowes-Lyon 2006)36 These instances of
alienation from traditional activities are hardly surprising given that the Nanisivik mine
was intended from the offset to incorporate Inuit labour into the wage-economy. In a
preliminary evaluation of the employment situation at Nanisivik, the failure to employ
higher levels of Inuit labour led consultants Hickling-Partners to conclude that "the mine
has not succeeded in the role for which it was intended - as an experimental prototype"
(Hickling-Partners 1981,36).
In summary, Nanisivik was designed in paJi to offer numerous social and
economic benefits to northerners, and the Canadian government appeared committed to
maximising these benefits, with varying levels of success, through the Strathcona
Agreement. While MRI's fundamental objective was to produce profit fi'om the Nanisivik
35 Ananlhropological study oflnuil commutcr workers from Clyde Riversuggeststhat theexpectalion 10
remain on-site for six-week periods was too long (Wenzel 1983)
3GAnotherkey problem that these studies highlight isthe impact oftheintroduclionofalcoholtoi\rclic
Bay. Many Inuit community members attribute marital problems and family breakdown to the introduction
of alcohol by the mine (Brubacher & Associates 2002; Bowes-Lyon 2006)
134
mine, the government saw Nanisivik as an opportunity to industrialize north Baffin
Island, incorporate Inuit into an industrial workforce and pioneer technologies to aid
future resource development in the Arctic. Though Nanisivik was oftcn cast as an
experiment to test the feasibility of mineral development in the nOl1h, a territorial logic of
power was clearly at play: the government's financial support for Nanisivik was approved
on the basis that the mine would strengthen other Canadian industries and help sccure
Canadian sovereignty in the far n0I1h. Nanisivik was co-productive of capital and the
state in the sense that Nanisivik functioned as much an expansion and enforcement of
govcrnment objectives for the north as it was an economic project. Evidently, a political
reading ofNanisivik's development is important in underlining the interlinking
geopolitical-economic functions this Arctic industrial site was intendcd to fultll.
3.4 The Closure of Nanisivik
After twenty-six years of profitable production the Nanisivik mine closcd in
September 2002 (Figure II), prompted by a depression in the price of zinc. In response to
stringent regulations surrounding mine closure, a number of third-party scicntific and
technical consultants were hired by both the Government ofNunavut and CanZinco to
assess the environmental impact of mining and examine the adequacy of the closurc and
reclamation plan for Nanisivik. The closed minescape became a medium of scientific
cxperimentation, subjected to scientitlc enquiry that extracted environmental data Ii'om
the mine site, produced scientific knowledge, and valued the cost ofrcclamation. This
involved generating objective, authoritative and neutral knowledge to legitimize different
claims about the environment and verify contesting valuations of the cost ofrcclamation.
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Far ti'om an unproductive space after closure, this section outlines the on-going ways
Nanisivik continued to be productive (and co-productive of valuations, of knowledge and
of science) after the mine's operations ceased, This section describes the closure of
Nanisivik using a variety of contemporary documents, first explaining how the
community and government response to Nanisivik's closure called for rigorous scientific
investigation to infol1n the closure and reclamation effort. This section then describes
how scientific knowledge was used to legitimize contested valuations of the cost of
reclamation, focusing on disputes surrounding the cost of an engineered tailings cover, an
example characteristic of the co-production between valuations (of the cost of
reclamation) and scientific knowledge at Nanisivik.
Figure II: Ore storage shed during closure [Photo by Kathleen Parewick. 2006}.
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The closure of this pioneering Arctic development project presented significant
challenges to the government, CanZinco, and community alike37 Residents of Arctic Bay
expressed concern about the destiny of the Nanisivik townsite and the level of community
involvement in reclamation activities. No one knew whether other economic activitics
could be undertaken at Nanisivik, and concerns grew over the environmental impacts of
mining (such as soil and water contamination, and the disposal of tailings waste) at
Nanisivik. After the decision to close the Nanisivik mine was announced in Octobcr
200 I, numerous public meetings were held to discuss how the closure and environmental
reclamation plan would be developed, providing a forum in which the community of
Arctic Bay aired their views 38 In these public hearings community members expresscd
concern about the impacts of mining on local wildlife and the land upon which they
depended for hunting. Some residents voiced concern about the impact of acid mine
drainage on ringed seals, while others suggested that shipping at Nanisivik scattcred
narwhal (NWB 2002b; 2004a). Kunuk Oyukuluk explained in one public hearing how
wildlife had been impacted by mining at Nanisivik:
In early spring, when it was still March or May, when there is still icc, they would break
the ice. And because it isourwildlifearea--andsoillyconcern is that scals,wcrclyon
the seal Illeat; and they have a breeding ground on the ice, that theship went through the
breeding ground of the seals. And in July when Arctic Bay residents were out Norwhale
37 Prior to announcing Ihe closure of the mine in November 2001. Canlinco, had filed an application to Ihe
Nunavut Water Board to extend mineral extraction 10 an east satellite ore body (NWB 200 Ia), indicating
thatclosurewasprematureandlargelyunplanned.lndeed,themine'smanagemenlhadanticipalcdmine
closure sometime between 2005 and 2006 but was forced to close early due to the low price of zinc (NWB
2002c). Canlincoexperienced an operating lossof$20.3 millionin2001 compared with anoperaling profit
of$15.7 million in 2000 as a result ofa depression in Ihe price ofzinc (NWB 2002a)
,8 Public hearings were held as a requirement of the Nunavut Waters and Nunavut Surface Righls Tribunal
Act [scclion 52] to hold public hearings in the event ofa change inthetermsofalicence.
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[Narwhal] hunting, the ship also went through the hunting ground, the hunting area. And
during the Norwhale [sic] hunting, Norwhales would be scattered away by the ship. So
every year they did that through the ice ... So I need more help so that ourgeneration--
next generation, that they will have to have food to eat. And because we were brought up
from the country food, so--and they are best foodandlllakesyoustronger,andwewill
be weaker population on other kinds of food (Kunuk Oyukuluk in NWB 2004a, 121)
These environmental impacts had explicit cultural implications for the Inuit of Arctic
Bay. In a similar narrative, Moses Akumalik described how this environmental change
impacted traditional lifestyles:
I'm not trying to look big but we were living off the land when we were young. Now
children when they grow up will lean more towards the civilized lile as opposed to the
nomadic life. In 1978, the ships would come into load concentrate and they break theice
Hunters lost their machines that were on the ice. That's why I'm asking for compensation
because there have been impacts ... They should thank the community for supporting their
mining activity for all those years. A public apology with a thank you in money would be
good. More than 20 skidoos were lost and all of their hunting equipment(Moses
Akumalik in NWB 2002b, 44)
As this quote suggests, some community members raised concerns regarding the cultural
and environmental impacts of mining to request an apology from the mine company3'!
Moses described how, despite co-operating with the mine, the community had been
39 For instance, one resident stated in a public meeting: "I want some kind of an apology, I guess, from the
company becausetheydid--theydid their own activity without considering what the Arctic Bay
community wants. And, you know, they didn't even ask the community how they feel about their activity,
whether to, you know--Arctic Bay residents were concerned that--theywereanxiousforanapology.1
guess, and they all just leave the area without apologizing to us .. (Mucktar Akumalik in NWB 2004a.
100)
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detrimentally affected by it and called for the community of Arctic Bay to be
compensated:
For 28 years of the mine life, every Christmas we received small baskels orfrllits and
nevcropposed Nanisivikalthollgh duringtheirwork,theywoliidchangethelandscape.1
want the commllnity of Arctic Bay 10 get $2million as compensation for destroying the
area. The old and new owners should help the community of Arctic Bay by giving the
community $2million (Moses Akumalik in NWB 2002b, IS).
While some community members requested monetary compensation, others called for
compensation in the form of old furnishings and equipment from the Nanisivik townsite
or employment in future reclamation activities 40 In whatever form, these requests for an
apology embodied justice: justice for harming the land, justice for impacting hunting
activities, and justice for transfonning the Inuit way oflife. By exposing the
dispossession of land and resources, and the economic and cultural hardships experienced
by the residents of Arctic Bay during the development ofNanisivik, mine closure
hearings evidently represented a critical forum in which residents fought for justice.
The closure ofNanisivik was also an important time for the Government of
Nunavut to ensure that the voices of the community were heard and make sure that the
impacts of mining were properly dealt with. Whereas the Nanisivik mine established at a
time when the Canadian government fostered the northward expansion of capital and the
4°Forinstanee"aresidentstatedthathewantedlnllittobeintheeloslIreaetivities.Moreover.helCltthat
the eompany shollid provide some sort of gift to the eommlinityofAretie Bay.l-lesuggestedthata
reloeatedbuildingwollidbeagoodgeslure. This would be seen as an apology for breaking the land at
Nanisivik.·'Another"resident stated that he wOllld Iiketoseeequipmentand fllrnituregiventolnllit from
the mine site as there were persons who have never gained from the mine" (NWB 2004b, 3)
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state, Nanisivik closed in 2002 amid a tightening regulatory regime. Across Canada,
government departments now "temper their promotional mineral-related activities by
acknowledging the need to ensure adequate environmental protection measures are in
place and that attention is paid to the socioeconomic health of affected communities"
(McAllister 2007,86). Indeed, the newly formed Government of Nunavut was aware that
many companies had, in the past, abandoned northern mining projects without dealing
with the environmental impacts of these activities, and conscious that the livelihoods of
aboriginal northerners had been severely affected by changes to the environments on
which they depend (INAC 2002).
The 'Mine Site Reclamation Policy for Nunavut', introduced in 2002, was
important in regulating the reclamation ofNanisivik. With the creation of "the new
territory ofNunavut and, with it, the expectation that Inuit would become the managers of
their own destiny" the Mine Site Reclamation Policy for Nunavut attempted to empower
northern communities and provide "the Inuit a 'clean slate' to develop the kind of
resource management regime they want to take with them into the new millennium"
(INAC 2002, 2). Whereas in the past, the costs associated with environmental degradation
had been largely externalized by mine companies and paid by the government, the Mine
Site Reclamation Policy for Nunavut sought to "reduce the environmental liability that
falls to government to the greatest extent possible" by applying the "polluter pays
principle" (INAC 2002, 2). Through the use of security bond arrangements written into
water licenses, land leases and other regulatory instruments, this landmark policy made
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mine companies fully financially liable for the costs associated with reclamation (INAC
2002).
At Nanisivik this meant that a water license administered by the Nunavut Water
Board (NWB) set the terms of reclamation, and the Board assumed the primary
responsibility for regulating and enforcing reclamation efforts. The federal government,
already occupied with remediating other abandoned mines it had inherited, sought to
ensure that Nanisivik did not become another financial liability and a security bond was
established at the time ofNanisivik's closure to ensure that CanZinco paid the costs of
reclamation (INAC 2002; see also Duxbury 2002). Although the Strathcona A!:,'Teement
had stipulated that the mine company should undertake reclamation activities after
closure,4t the security bond arrangements put in place after the closure ofNanisivik
largely reflected the guidelines outlined in the Mine Site Reclamation Policy for Nunavut
(INAC 2002). As part of the security bond arrangements, CanZinco, the NWB, and other
intervening parties42 present at public hearings had to agree on the value of the bond,
based on the projected costs ofreclamation. Initially, Indian and Northern Affairs Canada
(INAC) suggested that reclamation would cost $27,536,028, while CanZinco's
consultants estimated reclamation would cost $9,224,608, a figure almost three-times
lower than that estimated by INAC (Breakwater 2002; CanZinco 2002). A proliferation of
41 i\spart of the Strathcona Agreement, the mine company at Nanisivik was required to provide a $500.000
bond to ensure compliance with the terms of the Agreement (Gibson 197R). At the time of Nanisivik's
closure, the water licence and security bond administered by the Nunavut Water Board was the primary
means by which the reclamationofNanisivik was regulated
42 Interveners included representatives from: CanZinco and Breakwater. the Nunavut Water Board (NWB).
the Department of Indian Affairs and Northel11 Development (OlAND, which later changed its name to
Indian and Northern Affairs Canada (INAC)). the Government ofNunavut (GN). the Department of
Fisheries and Oceans (01'0), Environment Canada (EC) and of course, the community of Arctic Bay.
studics undertaken by government scientists, and more frequently scientists, engincers
and technical consultants working for private environmental consulting firms, sought to
provide an authoritative basis for resolving the dispute over the cost of reclamation. These
studies examined the extent of soil contamination, tested the stability and impact of
tailings, contributed toward various Environmental Site Assessments and the Human
Health and Ecological Risk Assessment (HHERA), and measured the level of
contamination of the townsite infrastructure (CanZinco 2004). Ironically performing one
of the functions for which it was originally designed in the Strathcona Agreement, the
Nanisivik minescape became a space of scientific investigation: soil samples were
collected, water quality monitoring stations were established and various field projects
initiated.
For CanZinco, this scientific knowledge was important in determining the amount
of money the company would have to pay for reclamation. Consequently, both thc
government and CanZinco hired their own scientific experts to ensure that the knowledgc
produced was accurate and rigorous. In one study, the Government ofNunavut hired
consultants EBA Engineering to conduct a soil sampling program to dctermine the extent
of contamination at Nanisivik - research that cost over $49,000 (EBA Engineering 2003).
Because of the high costs involved in the event that the townsite had to be destroycd duc
to contamination, CanZinco also hired privately owned environmental consulting tirm
Lorax Environmental Services. Lorax observed the work of EBA, and representcd the
interests ofCanZinco by collecting duplicate samples following the same mcthodology as
EBA (Dillon 2003).
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The government and CanZinco alike claimed that using a variety of expcrtise
resulted in greater confidence in the success of closure and rcclamation activitics at
anisivik. For instance, a community newsletter, produced by thc WB to instill public
confidence in the closure process at anisivik, commented that:
Becauseoflhemulti-pal1yparticipalionandlhesignificanlamountofefTol1 cxpcndcd in
the HHERA [Human Health Ecological Risk Assessment] review process, concerncd
parties have become more confident that the information presented in the HI-IERA is
scientifically sound and protects the interesls of local persons andtheenvironmcnt
(Duxbury2003a, I)
In many cases, however, the various scientific studies produced an increasing numbcr of
disparate conclusions which, in turn, produced new problems rather than solving old
ones. The HHERA, for example, was in fact one of the most contested documents
precisely because of its multi-party paI1icipation. The HHERA was written by consultants
Jacques Whitford to infolln clean-up objectives, a requirement under the tellns and
conditions of the water liccnse. In order to complete the risk assessment Jacques Whitford
used soil metal data for copper, lead and zinc in samples collected by anisivik Mincs
Ltd during exploration activities in 1985 (Jacques Whitford 2003). However, many pccr
review comments critiqued this methodology, arguing that using background data after
mining had commenced did not measure natural levels of metals prior to mining in 1976
(Dillon 2003). Additionally, reviewers recognized that in the absence of cadmium
background data Jacques Whitford employed Ontario Typical Range values, decmcd
completely inappropriate for a High Arctic location (Dillon 2003). The Nunavut Watcr
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Board hired Dillon Consulting to specifically provide a resolution to thesc divergent and
conflictual comments and claims of various parties regarding the HHERA and "provide
recommcndation on the correct approach" (Dillon 2003, I). Throughout its report, Dillon
commented on the lack of methodological transparency and the use of incorrcct
methodologies, remarking that "it can, and should be a straight forward and transparent
process that can be easily followed by all reviewers" (Dillon 2003, I). In this example,
disputes over scientific methodology resulted in the need to hire third party scicntific and
technical consultants to adjudicate between correct approaches and generate an accurate
cost estimate for the security bond.
The depth of an engineered tailings cover was perhaps the most contentious issue
during Nanisivik's reclamation, and an issue that demonstrates how scientific knowlcdge-
making was central to determining the cost of reclamation at Nanisivik. The tailings at
Nanisivik were the material by-product from the extraction and transformation of orcs
into lead-zinc concentrates. Describing the generation of tailings waste, Bob Carreau
ti'om CanZinco stated that:
... tailingsarethel1laterialthatyoupullli·ol1ltheunderground.9o percent of that l1laterial
is considered waste, that there's no econol1lic value. When we pulled the rock oUI,about
a l1lillion tonnes a year frol1l thel1line, 90 percent of that rock would be waste. It would
have no econol1lic value. It's been ground up, that was our process, and our flotation
process used reagents, chel1licals to recover the saleable produci ,and the rest of the
l1laterial would go out to tailings. So tailings are the ground rock,ground like beach sand,
144
and it was deposited here for 26, 27 years. Almost 15 million tonnes of material were
deposited out here (Can'eau inNWB2009).
Within these tailings, Thiobacillus bacteria catalysed the transfoll11ation of reactive
sulphide minerals to generate acid minedrainage43 as part of an oxidation reaction. Even
long after mining, these tailings continued to produce acid mine drainage - describcd as
"poison water" by the community (NWB 2009) - that the community and govcrnmcnt
viewed as harmful to the surrounding environment. For instance Elder Leah Oqallak
commented in two public hearings that: "so snow bunting, little bird landed on the
tailings and it died right away, and it got -- I got scared that I saw the bird die, so that's
why it is my big concern" (NWB 2004a; sce also NWB 2002b).
As part of progressive reclamation efforts undertaken during Nanisivik's
operation, a field monitoring program from 1990 investigated how acid mine drainage
could be mitigated. Research conducted on behalfofNanisivik Mines indicated that
Thiobacillus bacteria catalysed the production of metals at a slower rate at lower
temperatures (Kalin 1987; Elberling and Kyhn 200 I; Elberling 200 I; Elberling 2005).
The field monitoring program sought to test the optimum conditions under which freeze-
up of the tailings would occur using "test cell" covers (BCG 2003). Shale covers were
constructed of varying levels of compaction and saturation, with thermocouples and frost
gauges used to monitor temperatures. It was hoped that constructing a cover over the
tailings at Nanisivik would thell11ally insulate the exposed tailings and promote freeze-up
43 Acid Mine Drainage (AMD), also known as Acid Rock Drainage (ARD), refers to the outflow of acidic
watcrcontaining high conccntrations of heavy mctals from miningwastesexposedtooxygcn(formore
dctailsee Elbcrlingand Kyhn2001; Elberling2001; Elberling2005)
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(CanZinco 2004). Once incorporated into the permafrost regime, these freezing
conditions would reduce oxygen diffusion to make contaminants inert, prcvcnting the
contamination of surface water (NWB 2002b; CanZinco 2004; BCG 2003). The cxtremc
Arctic climate thus offered a natural method by which acid mine drainage could be
prevented; in the words ofCanZinco, this "reclamation work [was] focused on utilising
the natural conditions to provide for the secure, long-term closure of the mine" (CanZinco
2004, page ix).
Data from this field monitoring program, in combination with other studies
conducted during the closure of the mine, were critical to informing the design of the
engineered design cover that would limit acid mine drainage. Data collectcd by CanZinco
indicated that 'test cell I', constructed from shale without compaction or saturation, had
an average thaw depth ofO.92m (BCG 2003; CanZinco 2004). To ensure that the tailings
would remain frozen even under worst-case climate wanning scenarios, geothermal
models predicted thaw of 1.0m in aoneyearperiod in the event ofanextremeweather
scenario (I in 100 year warm event) and thaw of 1.22m at the end of 100 years under a
global warming scenario (BCG 2003). Whereas worst-case climate scenarios predictcd by
the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) and the Panel on Energy
Research and Development (PERD) estimated warming ofJ.5°C to 4.5°C respectivcly,
CanZinco's modelling assumed a change of5.5°C as a contingency to mitigatc against
thaw (NWB 2002b; Nanisivik Mine 2002). Based on the test cover results and geothcrmClI
models, CanZinco asserted in its 2002 'Mine Closure and Reclamation Plan' that a 1.25m
covcr depth was sufficient, comprising 1.0m of shale and 0.25m of armour surfacing.
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Throughout the closure and rcclamation process, however, much dcbatc
surrounded the depth, and thus cost, of the engineered tailings cover proposed by
CanZinco. Some Arctic Bay residents asserted that the cover should have been 10m decp
at the dock area and 5m deep at the industrial site, areas (correctly) perceivcd as thc most
contaminated (NWB 2004b). Though the rationale behind these estimates is unclear fi'om
the archival record, public hearing transcripts reveal the community saw the tailings depth
as an important issue and asserted that the hamlet was disappointed by the lack of
infollllation they had received regarding the tailings. In one hearing, the Mayor of Arctic
Bay Joanasie Akumalik explained:
In the past we know that there was monitoring happening of the water and the tailings
pond and even the air. We have also been aware of tailings monitori ngdevicesthathave
not worked for long periods of time. We have not received the result sfromthese
activities. It is important that the local people in Arctic Bay become fullyinvolvedinthis
long term monitoring work and be trained to undertake thisactivity. It is important that
the local people trust the results of these activities (Hamlet of Arctic Bay Working Group
2002,2).
This quote suggests some residents felt excluded fi'om these scientific activities during
Nanisivik's closure, in similar ways that the community felt marginalizcd during the
mine's opening. To rectify this, some residents hoped that the community could observe
the reclamation work undertaken at Nanisivik. An elder commented that:
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There should be someone observing when you are burying thetailingsothattheycan
share their story and the information that they observe. Back in 19591 was working for
the Bay store. We used to hide things from the Manager before they came to the store so
that the Manager would know it was a good store. I want someone there to observe the
burying of tailings. If you tell me straight [it] will not contaminate the people and
environment, 1will believe I won't mind if you cover it. It is a concern without someone
telling me that it won't have impact on my life. I want someone to observe. There will be
work for Arctic Bay residents to work on the clean-up but when you are covering the
tailings I want someone too. I want to see the picture of the tailings on the side of it. I'm
serious here. People are serious here. We should ask all kinds of questions here (Leah
OqallakinNWB2002b,43)
Rigorous monitoring was important for many residents to trust that the impacts of mining
on their health and livelihoods had been offset44 As well, these recommendations
positioned community members as independent observers who could fill employment
positions during reclamation and confirm whether work was being conducted correctly
(NWB 2004b). One resident, for instance, "hoped that reclamation would take longer to
provide more training and employment opportunities for Arctic Bay residents" (NWB
2004b, 3). Indeed, there were hopes that the failure of the 60% Inuit employment target
44 As well as a feeling that local residents had been excluded from these reclamation activities, some
community members called for more scientific studies to be completed and highlighted the environmental
risks they faced. For instance, Tommy TataTuapik said: "As a resident of Arctic environment, I know that it
ispossible,eveninthewintertodrinkwaterfromunderground.lunderstandtheplanandlthinkitisa
good plan but the weather is always changing. The plan is risky. Water will continue to generate even when
it is frozen. Our land is run by nature. No one can control the freezing and thawing. Water will come from
below ground even when it is frozen" (Tommy TataTuapik in NWB 2002b. 7)
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set by the Strathcona Af,'Teement would provide the impetus for significant Inuit
employment during reclamation activities45 (Arctic Bay 2004).
While the cover depth issue was important for the health and well-being of the
residents of Arctic Bay, it was equally important for CanZinco in determining the amount
the security bond would total- a figure subject to dispute between CanZinco and the
Nunavut Water Board. On behalf of INAC, Brodie Consulting initially estimated that a
cover depth of 1.75m was required, based on the fact that one of the test cells had
experienced thawing to a depth of 1.59m (Brodie Consulting 2002). Brodie later
suggested that a 1.5 cover depth was required, still costing $1.25 million more than
CanZinco's 1.25m estimate (Nanisivik Mine 2002; NWB 2002a). These cover depth
estimations were of utmost importance to CanZinco, as they represented significant sums
of money needed to pay for the surface covering - at the very least $1.25 million was at
stake.
CanZinco asserted the legitimacy of its estimate by presenting its cover depth as a
'scientifically sound' estimate. CanZinco stressed that a depth of 1.25m was sufficient to
keep the tailings frozen by highlighting that the data input into the geothermal model was
45 Finding employment for community members was a eommon theme inpublicmeetingsaftertheclosurc
ofNanisivik. While the community, govertlment agencies and CanZinco sought to provide employment to
local people in remediation activities undertaken at Nanisivik, these efforts were unsuceessful. TheGN
initially developed three training packages: Heavy Equipment Operator (HEO), Heavy Equipmcnt
Mechanic (HEM) and Personnel and Financial Administrative Skills (Duxbury 2003c). Thc GN estimated
that this scheme would cost $1.4 million and suggested this could bepaidbymultiplegovcrtlmentagencics
and CanZinco. While CanZinco stated it would be easier, quicker and cheaper to hire an independent
contractor, CanZinco agreed that the extra costs could be shared among those who supported this training
approaeh(ibid.).lntheend,however,thegovertlmentagencieswere unable to raise sufficient capital. the
scheme fell through and contractors from the south were hired
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more conservative than the estimates used by world-renowned scientilic panels such as
the IPCC. Emphasizing the authority of scientific fact it deployed, CanZinco declared:
We have calculated with the warming effect, so that's calculated in there. Global
warming, as you mentioned,isaconcern,andsowehad,asl mentioned, included
modelling that takes the worst-case scenario that Environment Canada orfers you now
over the years, we include that in the mine. And like any engineering we do, that's the
best you can do, it has to be based on some scientific data, and that is based onso/l/ld
scientific data (emphasis added Bob Can-eau in NWB 2004a, 118).
As this quote suggests, the scientific method not only produced knowledge about the
environment, but this method in itself was presented (by non-scientific bodies such as
CanZinco) as an authoritative and reliable source for the production of knowledge.
Indeed, CanZinco heavily relied on arguments based in notions of scientific
expertise to validate its estimate and protest against the valuations made by Brodie
Consulting and the community. Throughout the closure and reclamation period at
Nanisivik, CanZinco had urged the intervening parties to use "good science to come up
with the best answers" (Bob Carreau quoted in NWB 2002b, 26). In public hearings
CanZinco introduced scientific and technical consultants as "independent and outside
professionals" (NWB 2002c, 3), neutral parties, external to the politics of reclamation and
without bias. This is not to say that one estimate was more accurate than another, but
rather CanZinco sought to present its rationale as 'scientifically sound' to legitimize its
estimate of the cost of the cover depth. For instance, CanZinco wrote in one letter to the
NWBthat:
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The intervening pm1ies who are saying 1.25misinsufticientarenotsupportingthiswith
any concrete information. They are sill1pljl and quitearhilrarily saying that thcy
inlllilivelyassumethat 1.25 metres is not enough, and more cover should be added Ifthc
intervening parties are able to take theirralionale for additional covcrage,at the very least
a lI1eaning/iil lechnical debate could ensue, and CanZinco is confident that it would
prevail. CanZinco is currently at a disadvantage, though, where it presents scientifically
defensible information and the only rebuttal is 'we want more' (el/lphasisadded
Nanisivik Mine 2002, 3)
In this quote non-scientific estimates are cast as arbitrary and intuitive, whereas scicntiflc
expertise is meaningful and rational. In this way, CanZinco often appealed to the notion
that "modern science established itselfasan institution specialized in the production of
knowledge about material reality, in which political and religious powers have no
legitimate competence" (Pellizzoni 2010, 469). CanZinco's deployment of'sound
scientific data' reflects Stephen Bocking's suggestion that those in industry are often
"enthusiastic promoters of scientific authority, appealing consistently to 'sound science'
as the only reliable basis for decisions" (Bocking 2004,23). Again, this is not to say that
the science behind each estimate was correct (or incoITect), but rather that this discoursc
inscribed science with the power to adjudicatc and validate competing claims over
reclamation, in such a way that at times delegitimized non-scientific estimates suggested
by the communi ty46 This illustrates how CanZinco-sponsored research not only produced
an economic valuation (of the cost of reclamation), but necessarily reproduced the
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authority of science: an explicit example of the way the closed Nanisivik mine was a site
for the co-production of valuations (of the cost of reclamation) and scientific knowledge
that legitimized these valuations.
After many meetings and much technical debate between the intervening parties,
it was agreed that a 1.25m cover depth would be appropriate, the security bond was
finally set at $17.6 million, and CanZinco's closure and reclamation plan was approved in
2004. It had become increasingly clear that the Nanisivik townsite and infi'astructure
would have to be demolished, as efforts to find alternate uses for the site were
unsuccessful and contamination proved a costly problem. Many buildings had exceeded
their life span and those still in useable condition required as much as $50 million over
four years for renovation47 (NWB 2004a). Though the townsite was demolished,
CanZinco sold the mill, concentrate storage facility, power generation installation,
conveyors and ship loading equipment to Wolfden Resources (owners ofa property in
Nunavut) who, in return, performed environmental clean-up on the area that the mill and
storage facilities were located48 (Young 2003). After reclamation was completed in 2008,
the security bond was reduced to $2 million to cover a five year post-closure monitoring
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period. CanZinco estimated in a 2009 public hearing that the company had spcnt $1 7
million, and Wolfden had spent $12 million on reclamation at the site (NWB 2009).
In sum, after the closure of the mine, Nanisivik became a landscape of data
production: scientific and technical consultants were hired from several external
engineering firms, and technological infrastructures were erected to mine data fi'om the
environment. The intervening parties appealed to scientitic expel1ise to help intorm how
the Nanisivik mine was going to be reclaimed after the mine closed. It was also important
to the government and community of Arctic Bay that these studies were rigorous and
properly dealt with the environmental legacies of mining at Nanisivik. These efforts not
only generated scientific knowledge about the environment at Nanisivik, but the
intervening parties cast this knowledge as being neutral, external, and unbiased - the most
reliable knowledge for determining the cost of reclamation. Efforts to legitimizc scientitic
knowledge concurrently legitimized valuations of the cost of reclamation. I view this as
an example of the 'on-going-ness' of production at Nanisivik, as the secming
unproductive and degraded minescape became the site of the (co-)production of
valuations, knowledge and science.
3.5 Conclusion
In one public hearing after the closure of the Nanisivik mine, some residcnts of
the nearby community of Arctic Bay delivered a eulogy-like commemoration to a
personitied Nanisivik:
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In some ways, it's sad for me because it was a town for a long time, and we were working
there, and we were friends with the people that I worked with, and Inuit from our
communities were there too. And when you, one of your family member dies, it looks
like you're losing some of your family members even thenon-Inui ttherewere--theytoo
were your friends ... It was emotional forme that I could still feelthelifeinthat building,
and I even said onetime that Iseemtobenot--likel rememberthepeoplethere,John
Ingiaqtuq and others that were there, and I remembered how they were, so it was
emotional for me (Mr. Oqituq in NWB 2009, 184).
The closure ofNanisivik was deemed a natural milestone in its lifespan. In the productive
phase, the mine extracted ores as well as economic value. Once the mine's operation
halted, it seemed, the mine had died. The mine was no longer productive. The ore deposit
was no longer valuable.
This paper has argued against the idea that a mine's Iifecycieisa linear production
process dictated solely by economic variables, using a vast collection of archival and
contemporary documents to describe two different ways in which the Nanisivik was co-
productive. First, this paper has argued that Nanisivik was designed to be co-productive
of capital and the state. Through a political reading of archival documents relating to
Nanisivik's establishment and operation, this paper has suggested that the mine was
developed as a pilot project that, in its very nature, sought to test the feasibility of
operating in the far nOl1h. The government's involvement largely followed a territorial
logic of power which sought to suppOl1 MRI's capitalist logic while reinforcing the
Canadian economy and strengthening the nation's presence and influence in the Arctic.
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Evidently, the mine was not designed to produce economically valuable ores alone, but
rather fulfilled objectives dictated by the Canadian government, that together, would
secure Canadian sovereignty in the north and produce an industrialized Inuit workforcc.
In this sense, the capitalist and territorial logics of power were intertwined and co-
productive of geopolitical-economic objectives.
This paper has also argued that the Nanisivik mine was a site wherc scientific
knowledge and valuations of the cost of reclamation were co-produced aftcr its c1osurc.
The community of Arctic Bay and the newly fonned Government ofNunavut sought to
ensure that the impacts of mining at Nanisivik were properly dealt with, by hiring 'third
party' scientific and technical consultants to adjudicate between different valuations of
the cost of reclamation. The independent, outside, authoritative and value-ti-ce charactcr
of this scientific knowledge occupied a unique position in its power to adjudicatc bctwccn
competing claims reclamation (cf. Bocking 2004; Sarewitz 2004; Horowitz 20 I0).
Supp0l1ing the notion that the distinction betwecn science and politics is blurred becausc
cach depends on the other to legitimise their claims (Pellizzoni 20 10; see also Bocking
2004; Jasanoff2006), Nanisivik demonstrates how scientific knowledge and cconomic
valuations of the environment were co-produced: efforts to legitimize the authority of
scientific knowledge on reclamation concurrently legitimized economic valuations of the
Nanisivik minescape. Far from an unproductive, valueless or useless space aner its
closure, the Nanisivik minescape continued to perfonn some ofthe functions for which it
was originally intended.
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Together, these two examples of the way the Nanisivik was co-productive
demonstrate that production is not just a linear process that generates valuable
commodities, but can fulfil political functions and generate non-economic products.
Through illustrating the ways in which the Nanisivik minescape was co-productive during
its operation and after its closure, this paper has asserted that production is complex,
multifaceted, and on-going - and often linked to the cultural, (geo)political and
environmental importance of sites in the Arctic. As an experimental prototype for future
resource development ventures in the Canadian Arctic, the story ofNanisivik provides
important insight into historical-geographical processes of capitalist production at this
pioneering site, and is suggestive of the possible geopolitical-economic motives and
environmental legacies of mining at similar sites in the Arctic currently undergoing
industrialization.
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CHAPTER 4
THESIS CONCLUSIONS
This study began as an attempt to understand what functions High Arctic mincs
performed and what they produced, both during their operation and aftcr their closure.
Using an array of primary archival documents, policy documents, corporate and
government reports, scientific and technical studies, interview transcripts and sccondary
literature, this thesis has n3lTated the stories of mining on Svalbard and Nanisivik to
ground different notions of 'production' using a historical geographic materialist
approach. At a time when the Arctic is increasingly becoming a region of signi ficant
economic, environmental, cultural and political change and contestation, the histories of
mine development at these two sites provide insight into the interlocking economic and
geopolitical functions mineral production at these mines fulfil.
Aside from narrating mine development at Svalbard and Nanisivik - sites which
are rarely discussed, ifnot completely absent from much literature in human gcography,
history and cognate fields - this thesis has also sought to contribute toward a broadcr
body of literature in political economy. This is important because the reports of an Arctic
mining 'boom' presented by the media (Waldie and Sopinski 2011; Nunatsiaq Ncws
2012; Postmedia News 2012), the conceptual models of mining lifecyclcs produccd in
some academic fields (Ashmann 1970; Davis 2009), the schemas of mine production uscd
by industry experts and government bodies (Richards 2009), and more broadly, some
grand theories of capitalist production (Harvey 2006; Smith 2008) frequently suggcst that
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production processes are primarily organized around a profit-motive, whilc ovcrlooking
the geopolitics of such production processes. These discourses do not always account lor
the ways geopolitical objectives intersect with the production of minerals, nor thc ways
other economic (and non-economic) activities may revalorize moribund mining
landscapes. Instead, operating costs, mineral prices, capital investment, ore quality and
technology all determine profitability - and a mine's lifecycle - according to thc schcmas
used by mine companies and government agencies. Dictated by economic laws,
unfeasible mining projects never begin and unprofitable mining projects soon end. We
must remember, however, that these schemas do work. They do work to juxtapose
productive landscapes against unproductive ones. They do work to position money as the
sole measure of value. And they do work to naturalise the termination of capitalist
production and make inevitable the dereliction of landscapes. The naturalisation of
mining lifecycles produces an apolitical economy of mineral extraction. More
fundamentally still, these schemas naturalise capitalism, and capitalism's agcncy in
producing value and ruination. Set within an increasing body of critical geo!:,'Taphical and
historical literature on mining, political economy, and resource geography, this thcsis has
attempted to challenge such apolitical representations by illuminating the (geo)politics
behind capitalist production processes.
As the last two chapters indicate, the Svalbard and Nanisivik mines not only
functioned as sites for the production of ores and economic value, but were also dcsigncd
to fulfil a variety of interconnected state objectives. As well, these two chaptcrs havc
illustrated that mine closure does not simply equate to the end of the productivity of
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mining landscapes, but instead other activities may devclop at these Arctic sites owing to
their geostrategic, environmental or economic impOl1ance. By means of conclusion this
final section synthesizes the key arguments made in each chapter, in relation to how these
minescapeswere functional and productive. Because I have already summarised the
arguments made in each chapter elsewhere in this thesis, this conclusion provides a
theoretical overview from the two sites. This conclusion is structured into two shOl1
sections. The first concluding section summarises how Svalbard and Nanisivik were eo-
productive of capital and the state according to geopolitical-economic objectives, and the
second concluding section posits that these two mines continued to be productive (and co-
productive) after their closure.
4.1 The Geopolitical Economy: Svalbard and Nanisivik as Sites of the
Co-production of Capital and the State
The last two chapters have suggested that the production of minerals at Svalbard
and anisivik was not driven by a profit-motive alone, but mine development and mineral
production has been driven by interlocking economic, political and geopolitical objectives
at each site. This thesis proposes that the Svalbard and anisivik mines functioned as
sites of co-production: they not only generated valuable commodities, but the mines were
themselves the products of capital's requirements and state policies. As stated in the
introduction to this thesis, some geographic literature demonstrates that production
involves generating a range of material and discursive, economic and non-economic
things - and I have suggested that capitalist production can be better thought of as a co-
productive process. Building on this idea, the evidence outlined below suggests how
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Svalbard and Nanisivik functioned as sites for the co-production of capital and the state in
accordance with interlocking geopolitical-economic objectives.
Though the mines at Svalbard and Nanisivik generated commodities circulated in
the capitalist market that have been sold in exchange for money, the profitability of the
minerals produced at these two sites was questionable or a secondary concern for the
respective governments involved. Mining at Nanisivik was supported by the Canadian
government in the form of grants and loans despite the dubious feasibility of the mine -
demonstrating the willingness of the Canadian government to finance a potentially
unprofitable operation (though the mine was profitable in reality). And at Svalbard, Store
Norske has operated since 1916 yet only recently started to generate a substantial return.
The Norwegian government increased its share in Store Norske to subsidize this
unprofitable operation and keep the company afloat. Mining may never have begun at
Nanisivik and Store Norske's mines may have closed long ago without significant
financial support from the respective governments involved.
Various archival and contemporary documents show that state support ofthcse
mines by the respective Norwegian and Canadian governments was !,'Tanted on the basis
that these mines would achieve numerous political objectives. At Nanisivik, the vcry
concept of establishing a mine in Canada's far n0l1h was informed by government
objectives from the offset. Though the feasibility of the venture was questionable, the
Nanisivik mine was seen by the Canadian government as a project that would
industrialize n0l1hern Baffin Island, and in doing so, provide employment opportunities
for many nOl1hern indigenous residents, pioneer new operating techniques in the Arctic,
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and secure Canadian sovereignty in the north. Indeed, the Canadian government invested
in the development of a townsite at Nanisivik based on these objectives, and government
officials worked closely with the mine to ensure that these objectives were fulfilled
through implementing the Strathcona Agreement. At Svalbard, early mining undertaken
by many nations opp0l1unistically exploited the most feasible and easily accessible coal
seams. However, Norwegian mining after 1920 largely intended to consolidate the newly-
formed Norwegian state through providing a stable source of coal within Norwegian
territory at a time of international political conflict (particularly during the Cold War)
Though Norway's motivations for sustaining coal mining on Svalbard have changed over
time, maintaining Norwegian sovereignty over Svalbard remains one of the most
important reasons for the continued production of coal by Store Norske. Together, state
ownership of Store Norske and recent 'noI1l1alisation' efforts to develop Longyearbyen as
a permanent family town, have been used to ensure that a Norwegian presence on
Svalbard is maintained. Clearly, these two sites were never designed to be only
productive of ores, but in reality functioned as sites co-productive of capital and the state.
By investigating the co-production of capital and the state at Svalbard and
Nanisivik, several interesting theoretical insights regarding the geopolitical economy of
these sites can be made. First, the products generated from mining at Svalbard and
Nanisivik were not solely produced according to a capitalist logic of power, but were
informed by a territorial logic of power as well. As already suggested in the thesis
introduction, the very function of capitalist production is to generate useful commodities
which can be sold in exchange for a profit. However both Svalbard and Nanisivik
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demonstrate how this capitalist logic of power was not the sole imperative behind thesc
projects, butin fact production was a (geo)political process that was financed, and at
times organized, according to a territorial logic of power. At Svalbard, for instancc, the
production of coal not only generated a commodity and economic value, but the very
physical act of extracting coal from the gTOund by a Norwegian-owned mine company
exercised and actualized Norwegian sovereignty over Svalbard. Interview participants
and corporate reports shared the sentiment that mining on Svalbard was productive in
maintaining sovereignty, and that sovereignty was more important than profitability-
demonstrating how profitability is not synonymous with productivity. Mining at
Nanisivik not only produced lead-zinc concentrates, but co-produced the Canadian state
through using Canadian ships and materials, and building a townsite that would help
secure Canadian sovereignty in the north. Together, these two sites suggest how
production does not fulfil economic functions alone in the capitalist systcm, but
demonstrate how the interrelated economic imperatives and geopolitical objectives that
drive production processes are closely intertwined and, at times, mutually constitutive.
Second, the Nanisivik and Svalbard minescapes are the material product of state
investment and government objectives. In subscribing to the notion that landscapes are
both produced and productive, this thesis has shown how the produced landscapes at
these mine sites - their mining infrastructures, townsites, and the like - not only
functioned as the means of the production of ores, but were themselves the material
products of government investment and state objectives. Governmcnt financial support
was provided at both sites on the basis that mining would help fulfil state objectives, and
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it was important for both the Norwegian and (to some extent) the Canadian govcrnmcnt
that permanent mining settlements were developed at both sites. In this sense, state
financial support did not just economically subsidize these ventures, but state support can
be seen as an investment in geopolitical interests whereby the return on this investment
was the continued (or enhanced) ability to assert sovereignty and fulfil particular political
goals at these sites. So, the produced minescape at each site was not only productive of
ores, but co-productive in the sense that it reproduced state territory and functioned as
means of materializing interlocking geopolitical-economic objectives.
Clearly, commercial and political interests in mining at these sites have been
closely tied, and the entanglement of these logics makes the very concept of 'production'
as an economic process ambiguous. At these sites, the capitalist and tcrritorial logics of
power are important in explaining the state's role in assisting capitalist accumulation,
while illustrating how these capitalist ventures themselves (re)produced state territory. In
recognising that territorial and capitalist logics of power are blurred, the idiom of co-
production captures the mutually constitutive and intertwining geopolitical-economic
motives operating at Svalbard and Nanisivik. In line with literatures that demonstrate how
production does not only generate economically valuable commodities but also produces
nature, landscapes, states and the like, both Svalbard and Nanisivik reveal the importance
of government material and ideological support in developing and sustaining mines at
these High Arctic locations, and illuminate the close, and often inseparable connections
between the co-production of capital and territory, and their respective logics. The idea
that the historical development and operation of these two mincs represents a co-
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production of capital and the state may be useful for describing the geopolitical economy
of other similar resource developments in the Arctic characterized by interlocking
political and economic motives.
4.2 The On-going-ness of Production at Svalbard and Nanisivik after Closure
Much of the geographical literature reviewed in the introduction of this thesis
suggested that capitalist production processes, and especially mineral production, are
inherently unstable, ifnot outright contradictory. The boom-bust economies that
characterize the exploitation offinite resources are often paliicularly precarious in
peripheral regions where operating costs are high and opportunities for economic
diversification limited. High risk, capital intensive projects in the Arctic, including the
ventures at Svalbard and Nanisivik, are especially susceptible to global commodity price
fluctuations as well as high costs resulting from their geographic location. Rather than
conceiving mining as a linear process that will inevitably lead to closure, the last two
chapters suggest that scientific activity has re-valued the closed Nanisivik minescape and
revalorized some of the Norwegian mining settlements on Svalbard. This thesis proposes
that both sites demonstrate how production is on-going - especially when we view
production not as a process that only generates valuable commodities but as a process that
co-produces other non-economic things such as scientific knowledge and state territory.
Though some mining still continues on Svalbard, the development of scientific
research institutions and infrastructures from 1989 onwards has revalorized Svalbard's
minescapes. This scientization of Svalbard's minescapes was prompted not only by
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Norway's research agenda for the Arctic, but in response to an active cffort to kcep
Norwegian settlements on Svalbard 'productive' should mining on Svalbard ceasc.
Research institutions such as the Kings Bay Company and UNIS have developed using
existing mining infrastructures, and complement effOlis to diversify the Norwegian
economy on Svalbard. Like Store Norske, the Kings Bay Company and UNIS are owncd
by the Norwegian government, and 'state ownership' policy documents rcvcal how these
institutions are intended to help maintain the Norwegian control ofresourccs on Svnlbard
and infonn the future exploitation of resources in the Arctic. Through fulfilling various
(interrelated) scientific, economic and geopolitical objectives, this scientific activity
extends the geopolitical-economic functions performed by mining on Svalbard. The
scientization of Svalbard's minescapes illuminates how the devaluation ofSvalbnrd's
minescapes is not an inevitable process, but instead the existence of physical mining
infrastructures and persistence ofgeopoliticnlmotives permitted the revalorization
Svalbard's minescapes for scientific use.
During effOlis to offset community experiences of mining at Nanisivik, many
technical and scientific experts were hired by various government departments and the
mine company CanZinco to infol111 how the mine was going to be reclnimed and at whnt
cost. Owing to the high cost of reclamation, however, these valuations were subjcct to
dispute between the government and the mine company, and each presented scicntific
evidence to substantiate their own valuations of the cost of reclamation. Efforts to
legitimize the cost of reclamation concurrently legitimized the scientific knowledgc
mobilized by the different intervening parties at Nanisivik. Rather than deploying thc
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idiom of co-production to capture the connections between capital and the state, co-
production has been mobilized in a second way to describe the mutual constitution of
scientific knowledge and valuations (of the cost of reclamation), and to demonstratc how
Nanisivik continued to function as a site of production after its closure.
Though these examples of the way scientific activity has manifest at each site arc
very different, both Svalbard and Nanisivik demonstrate how production can be vicwed
as an on-going process. By understanding production as generative of economic and non-
economic things, scientific activity can be thought of as a process co-productive of
knowledge, political objectives, state territory, capital and the like. At sites where
scientific activity has developed in response to the environmental or geopolitical legacies
of mining, or as a result of the special economic, geographical and environmental
character of sites in the Arctic, this scientific activity often fulfils similar (or connected)
objectives as mining, and questions notions of 'post-productivity' after mine c1osurc.
Together, these various examples of co-production at Svalbard and Nanisivik
suggest how production is not one single, linear process, but rather production is a
complex and multifaceted process. This thesis concludes that the Svalbard and Nanisivik
mines were not simply economic projects intended to produce ores and value, but werc
co-productive ventures in the sense that thcy reproduced state territory and fulfilled
political, geopolitical or geostrategic objectives. The findings of this thesis also indicate
that mineral extractive industries do not always operate on a linear timelinc characterised
by an operational phase followed by a closure phase. Rather, the geographical,
geostrategic and environmental importance of these Arctic sites dictates the value, use
175
and lifespan of its minescapes. Clearly, understanding the political economy of
production should not only focus on the economic dimensions of mining at thesc sites,
but adopt a political reading that pays attention to various other objectives bchind
production processes. As such, I propose that scholars in geography, history and cognate
fields should view production as a political, geographically-particular process by
considering what political functions production fulfils in relation to the gcopolitical,
economic and environmental valueofa specific site.
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APPENDIX
-
UNIVERSITY
Appendix I: Consent Form Sample
Research project: "extracting and manufacturing value
from abandoned High Arctic minescapes"
Researcher: Scott Midgley, Department of Geography,
Memorial University of Newfoundland
Introduction to the study
This research focuses on the economic and environmental legacies of mining in the Arctic. This
research seeks to understand both the positive and negative impacts of mining in the Arctic,
from the perspective of policy-makers, government officials, researchers, mine companies,
remediation companies and environmental consultants.
Ifeelthatyoumaybeabletoprovideinterestinginsightsintothis topic given your professional
capacity. I invite you to participate ina semi-structured interview in which I will ask you about
the positive and negative impacts of mining, related to your expertise, experience and
knowledge.
This form is part of the process of informed consent. It should give you the basic idea of what
the research is about and what your participation will involve. If you would like more detail
about something mentioned here, or information not included here, you should feel free to ask.
Please take the time to read this carefully and to understand anyotherinformationgiventoyou
by the researcher. It is entirely up to you to decide whether to takepartinthisresearch.lfyou
choose not to take part in the research or if you decide to withdraw from the research once it
hasstarted,therewill be no negativeconsequencesforyou,noworin the future.
Duration of the study and method used
I will carry out the interview at a time and location convenient to you. The interview will not last
longer than 60 minutes. To help accurately represent your views I would like to tape record the
interview. After your interview you will be able to review the transcript of your interview, and to
add,change,ordeleteinformationfromthetranscriptsasyouseefit
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Protection of personal information and general interview guidelines
• The information obtained from the interview will be used strictly for this research.
• Interviewees can ask for the recording device to be turned off at any time and can have
recorded statements removed from the recording.
• Informationofa private nature will not be sought during the interview process and will
not be published.
• Interview data files and transcripts will not be distributed, sold or disseminated inany
way, though selected quotes may be used ina published essay or book,withpermission.
• Interview subjects will have the right to view and comment on this material prior to
publication.
• Interview subjects may consent to allow their names to be used in a publication or may
choose to remain anonymous. Interviewees that choose to remain anonymous will be
identified generically or through a pseudonym, and other personal identifiers (such as
gender) will be avoided.
Duration of the conservation of personal information
Interview transcripts and audio files will be securely stored by the researcher for a minimum of
five (5) and maximum often (10) years before being destroyed by deleting the electronic files
and shredding any paper material that contains primary data (interview transcripts, field
notebooks,etc.).
Right to refuse or withdraw
The participant will be able to withdraw from the research project at any time, without having to
give a reason and will not suffer any kind of prejudice fordoing so.
Consent statement
I (name in block letters) freely
consent to participate in the following aspects of the research project (check appropriate boxes):
~conductofanindividualinterviewidentification of informant in publications or reportsdigital recording and secure storage of the interviewtranscription, printing and secure storage of the interviewuse of interview material for research and publication purposes(related to the topic of the study as indicated above only)
Signature ofparticipant _
Signatureofresearcher _
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Date:
Date:
The proposal for this research has been reviewed by the InterdisciplinaryCommitteeonEthicsin
Human Research and found to be in compliance with Memorial University's ethics policy. If you
have ethical concerns about the research (such as the way you have been treated or your rights
as a participant), you may contact the Chairperson of the ICEHR at icehr@mun.ca or by
telephone at 709-864-8368
If you have any concerns, please contact Scott Midgley or his supervisor(seecontactinfobelow)
who will do their best to answer your questions. If you have ethical concerns about the
research, you may contact the Chairperson of the ICEHR at icehr@mun.caorbytelephone at
(709)864-2861.
Scott Midgley (principal researcher)
Department of Geography
Memorial University
St.John's, NL
AlB3X9
E-mail:scott.midgley@mun.ca
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Dr. Arn Keeling (supervisor)
Department of Geography
Memorial University of
Newfoundland
St.John's, Newfoundland,AlB 3X9
e-mail:akeeling@mun.ca
Appendix II: Sample Interview Questions
Read and explain consent form
Thank you/or par/icipa/ing in /his in/erviel1'. I am a s/uden/ s/udving Geography at
Memorial Universi/y ofNew/oundland. in Canada. and I am doing a projec/ ahou/
mining in /he Arctic. This projec/ seeks /0 unders/and bo/h the posi/ive and negatil·e
impac/s ofmining in /he Arc/ic.Fom/he perspec/ive a/policy-makers. government
officials. researchers. mine companies. remedia/ion companies and environmen/al
consul/an/s.
I am going /0 ask you a series o/ques/ions. Please anSH'er /he ques/ions lI'ith as lIIuch
de/ail as possible. Please answer /he ques/ionsfi"Oln /he perspec/ive o(vourjoh posi/ion
Il'i/hin /he ins/i/u/ion you represen/- /his is velY illlpor/ani. I{you do no/fii/ly unders/and
a ques/ion. I will he happy /0 explain /he ques/ion in more de/ail. I/you do no/ knoll' /he
answer /0 a ques/ion. Ie/ me know and we will move on /0 /he next question. And
remember. you are/i'ee to end the interview at any time. askfiJr the tape-recorder to he
turned-ofr: and/i'ee to request that an answer is not used in the research, Do you hal'e
any questions?
Wal'm-up questions:
I. To begin, can you explain your job role and area of expertise?
Questions on mining
2. The focus of my project is to look at the impacts of mine closure in the Arctic.
What are the environmental impacts of mine closure on Svalhard?
3. The Russian and orwegian mine companies are owned by their respcctivc
governments. What measures do these companics takc to minimise the
environmental impacts of mining on Svalbard?
4. What is the role of the Norwegian govell1ment and Govcrnor of Svalbard in
regulating the cnvironmental impacts of mine closure?
5. Have the closed mincs on Svalbard been rcmcdiatcd?
a. Whopaysthccostsofremediation?
b. Are external consulting, research or remediation companies employcd?
6. What are the economic advantages and disadvantages of mining on Svalbard?
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7. Does mining in Svalbard have a secure future? Is there a strategy in place for
developing a post-mining economy at sites across Svalbard?
8. In my project, I am particularly interested in the impacts of mining at Pyramidcn.
How successful was mining at Pyramiden? Why did the mine at Pyramiden close?
a. What are the environmental impacts of mining at Pyramiden?
b. How are the environmental impacts at Pyramiden being managed?
c. Is Pyramiden being remediated? By whom? At what cost?
d. Have any scientific studies regarding the environmental impacts of mining
been undertaken at Pyramiden?
e. Are there plans for developing new economic activities at Pyramiden?
f. How important is preserving the mining ghost town image of Pyramiden
compared with developing new economic ventures there?
9. In my project, I am also interested in the impacts of mining at Longyearbycn.
What are the economics advantages and disadvantages of mining at
Longyearbyen?
a. What are the environmental impacts of mining at Longyearbyen and the
surrounding area?
b. How are the environmental impacts being managed?
c. Has the environment around Longyearbyen being remediated? By whom? At
what cost?
d. Have any scientific studies regarding the environmental impacts ofmining
been undertaken around Longyearbyen?
e. As mining has declined around Longyearbyen, tourism and science are
becoming increasingly important to the economy at Longyearbyen. Do you
think this is true?
10. The Arctic is becoming increasingly important as a resource base, causing
sovereignty disputes between Arctic nations. Is mining a political project for
Norway and Russia to assert sovereignty over Svalbard/ the Arctic? Is sovereignty
more important than making profits?
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Questions on environmental management and conservation
Mining in the Arctic can be damaging to the Arctic environment.
II. How is the Arctic environment being preserved through regulation on Svalbard,
and how successful is it?
12. Why is the environment being preserved on Svalbard?
13. Is environmental preservation more important than successful mining activity on
Svalbard?
14. Are there any economic benefits or costs to environmental preservation?
15. Some people suggest that mining on Svalbard was politically strategic. Do you
think that environmental preservation is used by Norway or Russia in politically
strategic ways? How?
Questions on cultural heritage
On Svalbard, much of the remains of past mining activity are classed as cultural heritage.
16. Why is cultural heritage preserved on Svalbard?
17. Are there any advantages and disadvantages of preserving cultural heritage?
18. Why is it impOliant to remember past mining activity to the culture and history of
Svalbard?
19. Is much money invested in the preservation of cultural heritage?
20. Some people suggest that mining on Svalbard was politically strategic. Do you
think that cultural heritage is used by Norway or Russia in politically strategic
ways? How?
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Questions on scientific research
As mining activities on Svalbard have slowed down or stoppcd in some areas, ncw
activities are being undertaken. For example, U IS has been established and science in
general is increasingly imp0l1ant to the economy on Svalbard.
21. Why was U IS established? How important was the decline in mining activity to
the decision to establish UNIS?
22. How important is U IS and science in general to the economy on Svalbard? Who
economically benefits from science? Who funds U IS?
23. Does science infoll11 mining operation policy and rcclamation policy/
environmental policy/ cultural heritage policy?
24. Some people suggest that mining on Svalbard was politically strategic. Do you
think that the establishment of UN IS was politically strategic? Do you think that
science is used by Norway or Russia in politically strategic ways? How?
Interview wind-down
COnfill11 contact details
Other documents available?
77wnk you/or participating in this interviell'. lll'i// sendyoll an electronic copy o!"the
consent/arm in an email.
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